On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is
told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the
reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that
the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe
that he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility,
or plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after
pushing the button in Helsinki?
As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee.
Once again, some amplification of the this answer is perhaps in
order. I cannot answer your question with a Yes/No as you wish
because the question is basically dishonest -- of the form of "Have
you stopped beating your wife yet?". The question contains an
implicit assumption that the differentiation takes place.
Not at all. Question 1 is neutral on this, but if you prefer I split
question 1 into two different questions.
Question 1a.
The H-guy is told that the coffee is offered *in* the reconstitution
boxes, and that it has the same taste. Put it differently, we ensure
that the differentiation has not yet occurred.
And the question 1a is the same, assuming he is a coffee addict, and
that he wants drink coffee as soon as possible, should he worried,
knowing the protocol telling the coffee is offered, or can he argue
that he is not worried, and that if comp is true and everything go
well, P("drinking coffee") = 1?
Question 1b
Same question, but now, the coffee is offered after the opening of the
doors.
Since it is this differentiation that is in question, the question
is disingenuous: it can only be answered as I have done above.
Oh nice! The Helsinki guy, as a coffee addict, is very please you tell
him that he will drink two cups of coffee.
Now, I hope, you agree that 'drinking two cups of coffee' entails
'drinking coffee', and in this case, the Helsinki addicted guy has
less reason to worry about lacking coffee. You do answer P("drinking
coffee") = 1.
So, just to be clear, and a bit more general: do you agree with the
Principle 1:
Principle 1: if a first person event x is guarantied to happen to
*all* its immediate (transportation-like) copies, then, before the
copy the person can expect x to happen with the same probability it
would have if there was only one copy.
OK? (We *assume computationalism. We have agreed already that it
entails P(x) = 1 if x is guarantied to be presented to the guy with
the artificial brain, or to the teleported (classically) person.
Bruno
Bruce
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