On 10 Apr 2015, at 22:43, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
>>And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question
that you dodged: Who is traveling through time in a forward
direction, Mr. John Clark or Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man?
> Both are. Everyone is.
Then when Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man says "I will see Moscow"
please explain exactly who the prediction is about.
John Clark's first person, as John Clark knows that he will not die
(by computationalism).
You have already agreed that John Clark's 3p surivive in both place,
so his first person experience, which can be lived in only one place
will be W or M. It is the best prediction available, and as the 3p are
numerically identical before they open the doors in W and in M, P = 1/2.
>> if just before the multiple duplications John Clark predicted
that "you" will see X how could it be determined which one of the
6.02 *10^23 is Mr. You so we could ask Mr, You if he did really did
see X and figure out if John Clark's prediction was correct?
> John Clark will predict that one will see X1, and that all the
other Telmos will see all the other Xs. That prediction will be
confirmed with 100% accuracy.
Yes. So where is the indeterminacy in that?
In the individual experience of John Clark. All of them, as Telmo
explained.
> If you ask the original Telmo to bet on a destination and he bets
on X1, the copy at X1 will tell you that he predicted correctly,
Yes. So where is the indeterminacy in that?
That only X1 will confirmed that bet, and we have already agrees all
the copies are genuine "Telmo".
> while the copies at the while the copies at the other Xs will tell
you that they were wrong. Xs will tell you that they were wrong.
It wasn't wrong if the prediction was "Telmo will see X1" because
every one of the 6.02 *10^23 Telmos can clearly see that Telmo did
indeed see X1.
Confusion between the 3-1 views and the 1-views. This has been
explained in details more than once. Your rhetorical technic consists
in forgetting the 3-p, 1-p, 3-p, ... nuances on the pronouns, and then
criticizing the use of pronouns, which is indeed correct, but only on
your own use of the pronouns.
If the prediction was "I will see X1" then there is no way to know
if the prediction was correct or not because of the inherent
ambiguity matter duplicating machines brings to personal pronouns.
In your imagination only. That "inherent" ambiguity is handle in a
clear way by the taking into account the 1-3 differences. Which you
refuse to do, systematically, confirming Liz ananlysis that you are
like a child plugging his ears and trying to make noise, only.
> If you repeat the experiment several times, the Telmos will
eventually realize that there is a 1/6.02 *10^23 probability for
each location, and that they are in a state of uncertainty
You don't need exotic matter duplicating machines for this thought
experiment because it's all just old fashioned conventional
subjective uncertainty not the newer objective uncertainty found in
Quantum Mechanics.
It is the same in the MWI. Everett reduced the unintelligible
uncertainty of Copenhage into the old fashioned subjective
indeterminacy, and I show we have something similar in the
computationalist (quantum or classical or whatever) setting.
I show this not to get the Nobel Prize, but to formulate the mind-body
problem in a way such that we can handle it with the scientific method
and get testable conclusion.
The copies are uncertain about what they will see only because you
have kept some information from them.
Which one? What can be added to the step 3 protocol so that the
Helsinki person can predict his future first person experience with
certainty?
You are in charge of the experiment, you are Monty Hall, you always
knew with 100% certainty which door the car was behind, and you
determined if each individual copy sees X1 or not and how
information they had about what your decision would be. So Bruno's
thought experiment is no deeper and has no more philosophical
significance than a episode of "Let's Make a Deal".
OK, but if you cannot answer the above, it follows that you have to
admit the existence of the indeterminacy, so please move to step 4.
> the difference between Many Worlds and the duplication machines is
that the copies can interact and an outside observer can see several
of the copies.
And another difference is that personal pronouns work just fine in
Many Worlds but matter duplication machines renders them useless in
most circumstances.
This has been refuted many times, by Quentin, Telmo, PGC, Resch, Liz
and myself, but you never reply to them, except sometimes with
insulting rhetorical tricks.
Nor have you answered the simple question about the expectation of
drinking coffee in the step 3 modified protocol.
> But the John Clark who wrote the emails no longer exist.
I remember being him and that's good enough for me.
That is exactly what we need to get the indeterminacy. Nothing more.
> Why is this not a problem for you with emails, not even with many
worlds, but it becomes a problem with duplication machines?
There is no existential problem, there is only a pronoun problem. If
there will be 6.02 *10^23 copies of me tomorrow then I will
certainly exist tomorrow, but I will no longer be unique,
But you will certainly feel unique, given that we assume comp, and if
the level is right, there will be no telepathy involved between the
copies.
not one of those 6.02 *10^23 copies has more of a right to call
himself Mr. I than another.
Exactly, so we have to interview all of them. Simple combinatory
calculus shows that most of them will agree that they were unable to
make a correct prediction, on that first person experience.
For the billionth time, you reintroduce an ambiguity in the pronouns,
which has been carefully handled by the 1-3 difference, but *you* come
up each time with ambiguous use of pronoun and ambiguous person
points of view.
> Further along the proof everything comes full circle, and you are
confronted with having to chose between comp (the mind can be
replaced by an equivalent computation at some correct substitution
level)
Obviously true to my mind.
> and materialism -- in this specific case, the claim that position
is an aspect of fundamental reality,
Obviously ridiculous.
Ha haaa... You betray your dogma here. This contradicts your statement
that you were open that physics might not be the fundamental science
(meaning that position might not be an aspect of fundamental reality).
> I can't help but notice, tough, that your distaste for peer
pressure is quite selective. You are the one who likes to argue
every new year that psi phenomena do not exist because Nature and
Science haven't published a paper about them yet.
That is because I can't personally reproduce all the experiments in
Nature and Science, but I know that the editors of Nature and
Science have a very good (but not perfect) track record of not
publishing junk science, so by induction I conclude that what I read
is probably true.
Assuming I would have submit a paper to those journal. But I never
submit. It is always when people order me a paper, and insist a lot,
that I eventually submit.
But Bruno performed no experiments, and with all the personal
pronouns it very quickly became apparent that Bruno LITERALLY (not
figuratively) didn't know what he was talking about.
Except that you are the one reintroducing ambiguities after I gave you
a tool for the disambiguitation, and this systematically.
Your goal is defamation, probably to save your (christian,
materialist, aristotelian) dogma.
Now, we have progressed. You are Aristotelian. You really dislike the
idea that Plato might be correct.
I prefer this, because with your so frequent uses of ad hominem
remarks, I was beginning to think it was personal.
> To answer your question for the n-th time. John Clark the pre-
duplication man makes the prediction. Then [..]
Not so fast! First I need to know what you're talking about. Please
specify EXACTLY what the prediction is, and for god's sake give the
personal pronouns a rest.
The prediction is "I will open a door and see a city. Which one?" It
is about the city I will see. the "I" is no ambiguous and refer to the
future first person available. We know the guy will experience both
city, but in a way which subjectively will be felt as seeing only one
city.
> I believe the arrow of time is seen as an open problem in physics.
The arrow of time MUST exist if the universe was created in a very
low entropy condition. How the universe was created in a low entropy
condition is an open problem.
We are agnostic on the nature of the physical universe at the
beginning of the reasoning.
Please answer my questions in the preceding posts, and perhaps you
could try to stop the rhetorical tricks, so that you might progress a
little bit in the paper, and threads. By betraying your
aristotelianism, you gave a clue why you resist so much. But when we
do metaphysics with the scientific method, it is preferable to not do
any ontological commitment, and stay agnostic.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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