On 01 Oct 2014, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 3:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 01 Oct 2014, at 12:35, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-10-01 9:09 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>:
On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a
computer, a type information processing machine, and it
postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't
have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter.
> Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in
his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post,
Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more
"physical" but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and
computations are too.
So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money
to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make
computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really
do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe
they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get
the job done here on planet Earth.
> You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless
you are interested in the implementation of computer in some
physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this
means. But this does not mean that physics is primary.
As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where
nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next,
Protein folding?
He uses anyway a bad example,
We can agree on this.
Indeed.
NP-hard problem are computable...
Yes.
they just take exponential time to solve.
Assuming that P ≠ NP, which is indeed judged very plausible by all
experts (but not all) in the field, but remains still unproved
today. It is as you know a famous open problem.
This is why I find protein folding intriguing. I see the following
possibilities:
-> Molecular interactions entail an immense computational power;
Assuming the very linear base of QM is correct, that is the case. A
priori to emulate exactly an hydrogen atom, you need a continuum of
universal numbers, that is, assuming that comp and the derivation are
correct, we need a computer exploiting its FPI statistics on the limit
of all computations (in the FPI sense) to emulate even a very little
piece of "matter". I guess this means that we need a quantum computer.
Now, if our subst level is classical, it would mean that a rough
classical emulation of the behavior of the molecules would be enough,
and that might be polynomially computable in the length of the
(arbitrary) input.
That might still require high parallelism in practice, and the
polynomial idea of simplicity is still quite theoretical, as in
practice an high degree polynomial on a high input remains intractable.
-> P = NP;
If P = NP, quantum computer science collapse with classical
computations, and we don't exploit the FPI limit, the quantum. Physics
itself might collapse into classical logic and the quantum is refuted.
I think. Perhaps quickly ... exercise: very this :)
-> We are constantly winning at quantum suicide.
We *are* constantly winning at the computationalist arithmetical
suicide, when assuming 'consciously' comp. But that is why we have to
solve, hopefully in the positive, the problem of the existence of the
other and the problem of sharing a non trivial part of the observable
in an apparent consistent way.
Interviewing the Löbian machine about her observable (the statistic on
the sigma_1 sentences with the right modality ) shows that the linear
and the symmetrical appears at the horizon, and we might get the
qubit, but to get a second qubit might be the major difficulty. Yet it
has to be there if comp *and* the quantum are correct.
Am I missing something?
I have the same question.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
We were talking about non-computable problems, and nature could use
unknown non-computable things for consciousness that would render
computationalism false.
Quentin
if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult
to understand why that is the case.
John K Clark
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