On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 3:39 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 04:56:39PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 10:14 AM, Russell Standish < > li...@hpcoders.com.au> Sufficiency is a loaded term. It is better to stick with supervenience. > > > is shown in the MGA reasoning to be useless and can be cut out with > occam. > > This sort of usage of language on your part has and is confusing me. > > > > The MGA only works for non-robust universes. As soon as the universe > is robust, all counterfactuals are in fact physically realised, and > physical > supervenience becomes equivalent to computation supervenience, with > respect to the MGA at least. > > > > > > > ie assuming non-robustness (which IMHO is virtually equivalent to > > > assuming ultrafinitism - like Norm Wildberger's position). > > > > > > > Please elaborate why non-robustness assumes ultrafinitism. I don't think > > this holds. > > > > If all the integers (and their arithmetical properties) exist, then we > have a robust universe. Isn't this a bit quick? ISTM a robust physical universe, whatever that may be primitively, is only used in UDA to justify initial UD's running. But it's hypothetical existence finally eliminates, under digital mechanism, the possibility of utilizing primitively physical universe hypothesis to justify knowledge of physics, beliefs etc. Even if we suppose the real, actual universe to be non-digital in nature, then this changes nothing within comp, where our virtual reconstitutions are digital by definition. So I don't see: robust universe => all integers exist > The UD exists and "runs to completion". > > For this not to be the case, there must be some integers that can > never be realised. Whilst one can think of bizarre cases such as prime > numbers stop existing after 10^10^10^10^10^10^10, but all other > numbers remain existing, the most believable scenario for reality to > be non-robust is that there is some maximum integer (even if we can > never know what it is). > That doesn't change what I don't see, but noble try nonetheless. > > > > > > > > > gives you convincing leverage > > > > concerning consciousness relating to experiential outcome of some A/B > > > > experiment, as the relation of selection is invariant for delays and > > > > locations of reconstitution. > > > > > > > > > > It demonstrates an inconsistency between physical supervenience and > > > computational supervenience, notably that physical supervenience > > > entails that certain very simple computations, such as the replaying > > > of a recording, will be conscious. > > > > > > This only works in a non-robust universe, however, a point that is > > > often overlooked in treatments of this. > > > > > > > I don't think we gain anything (measure problem/hunting down rabbits) by > > stating robust universe is some large mathematical structure that appears > > to be physics; that's already assumed in the original work. And stating > it > > again and again makes more likely confusions of this sort. PGCC > > > > It was Bruno who introduced this term, and I believe it was largely in > response to Peter Jones's criticism, as it doesn't appear in the > presentation in the Lille thesis. Bruno's position is that the MGA is > only required for the non-robust case. For many years, I left it at > that, for being a good little platonist, I could never conceive of > reality not being robust. But wouldn't this be a bad little platonist? > Plus I could never get the MGA, until I > realised that it could be made to work, provided you negated the many > worlds interpretation, and assumed some preferred classical > reality. That is the core of my paper's critique. I don't know whether > Bruno ultimately accepted that criticism, but he did manage to > convince me that the many worlds is already robust, and so does not > present a problem for his argument. > > As for gain - yes we gain something: the understanding of what the MGA > actually implies. True, it doesn't address the measure issue - that is > different line of research, to which appendix A is a > contribution. Whether appendix A belongs in that paper is another > question, of course, but I guess I was thinking of maybe commenting on > Jean de la Haye's critique of Bruno's work. > Last I checked I didn't think that it (the "critique"; not your comments on it, which I haven't read) was worth effort/time. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
