On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states
where the
conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit.
Clearly, by the YD
assumption, both states are survivor states from the original
conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because
of the
single bit difference.
By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time.
Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by
assumption (YD).
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single
consciousness through time. We get different input data all the
time but we do not differentiate according to that data.
I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two
identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of
indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data
is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should
lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into
two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources
simultaneously -- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel
impacts on our body, and hear many sounds from the environment.
None of this leads our consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed,
our evolutionary experience has made us adept at coping with
these multifarious inputs and sorting through them very
efficiently to concentrate on what is most important, while
keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our minds.
I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex
ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the
road, other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be
talking to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and
reflecting on philosophical issues that are important to me. And
this is by no means an exhaustive list of our ability to
multitask -- to run many separate conscious modules within the
one unified consciousness.
Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the
least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another
stream of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic
structure of our consciousness -- we will just take this
additional data and process in the way we already process
multiple data inputs and streams of consciousness. This would
seem, indeed, to be the default understanding of the
consequences of person duplication. One would have to add some
further constraints in order for it to be clear that the
separate bodies would necessarily have differentiated conscious
streams. No such additional constraints are currently in evidence.
Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly
suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the
decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the
consciousness is not separate from the physics. It's only "not
in evidence" if your trying to derive the physics from the
consciousness.
Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the
additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is
essentially a mind-brain identity thesis.
Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different
memories or different first person report, not different brain.
The differentiation we are talking about is into two separate
persons who do not share a consciousness. You need the
differentiation before you get two first person reports: one
consciousness could store several different memories.
What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the
first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W,
and the diary in M contains M.
I explained that in the previous post. It is not in the least
mysterious -- no different from seeing different things with each
eye and recording what is seen with different hands. Ther emight be
twoexperiences, but that does not need two persons.
You lost me with your last post, as they seem to conflict
immediatey with step 1 and "step 0", the definition of (weak)
computationalism used in the UD Argument.
I don't see any conflict with ordinary teleportation, with or
without a delay. There is no duplication in those cases, so ordinary
considerations apply. Of course, if there is a delay that the
teletransported person has no way of knowing about, then he will not
know about that delay -- so what?
I presume by "step 0" you mean YD + CT. There is no problem with
these assumptions; it is just that you appear not to be able to
prove the differentiation at step 3 from these assumptions.
And my suspicion is that the mind-brain identity thesis plays
havoc with the rest of Bruno's argument.
The identity thesis is refuted in the computationalist frame.
But not if computationalism is not valid. But, as I now think, the
identity thesis itself is probably not enough to ensure the
differentiation.
That might be a problem for materialist, which will need at that
stage to assume a small physical universe without UD running in it
forever, and without too much Boltzmann Brain, a move which is
shown to not work later.
In a physical universe we do not necessarily run the UD -- what
happens in arithmetic is a matter for arithmetic, it does not affect
the physical universe.
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is
told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the
reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that
the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe that
he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or
plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after
pushing the button in Helsinki?
As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee.
We need to decompose step 3 in sub-steps, so that we can see if
there is a real disagreement, and in that case where and which one,
or if it is just pseudo-philosophy or bad faith.
The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two
persons is inevitable.
It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the
diaries have differentiated.
The first person are approximated/associated by their personal
diaries. Everett use a similar theory of mind, and indeed most account
of the QM-without-collapse use digital mechanism, more or less
implicitly.
Accusations of bad faith are not required.
Sorry for the accusation of bad faith, but I hope now we can move on
step 4. I mean, come back to the original definition of first person
discourse.
The notion of first person and third person have been defined since
long, and you were persisting in talking like if it could be possible
that the first person experience does not bifurcate, differentiate.
When we comp we admit that the only way to know is asked the copies or
consulted their opinions and experiences, and then simple elementary
logic shows that they all differentiate.
We admit P=1 in the simple teleportation case, then the
differentiation is a simple consequence that the robot in W sees W,
believes he is in W, and as it is in W, he knows that he is in W (with
the antic notion of knowledge: true belief). The same for the robot in
M. They are both right, they have just differentiated. They both
confirmed "W v M", and refute "W & M", as, by computationalism, the W-
machine has been made independent from the M-machine. The W-machine
has no first person clue if the M-machine even exist, and vice versa.
(Or you bring telepathy, etc.).
You can't invalidate a reasoning by changing, in the reasoning, the
definition which have been given in the reasoning.The differentiation
are obvious. In the n-iterated case, the differentiations are given by
the 2^n sequences of W and M.
Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against
computationalism. I assume it, and study the consequences.
Later, I can explain that the "P=1" of 'UDA step one' belongs to the
machine's G*\G type of true but non- justifiable proposition, which
can explain the uneasiness. "P=1" requires a strong axiom, and indeed
both CT and YD are strong axioms in "cognitive science/computer
science/theology". Computationalism could be the most insane theology
except for all the others. I don't know if comp is true or not, but I
am pretty sure that IF digital mechanism is true, then the "correct
theology" will be more close to Plato than to Aristotle.
Bruno
Bruce.
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