On 07 Apr 2015, at 01:57, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
>>> Assuming you're like me, you perceive yourself as a single
entity travelling through time in the forward direction.
>> You? Mr. John Clark The Moscow Man will perceive a single entity,
and Mr. John Clark the Washington Man will perceive a single entity,
and Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man will no longer perceive anything
at all.
> You left out "traveling through time in a forward direction".
Who is traveling through time in a forward direction, Mr. John Clark
or Mr. John Clark The Helsinki Man?
We have agree that both the W-man and the M-man are the H-man. It
follows indeed from step 1, as if they were new man, the H-man would
have died.
> many worlds or duplicating machines you have to specify which
"Telmo Menezes" or which "you" in the exact same way.
No it is not exactly the same way. With copying machines John Clark
can see 6.02 *10^23 Telmo Menezes running around and has no idea
which one is Mr. You, but in Many Worlds it is dictated by the laws
of physics that John Clark can see only one Telmo Menezes, and human
language need not be made more precise than the laws of physics.
Assuming that you are not duplicated in possible far away Boltzmann
brains, that there is no Du running in the universe, etc. To attach
the first person to an third person reality is what is shown
problematical. The identity thesis is assumed, but duplication
illustrates this is problematical in general.
> Bruno does this with the concept of diary -- which can be a brain
state.
What good does that do? We're in Moscow now and John Clark The
Moscow Man didn't write that diary, John Clark The Helsinki Man did
and John Clark Helsinki Man no longer exists.
We did agree on this. You are changing your mind here, without
explaining why.
>>The position of their brains is unimportant because until the door
is opened both are still identical to the Helsinki Man.
> They are important if we are discussing the implications of
computationalism (the belief that you mind can be replaced with some
computation,
Baloney. If consciousness even has a position it's the place a mind
is thinking about or the place where its sense organs are; a mind
might not even know or care where the computations are taking place.
> So you undoubtedly agree that step 3 is correct.
In science it's better to be wrong than meaningless and step 3 is so
infested with ambiguous personal pronouns that it is meaningless.
Baloney. There is no ambiguity at all, as we have agree on the 1p/3p
distinction. The W and M man are both the H-man, but suddenly put in
different context. The personal identity is an indexical, and so, like
most modalities, does not obey to the Leibniz rule. The only relevant
point is that after the duplication, the W-man and the M-man do not
feel to be the same person, and remains the same only
"intellectually". If they keep that "intellectual" idea seriously
(which I do), it leads to the idea that personal identity is an
illusion (which I think), but this poses no problem in the sequel of
the reasoning which is concerned with prediction of first person
experience.
So I neither agree nor disagree with step 3
Oh, we are progressing. may be reading the next steps can help you to
see if your bad feeling about the FPI is really relevant.
just as I don't agree or disagree with a burp or the phrase "free
will"; all three have zero informational content. They don't have
enough meat on the bone to even be wrong.
False. You have shown that "incompatibilist theories of free will"
does not make sense, but that is not a reason to thrown the concept
away, it is a reason to look at the compatibilist theories.
You make the same error with the concept of God. You don't believe in
the christian God, and declare from this that all notion of God are
"burp".
The idea of taking some idea X seriously, is the idea of trying
definition, and changing them when contradiction occurs.
You illustrate only that you are taking *some* definition of free-
will, and of God, too much seriously.
Well OK maybe I went a little too far with that, a burp may contain
some information about the nature of human digestion.
> The duplicator uncertainty is perhaps more remarkable, because
different worlds exist as first person perspectives,
If the one and only thing that can turn the Helsinki Man into the
Moscow man is the sight of Moscow then I don't have the least bit
uncertainty in predicting that the guy that will see Moscow will
turn out to be the Moscow Man, nor do I find that fact remarkable. I
find it a tautology
Sure, but the question was asked to the Helsinki-man, about what he
expects. As he does not expect to die (because he assumes
computationalism) he expects that Moscow man will see Moscow and be
astonished to he is the Moscow man, and that it could not have
predicted it, given the numerical identity of the code sent to both
cities. Then the iterated experience makes things completely
transparent.
Telmo is right.
You do understand the step 3 very well enough to tell us if the
indeterminacy is changed or not in the step 4.
In case you don't believe in the indeterminacy, and still believe you
can survive with a digital brain substitution, you need to give the
prediction algorithm. Your "W & M prediction" has already been
refuted, I recall, to avoid going in a loop.
Bruno
> while a third person perspective contains the two copies.
Well what else did you expect to happen?
John K Clark
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