On 12 Sep 2015, at 23:48, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 11 Sep 2015, at 04:08, Jason Resch wrote:
I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple
realizability", as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper,
"The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely
mechanical will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition.
Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital
computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is
electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since
all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this
use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course
electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so
that it is not surprising that we find it in both these
connections. In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at least
as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage system
is mainly acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen
to be only a very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such
similarities we should took rather for mathematical analogies of
function."
I am not sure at all of your interpretation Jason. Logicians like
Gödel and Turing would not use "higher" in such a sense. And I am
not sure Gödel talked about the 1950 paper, as Gödel was a tiny bit
anti-mechanist, I do think that by "higher" he meant "divine", in
the theological realm, or belonging to a large, perhaps very large,
cardinal.
Note that the multiple realisability entails directly that not only
electricity is superficial, but given that the computation can be
realized in and by any Turing universal system, the physicalness is
itself superficial. A tiny part of elementary arithmetic is Turing
universal.
So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need
not be made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as
we, if it is the functions/patterns/mathematical relations that
determine consciousness.
Interesting but I am not sure if that was what Gödel thought about.
(But I confess I have not yet read the entire work of Gödel, I still
miss probably some of the unpublished writings)
I am not certain either. It was conjecture on my part. Another
possible interpretation: God-like intelligences may converge on the
same set of beliefs/actions/personalities, etc. as with increasing
intelligence becomes decreased probability of making mistakes.
Therefore matters of disagreement between any two entities converges
toward zero as intelligence increases.
Then it looks like humans are less intelligent than animals. Should
not the possibility of doing mistake grows with intelligence? Is not
intelligence an opening to the change of mind? That is also the
experience of having been mistaken or deluded or failed and of
possibly still being mistaken and probably being mistaken in the
(hopefully consistent and sound) extensions.
For the Gods, I don't know. I model the Gods by non recursively
enumerable sets of true arithmetical sentences. Some such sets can be
defined in arithmetic, and some needs analysis or second order logic.
With computationalisme they can have role as oracle, but I doubt that
this is the case "on the terrestrial plane". Near death or through
brain perturbation, or by doing mathematics, we can develop a
familiarity with them, a bit like we can be familiar with the
Cantorian infinities. Despite their high level of non computability,
machines like PA or ZF, and us, can with still prove many things
about them.
Then we might conclude "divine beings" would all behave/believe/
operate the same way, have the same ethics, etc.
That is platonism. With computationalism, I think that something like
that might be true but non justifiable, and when justified it re-
enlarges the spectrum of the differences. It is basically why souls
fall, and multiply, and why theology contains a theological trap
(which incarnates itself in the institutionalization of moral rules).
No problem with laws, but there is a problem with morality and
spirituality: it can never be imposed or normalize in any way.
Maybe I can say this: the day we have all the same ethics is the day
we are all the same person. (I am not sure, neither that this is true,
nor that this is communicable, nor perhaps trivial).
Bruno
Jason
I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/
politics is an objective, rather than subjective science.
Jason
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the
higher beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal
rights comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something
objectively knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings
thing sounds like something I *would* agree with, if I understood
it... ;)
On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
Which of the 14 points did you not agree with?
As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he
did for fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's
argument.
Jason
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz <pie...@gmail.com> wrote:
It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the
drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something
about that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in
87.5% agreement with him...
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