On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 11 Sep 2015, at 04:08, Jason Resch wrote: > > I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple realizability", > as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper, > > "The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical > will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often > attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that > the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not > electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we > see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of > course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so > that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the > nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical. > In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of > using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If > we wish to find such similarities we should took rather for mathematical > analogies of function." > > > I am not sure at all of your interpretation Jason. Logicians like Gödel > and Turing would not use "higher" in such a sense. And I am not sure Gödel > talked about the 1950 paper, as Gödel was a tiny bit anti-mechanist, I do > think that by "higher" he meant "divine", in the theological realm, or > belonging to a large, perhaps very large, cardinal. > > Note that the multiple realisability entails directly that not only > electricity is superficial, but given that the computation can be realized > in and by any Turing universal system, the physicalness is itself > superficial. A tiny part of elementary arithmetic is Turing universal. > > > > > > So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not be > made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if it is the > functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine consciousness. > > > Interesting but I am not sure if that was what Gödel thought about. > > (But I confess I have not yet read the entire work of Gödel, I still miss > probably some of the unpublished writings) > > I am not certain either. It was conjecture on my part. Another possible interpretation: God-like intelligences may converge on the same set of beliefs/actions/personalities, etc. as with increasing intelligence becomes decreased probability of making mistakes. Therefore matters of disagreement between any two entities converges toward zero as intelligence increases. Then we might conclude "divine beings" would all behave/believe/operate the same way, have the same ethics, etc. Jason > > > I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/politics is > an objective, rather than subjective science. > > Jason > > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the higher >> beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal rights >> comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something objectively >> knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings thing sounds like >> something I *would* agree with, if I understood it... ;) >> >> On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote: >>> >>> Which of the 14 points did you not agree with? >>> >>> As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did for >>> fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz <pie...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the >>>> drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about >>>> that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement >>>> with him... >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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