On 10/16/2012 10:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any
sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that
atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels
of the same thing.
Hi Craig,
I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic
and one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into
mereology and discuss different types of organization such that we
have a broader and deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms,
molecules, cells, organs, and bodies".
I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we
can say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a
qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age
is because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The
deeper structure is a distraction, takes us further into the
impersonal 3p view, which tries to reconcile all views of all other
views rather than the significant themes that allow us to make sense
of it in the first place. To do big picture, I think it has to be
broad strokes.
Hi Craig,
But we sacrifice detail that matters for those broad strokes...
Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does
not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.
COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.
I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet
narrow, way.
What seems true about COMP?
The argument as Bruno presents it.
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.
I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an
"externalization" of sense.
I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.
Good!
We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while
pointing outside of 1p.
There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
I agree, but consider what happens in the limit of the totality.
Distinguishability itself vanishes and with it 1p. The totality of what
exists, the necessarily possible, does not have a single consistent 1p,
it has all possible 1p's simultaneously.
It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood
to be problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure
we can discuss sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that
it is not the symbols or the terms we use and cannot be.
I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection
and translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the
things we say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
OK, but we can tease detail from this!
COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of
mathematical truths, with the small exception that numbers can
alone "do the work" that they are required to do. After all, comp
only works in Platonia! It is the inability of comp to solve the
arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles heel.
Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism
supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are
internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical
universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is
there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math
remains to be seen.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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