On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:51:32AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > > I have only come across two theories of personal identity that are > consistent and void issues inherent to body-continuity and > psychological-continuity theories. The two consistent personal identity > theories I am aware of are no-self (you are only a single thought moment > and nothing else) and universalism (you are all thought moments and all > people). Anything in between is bound to fall flat when you try to limit > the scope of experiences you my ascribe that person to some biological or > some psychological continuation when both of these continuations can > changes over time. What are the practical limits to allowable change which > preserve that person? It seems entirely arbitrary to me. >
I am not convinced that they are the only two possible outcomes. Remember my skepticism of the Parfit Napoleon thought experiment. However, ISTM that the real issue being discussed here is transitivity of the notion of personal identity. Why should identity be transitive? After all, why shouldn't your identity be tied up with whoever you remember being? If B and C both remember being A, then they can claim to being the same person as A, in spite of the fact that B and C are different people. What is the problem with that point of view? Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
