On 7/18/2016 9:01 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:51:32AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
I have only come across two theories of personal identity that are
consistent and void issues inherent to body-continuity and
psychological-continuity theories. The two consistent personal identity
theories I am aware of are no-self (you are only a single thought moment
and nothing else) and universalism (you are all thought moments and all
people). Anything in between is bound to fall flat when you try to limit
the scope of experiences you my ascribe that person to some biological or
some psychological continuation when both of these continuations can
changes over time. What are the practical limits to allowable change which
preserve that person? It seems entirely arbitrary to me.
I am not convinced that they are the only two possible
outcomes. Remember my skepticism of the Parfit Napoleon thought
experiment.
However, ISTM that the real issue being discussed here is transitivity
of the notion of personal identity. Why should identity be transitive?
After all, why shouldn't your identity be tied up with whoever you
remember being? If B and C both remember being A, then they can claim
to being the same person as A, in spite of the fact that B and C are
different people.
What if Eve White can only remember being Chris Sizemore, but Eve Black
can remembers everything Eve White remembers, but doesn't remember
*/being/* Eve white. And Jane can remember being Jane and Eve White and
Eve Black (c.f. "All About Eve").
Brent
What is the problem with that point of view?
Cheers
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