On 8/8/2016 4:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions.
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He
just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's
irrelevant.
Brent
Physicality in the thought experiment seems like a red herring to
me. We can just as easily consider running the duplicated
consciousnesses in virtual reality simulators of the two cities.
What if they are linked as one simulator by RF or by the internet? The
physicality is being used to assert that there is not one consciousness
supervening on different brains/computers/simulators. I think that's
true, but it's because I think you are right that supervenience is
implicit in YD. But if consciousness is generated by a kind of statmech
of UD computations then one can't rely on this implicit supervenience
before have derived spacetime and the finite speed of communication.
Brent
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