On 06 Aug 2015, at 00:57, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have
no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John
Clark" for the personal pronoun "you".
> We did this already, but you came up with non sense again.
More than one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is
not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or
in the 1-1p/3-1p difference.
In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the
difference between THE1p and the 3p difference
and the difference between THE 1-1p and the 3-
1p difference? And whose "1p" is it anyway?
It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person,
and what an outsider can describe as exclusive content of a collection
of diaries. It is the difference , in this case, between the semantic
of "I open the door and saw M (resp W) and the list "I open the door
and saw M" + "I opened the door and saw M".
In this case the difference is the difference between "and" and "or".
> you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p,
In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused
about which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not
as confused as Bruno Marchal.
> as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all
experiences.
John Clark is profoundly uninterested in "comp" and does not
believe that "comp" can explain anything at all.
Computationalism is used only to formulate the problem, to get the
shape of the solution (the reversal), and to motivate for the
technical definitions and the mathematical solution (the Arithmetical
UDA, alias the machine's interview, where the "pronouns" are defined
with the technic exposed in Smullyan's Forever Undecided, notably.
>> Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has
one question, there are two first person experiences, which one
is Bruno talking about?
> The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively,
Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as
interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John
Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things.
But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki.
But why is this even relevant?
You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why
it is relevant (of course).
The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he
has
The point is that there are more than one which is available.
and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely
positively NOTHING to do with it.
?
That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the
future rather than the past is just nuts.
Yes, but that has not been done.
> we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington
man is the Helsinki man.
What day is it....lets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we
agree on that. Tomorrow we won't.
You should try to not show so much clearly that you are a troll, as I
will lose credits just by answering such remark.
> we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same
person as the H-man
Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man,
but it's important to remember that the Washington man is
NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be
traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the
future.
Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. You confirms (if
that was necessary) that you never complete the thought experience.
You don't interview the copies. You don't put your shoes in their shoes.
> which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the
1p, well defined in H) will live the W or the M experience.
The only uncertainty is who "he" is.
We have agreed that he is the guy remembering pushing the button. We
have agreed that he will find himself in bioth city, and we have
agreed that in both cities both live an experience logically
incompatible with their doppelganger experience, and thus live W or M
(even W xor M).
If "he" is the guy experiencing Helsinki today then "he" will
experience NEITHER Washington nor Moscow tomorrow. However if "he"
is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki today (or if "he" is
Bruno Marchal) then "he" will experience Washington AND Moscow
tomorrow.
That will never happen. Nobody will experience W and M tomorrow or any
day. Both experience will occur, but a couple of incompatible
experience is NOT an experience. It is only two experience of
different person, who happen to be both the H-guy.
I think you have stabilized on the first/third person pov.
> In Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative
described just below, but we don't let you know the result:
- tail : you are duplicated in M and W
- head: you are not duplicated, but teleported to one of the city
(also chosen with a coin)
This time John Clark would have less information to work with so
not surprisingly John Clark would not know what to expect, maybe one
city maybe two. Not that expectations, correct or incorrect, have
any bearing on the question at hand.
He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities, and the
point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless telepathy, but
that would be like a third person clue which in this protocol are
assumed not to exist.
> So you don't know if you will be simply teleported in one of
the two city, or be duplicated in both, once you push the button.
The question is: do you think that without external clue you could
know which one of the alternative has been realized after pushing
the button?
Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark
had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not
have been.
So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure nonsense.
Replace John Clark by a robot.
Even a zombie would not get such non-sense in his diary.
Bruno
John K Clark
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