On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states
where the
conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit.
Clearly, by the YD
assumption, both states are survivor states from the original
conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of the
single bit difference.
By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time.
Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by
assumption (YD).
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single
consciousness through time. We get different input data all the
time but we do not differentiate according to that data.
I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two
identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of
indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is
input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead
the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In
normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we
see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and
hear many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our
consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience
has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and
sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is
most important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level
in our minds.
I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex
ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road,
other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking
to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting
on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by no
means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run many
separate conscious modules within the one unified consciousness.
Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the
least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream
of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure
of our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and
process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and
streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the
default understanding of the consequences of person duplication.
One would have to add some further constraints in order for it to
be clear that the separate bodies would necessarily have
differentiated conscious streams. No such additional constraints
are currently in evidence.
Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly
suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the
decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the consciousness
is not separate from the physics. It's only "not in evidence" if
your trying to derive the physics from the consciousness.
Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the
additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is
essentially a mind-brain identity thesis.
Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different memories
or different first person report, not different brain.
The differentiation we are talking about is into two separate persons
who do not share a consciousness. You need the differentiation before
you get two first person reports: one consciousness could store several
different memories.
What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the
first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W, and
the diary in M contains M.
I explained that in the previous post. It is not in the least mysterious
-- no different from seeing different things with each eye and recording
what is seen with different hands. Ther emight be twoexperiences, but
that does not need two persons.
You lost me with your last post, as they seem to conflict immediatey
with step 1 and "step 0", the definition of (weak) computationalism
used in the UD Argument.
I don't see any conflict with ordinary teleportation, with or without a
delay. There is no duplication in those cases, so ordinary
considerations apply. Of course, if there is a delay that the
teletransported person has no way of knowing about, then he will not
know about that delay -- so what?
I presume by "step 0" you mean YD + CT. There is no problem with these
assumptions; it is just that you appear not to be able to prove the
differentiation at step 3 from these assumptions.
And my suspicion is that the mind-brain identity thesis plays havoc
with the rest of Bruno's argument.
The identity thesis is refuted in the computationalist frame.
But not if computationalism is not valid. But, as I now think, the
identity thesis itself is probably not enough to ensure the differentiation.
That might be a problem for materialist, which will need at that stage
to assume a small physical universe without UD running in it forever,
and without too much Boltzmann Brain, a move which is shown to not
work later.
In a physical universe we do not necessarily run the UD -- what happens
in arithmetic is a matter for arithmetic, it does not affect the
physical universe.
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told
that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in
both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a
believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in
Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp
maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki?
As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee.
We need to decompose step 3 in sub-steps, so that we can see if there
is a real disagreement, and in that case where and which one, or if it
is just pseudo-philosophy or bad faith.
The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two
persons is inevitable. Accusations of bad faith are not required.
Bruce.
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