On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of course
that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two consciousnesses.
But that says nothing about the case of two identical brains -- is
there one or two consciousnesses? The default assumption around here
appears to be that the identity of indiscernibles will mean that there
is only one conscious being. The question is then how this
consciousness evolves as inputs change?
I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the
brain, so two different brains will realize two different
consciousnesses because they are at different locations and perceiving
different things. I would speculate that it would be just like having
two autonomous Mars rovers that "wake up" at different points on the
surface. They may have the same computers and sensors and programs, but
their data and memories will immediately start to diverge. They won't
be "completely" different, as identical twins aren't completely
different. They may even occasionally think the same thoughts. But
relativity tells us there's no sense to saying they think them at the
same time.
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He just
wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's irrelevant.
I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He cannot
derive the differentiation of consciousness in this duplication case
from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it come from?
In his theory, it the physics and the consciousness must both derive
from the infinite threads of computation by the UD. I'm just making the
point that he does need to derive the physics, specifically the finite
speed of communication in order to show that the duplication results in
two different consciousnesses.
It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have duplicated a
conscious being, we will not know whether the consciousnesses
differentiate on different incomes or not.
Suppose their is an RF link between them so they can share computation,
memory, sensor data,... Then we'd be inclined to say that they could be
a single consciousness. But now suppose they are moved light-years
apart. They could still share computation, memory, etc. But
intelligent action on the scale of an autonomous rover would have to be
based on the local resources of a single rover. So they would have to
effectively "differentiate". It wouldn't be some kind of axiomatic,
mathematically provable differentiation - rather a practical, observable
one.
Brent
It seems far from obvious to me, one way or the other. I can think of
no general principles that would give a definitive answer here.
Physics alone does not seem to be enough. Any attempted derivation
from physics seems just to beg the question.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
