> > >> >> > You left out "traveling through time in a forward direction". >> > > Who is traveling through time in a forward direction, Mr. John Clark or > Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man? >
Have you ever met anyone who doesn't feel like they are travelling through time in a forward direction? > > >> > many worlds or duplicating machines you have to specify which "Telmo >> Menezes" or which "you" in the exact same way. >> > > No it is not exactly the same way. With copying machines John Clark can > see 6.02 *10^23 Telmo Menezes running around and has no idea which one is > Mr. You, > They will all believe to be Telmo, and they will all have their own first person perspective of the world. If you ask about something before the multiplication, they will all tend to remember the same things. Nobody is asking you to decide which one is the real one. There is no real one, all are equally real and all believe they are themselves, as anyone believes to be themself. > but in Many Worlds it is dictated by the laws of physics that John Clark > can see only one Telmo Menezes, and human language need not be made more > precise than the laws of physics. > I don't see how the laws of physics prevent the possibility of another chunk of matter being configured in the exact same way as I am. > > >> > Bruno does this with the concept of diary -- which can be a brain state. >> > > What good does that do? We're in Moscow now and John Clark The Moscow Man > didn't write that diary, John Clark The Helsinki Man did and John Clark > Helsinki Man no longer exists. > Why do you write emails? The moment after you press "Send" you are John Clark the 1428412752 Unix timestamp man, and no longer John Clark the Unix timestamp 1428412651 man. > > >> >>The position of their brains is unimportant because until the door is >>> opened both are still identical to the Helsinki Man. >>> >> >> > They are important if we are discussing the implications of >> computationalism (the belief that you mind can be replaced with some >> computation, >> > > Baloney. If consciousness even has a position it's the place a mind is > thinking about or the place where its sense organs are; a mind might not > even know or care where the computations are taking place. > I agree. Of course, I never said that the mind supervenes on a position, what I said is that investigating the specific scenario of duplication to another position is a useful device used by the thought experiment that you refuse to follow. This might become more clear if you did, so this conversation is a bit weird. You reminded me of the sort of person who tries to derail a joke by asking for meaningless details in the setup, instead of waiting for the punchline. In this specific case, you might discover later on that your objections are meaningless. Or not, but it would certainly be more productive to discuss the entire thing. > > >> > So you undoubtedly agree that step 3 is correct. >> > > In science it's better to be wrong than meaningless and step 3 is so > infested with ambiguous personal pronouns that it is meaningless. So I > neither agree nor disagree with step 3 just as I don't agree or disagree > with a burp or the phrase "free will"; all three have zero informational > content. They don't have enough meat on the bone to even be wrong. > You may criticize the clarity of the language in the paper. I don't think anyone ever accused Bruno of being unquirky in his English, but everything has been thoroughly clarified after years of discussion. You are not the only one who doubts that the proof is correct, but you are the only one who doesn't understand step 3. > > Well OK maybe I went a little too far with that, a burp may contain some > information about the nature of human digestion. > > > The duplicator uncertainty is perhaps more remarkable, because different >> worlds exist as first person perspectives, >> > > If the one and only thing that can turn the Helsinki Man into the Moscow > man is the sight of Moscow then I don't have the least bit uncertainty in > predicting that the guy that will see Moscow will turn out to be the Moscow > Man, nor do I find that fact remarkable. I find it a tautology > The point is not to be remarkable, it's to be correct. Step 3 proposes that an outside observer will correctly predict that the man who sees Moscow will turn out to be the Moscow man and that the man who sees Washington will turn out to be the Washington man and that both men will exist after the duplication. The other part that you always leave out is that, if you ask the Helsinki man to predict what he will see next, both men will remember being the man who made a prediction, one will turn out to be right and the other wrong. If you run this experiment a number of times with a sufficiently intelligent person, the swarm of duplicates will agree on uncertainty, that they* cannot predict their* next city, each one has p = .5. This uncertainty of the first person arises from a scenario where there is no uncertainty on the third person. Do you have a problem with any of these statements? * all of them, no ambiguity whatsoever > > > >> > while a third person perspective contains the two copies. >> > > Well what else did you expect to happen? > It's great that this is obvious to you. What's the problem then? Telmo. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
