On 1/4/2013 6:23 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:48 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
On 1/4/2013 8:31 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Hi Richard,
I will take a look, but I confess to being a bit skeptical of any
substantist theory... How can substances communicate with each other
representationally?
Sorry but I do not understand what this last sentence means. BECs
certainly can copy each others configurations.
Hi Richard,
This ability to "copy each others configuration" , does it give us some
thing like "representability"? What does "representability" mean to you?
Well in the Consciousness Canonizer my string consciousness model is
listed or categorized under "Representational Qualia Theory" but I do
not really have an appreciation for what that means
The Stanford Encyl has an article on Representational Theories of
Consciousness which says that intentionality is representation???
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/
That defines a word in terms of another word that I do not understand-
a problem I often have on this list. However further into the article
is a clarifying sentence:
" Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or
mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they
entail or imply other beliefs; they are (it seems) composed of
concepts and depend for their truth on a match between their internal
structures and the way the world is; and so it is natural to regard
their aboutness as a matter of mental referring or designation. "
So I conclude that this is quite different issue from one BEC copying
what exists in another BEC.
Hi Richard,
Yes. Copying states and representing states are not the same thing.
Representionality is closer to IMO Godelian incompleteness or
Marchal's CTM wherein beliefs and truth, etc. can be represented. I do
not know how.
Representations are "about" things, they are not themselves things
in the physical sense and yet physical processes can act as media on
which representations can be rendered. Representations are strange in
that they can be about other representations, even themselves. It is
this property, more than any other, that distinguished minds from bodies.
But my conjecture is that whatever representations exist in the CTM
BEC of string theory can be copied into the BEC of (human brain)
physical consciousness, and vice versa. This is essentially a
mind/body duality.
Richard
yes, this does straight to the mind-body problem. I am proposing a
solution to it that is different from Bruno's (and can subsume Bruno's
idea), it is dual aspect monism. Minds and bodies are two distinct
aspects of one and the same neutral oneness of all that exists. Vaughan
Pratt explains this in his paper: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf
--
Onward!
Stephen
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