On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states
where the
conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit.
Clearly, by the YD
assumption, both states are survivor states from the original
conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of
the
single bit difference.
By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time.
Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by
assumption (YD).
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single
consciousness through time. We get different input data all the
time but we do not differentiate according to that data.
I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two
identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of
indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data
is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should
lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into
two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously
-- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body,
and hear many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our
consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience
has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and
sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is
most important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level
in our minds.
I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex
ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road,
other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking
to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting
on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by
no means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run
many separate conscious modules within the one unified
consciousness.
Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the
least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream
of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure
of our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and
process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and
streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the
default understanding of the consequences of person duplication.
One would have to add some further constraints in order for it to
be clear that the separate bodies would necessarily have
differentiated conscious streams. No such additional constraints
are currently in evidence.
Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly
suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the
decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the consciousness
is not separate from the physics. It's only "not in evidence" if
your trying to derive the physics from the consciousness.
Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the
additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is
essentially a mind-brain identity thesis.
Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different memories
or different first person report, not different brain.
What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the
first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W, and
the diary in M contains M. You lost me with your last post, as they
seem to conflict immediatey with step 1 and "step 0", the definition
of (weak) computationalism used in the UD Argument.
And my suspicion is that the mind-brain identity thesis plays havoc
with the rest of Bruno's argument.
The identity thesis is refuted in the computationalist frame. That
might be a problem for materialist, which will need at that stage to
assume a small physical universe without UD running in it forever, and
without too much Boltzmann Brain, a move which is shown to not work
later.
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told
that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in
both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a
believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in
Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp
maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki?
We need to decompose step 3 in sub-steps, so that we can see if there
is a real disagreement, and in that case where and which one, or if it
is just pseudo-philosophy or bad faith.
Bruno
Bruce
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