On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 04:53:57PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 9:12 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> > wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 05:22:53AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 1:18 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 04:47:08PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > It is implied by Russell's statement "materialism is perfectly > > compatible > > > > > with comp", which I still don't see. "Organized in certain ways" > > denotes > > > > > function of some sort, so one appears to need platonia, > > machines/notion > > > > of > > > > > function with Russell's version of "comp"... while consciousness > > > > supervenes > > > > > on matter is pulled out of the hat, which I would like explained as > > we > > > > seem > > > > > to have left the comp frame Russell is asserting we are still in. > > > > > > > > Materialism just means consciousness supervenes on matter. This is > > > > Chalmers' definition, and is how I use the word. We've been over this > > > > many times - the UDA does not rule out physical supervenience. If it > > > > did, it would be so much the worse for COMP. > > > > > > > > What the UDA does rule out is physicalism, the notion that the physical > > > > reality is all there is. > > > > > > > > Bruno's "primitive matter" is just physicalism. Some people seem to > > > > conflate materialism with physicalism - Michael Lockwood is one, for > > > > instance, but I'd prefer to distinguish them like Chalmers does. > > > > > > > > The MGA does drive a contradictio between physical supervenience and > > > > COMP, but the point of my paper which started this thread is that the > > > > MGA only works in a non-robust universe. Thus COMP is perfectly > > > > compatible with materialism in a robust universe. > > > > > > > > > > Where you still require the complete integral realization of the UD, > > robust > > > time and space in causal/historical relations, that each have to be > > > accounted for and explained themselves: stating "physical quantum > > computer > > > multiverse" doesn't clarify the extravagant, as Bruno put it, weirdness > > of > > > "flipping the switch" consciousness relation to matter. > > > > > > To be short: the physical realization part of computation for > > > counterfactual correctness of diverging branch is the baroque thing that > > > bothers me. I don't see the need or what is gained/clarified as such. PGC > > > > > > > In every robust universe, all counterfactual realities are realised by > > the universal dovetailer. You don't get a choice about it being > > needed, nor does it matter in slightest what it clarifies. > > > > > Lol, but I do: this model seems too baroque. The relation between matter > and consciousness becomes fuzzy, in a fashion that what MGA points towards > avoids. It is therefore not my choice, which has less to do with its author > selling too hard, even though I have complemented his effort behind the > paper in the past on this list, but more to do with taste: it is not my cup > of tea though it may be yours. Too fancy and unclear. I don't see the > relevance of quantum aspect and how this relates to changing the funky > relation between consciousness and "physical quantum computer matter", > whatever that is. Seems to be platonically malleable urstuff, at least to a > certain extent. PGC >
Well done for being obtuse! The platonically malleable urstuff is usually taken to be integer arithmetic, although any system capable of universal computation will do, such as Bruno's combinators example. But conscious does not supervene on that, for the reasons given in my paper, but rather on sheaves of computations that make it up, by assumption of COMP. It also must supervene on the emergent phenomenal physics that arises. That is a raw empirical fact that no pussy-footing around can eliminate. The MGA demonstrates the fundamental contradiction between COMP and physical supervenience in a non-robust universe, consequently the only way to save COMP is for the universe to be robust. You may think robust universes are baroque, but I don't. Infinite, symmetrical ensembles of universes are simpler from an information theoretic perspective than specific finite instances. This is ultimately the strongest argument in favour of platonism. But there is a sense that nature doesn't have to play by our rules. Maybe we really do live in a non-robust universe. If so, we cannot have our COMP and eat it. As an aside, this week I had the pleasure of attending a seminar titled "Does infinity exist?" that took the form of a debate between Norman Wildberger arguing the no case and James Franklin arguing the yes case. Norm was essentially arguing for a form of ultrafinitism, or non-robust universe in our terminology, and James for the conventional neoplatonist status quo. The debate really boiled down to a modern version of Aristotle versus Plato. Not only was the seminar room packed (first time I've seen that), it was not even standing room only. People spilled out into the corridor, and late comers had to make do with a glimpse through the seminar doorway. I don't see any real winners here, but in the debate, Norm probably won on eloquence. Cheers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
