On 13 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/13/2015 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Sep 2015, at 23:48, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


On 11 Sep 2015, at 04:08, Jason Resch wrote:



So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not be made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if it is the functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine consciousness.

Interesting but I am not sure if that was what Gödel thought about.

(But I confess I have not yet read the entire work of Gödel, I still miss probably some of the unpublished writings)



I am not certain either. It was conjecture on my part. Another possible interpretation: God-like intelligences may converge on the same set of beliefs/actions/personalities, etc. as with increasing intelligence becomes decreased probability of making mistakes. Therefore matters of disagreement between any two entities converges toward zero as intelligence increases.

Then it looks like humans are less intelligent than animals. Should not the possibility of doing mistake grows with intelligence? Is not intelligence an opening to the change of mind? That is also the experience of having been mistaken or deluded or failed and of possibly still being mistaken and probably being mistaken in the (hopefully consistent and sound) extensions.

So the omniscient Gods of monotheism are even less intelligent.


I am not sure the notion of intelligence applies to the God of the monotheism, and why would you need to be intelligent/wise if you knew everything (assuming that omniscience makes sense (but it does not, according to a diagonal argument due to Grimm, and which makes sense assuming in the classical-indexical-computationalist theory).

Intelligence and wiseness can help to get closer to God, but why would God, the outer god,have any need of that?

The One of the NeoPlatonist is the Outer God, playable by the notion of Arithmetical Truth (in a first approximation, assuming comp). The outer god, like the outer universe (quanta), as a whole, trivially does not have to interact, talk, that is, virtually they do nothing, or everything. The universal dovetailer, as a program, computing a function, computes the empty function from the no inputs to no outputs, I mean by definition of Uni-thing, be it a universe, god, or whatever.

It is not clear , in the case of classical computationalism if that Outer God can be a person, unlike the Inner God, played by provability +truth ([]p & p), or the "rational-man", played by []p (always interpreted in arithmetic).

We can affectively (re)define the Outer God by any person who know all the arithmetical true propositions. It is a quite non computable extension of the Universal Dovetailer which knows only the true arithmetical Sigma_1 propositions. The first knows if there is, or not, a non trivial zero of the Riemann function away from the critical line, for example, the second never know things like that.

But the relation between the numbers can be arithmetical, but also analytical, like in second order arithmetic, where you quantify also on the sets and/or functions. With comp, things like that can be associated to relative recursive operator, or to semantic of programming language. Incompleteness prevents a machine to prove it has a semantic, when the machine has a semantic. The semantic is on the side of the psycho or theo -logical matter from the first person points of view of the person rendered by this or that probable universal numbers.

The arithmetical reality kept inside a universal dreamer which lost lucidity from times to times. It might be able to remember back regularly. And there are many false awakenings, we are warned somehow, already with G* proving <>[]f, or G proving <>t -> <>[]f.

Bruno






Brent

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