On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to >> how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to >> contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena >> (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are >> different levels of same thing". >> > > I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, > molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing. > > > Hi Craig, > > I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and > one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and > discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and > deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, > and bodies". >
I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes. > > >> >> Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to >> be what we refer to as COMP. >> > > COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false. > > > I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way. > What seems true about COMP? > > Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause. > > > I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an > "externalization" of sense. > I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant. > We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing > outside of 1p. > There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p. > It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be > problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss > sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or > the terms we use and cannot be. > I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we say can remind us of what we experience first hand. > > COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation. > > > Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical > truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that > they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the > inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles > heel. > Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics? Craig > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/KBOBFAmnTEgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
