On 13 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 9/13/2015 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Sep 2015, at 23:48, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 11 Sep 2015, at 04:08, Jason Resch wrote:
So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need
not be made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as
we, if it is the functions/patterns/mathematical relations that
determine consciousness.
Interesting but I am not sure if that was what Gödel thought about.
(But I confess I have not yet read the entire work of Gödel, I
still miss probably some of the unpublished writings)
I am not certain either. It was conjecture on my part. Another
possible interpretation: God-like intelligences may converge on
the same set of beliefs/actions/personalities, etc. as with
increasing intelligence becomes decreased probability of making
mistakes. Therefore matters of disagreement between any two
entities converges toward zero as intelligence increases.
Then it looks like humans are less intelligent than animals. Should
not the possibility of doing mistake grows with intelligence? Is
not intelligence an opening to the change of mind? That is also the
experience of having been mistaken or deluded or failed and of
possibly still being mistaken and probably being mistaken in the
(hopefully consistent and sound) extensions.
So the omniscient Gods of monotheism are even less intelligent.
I am not sure the notion of intelligence applies to the God of the
monotheism, and why would you need to be intelligent/wise if you knew
everything (assuming that omniscience makes sense (but it does not,
according to a diagonal argument due to Grimm, and which makes sense
assuming in the classical-indexical-computationalist theory).
Intelligence and wiseness can help to get closer to God, but why would
God, the outer god,have any need of that?
The One of the NeoPlatonist is the Outer God, playable by the notion
of Arithmetical Truth (in a first approximation, assuming comp). The
outer god, like the outer universe (quanta), as a whole, trivially
does not have to interact, talk, that is, virtually they do nothing,
or everything. The universal dovetailer, as a program, computing a
function, computes the empty function from the no inputs to no
outputs, I mean by definition of Uni-thing, be it a universe, god, or
whatever.
It is not clear , in the case of classical computationalism if that
Outer God can be a person, unlike the Inner God, played by provability
+truth ([]p & p), or the "rational-man", played by []p (always
interpreted in arithmetic).
We can affectively (re)define the Outer God by any person who know all
the arithmetical true propositions. It is a quite non computable
extension of the Universal Dovetailer which knows only the true
arithmetical Sigma_1 propositions. The first knows if there is, or
not, a non trivial zero of the Riemann function away from the critical
line, for example, the second never know things like that.
But the relation between the numbers can be arithmetical, but also
analytical, like in second order arithmetic, where you quantify also
on the sets and/or functions. With comp, things like that can be
associated to relative recursive operator, or to semantic of
programming language. Incompleteness prevents a machine to prove it
has a semantic, when the machine has a semantic. The semantic is on
the side of the psycho or theo -logical matter from the first person
points of view of the person rendered by this or that probable
universal numbers.
The arithmetical reality kept inside a universal dreamer which lost
lucidity from times to times. It might be able to remember back
regularly. And there are many false awakenings, we are warned somehow,
already with G* proving <>[]f, or G proving <>t -> <>[]f.
Bruno
Brent
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