On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have
separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different
perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of
course that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two
consciousnesses. But that says nothing about the case of two
identical brains -- is there one or two consciousnesses? The
default assumption around here appears to be that the identity of
indiscernibles will mean that there is only one conscious being.
The question is then how this consciousness evolves as inputs change?
I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on
the brain, so two different brains will realize two different
consciousnesses because they are at different locations and
perceiving different things.
That is fine if they started off different, and were never identical
-- identical in all details, not just sharing single "observer
moments", even if such can be well-defined.
I would speculate that it would be just like having two autonomous
Mars rovers that "wake up" at different points on the surface. They
may have the same computers and sensors and programs, but their data
and memories will immediately start to diverge. They won't be
"completely" different, as identical twins aren't completely
different. They may even occasionally think the same thoughts. But
relativity tells us there's no sense to saying they think them at
the same time.
But Mars rovers are not conscious -- or are they?
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He
just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's
irrelevant.
I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He cannot
derive the differentiation of consciousness in this duplication
case from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it come from?
In his theory, it the physics and the consciousness must both derive
from the infinite threads of computation by the UD. I'm just making
the point that he does need to derive the physics, specifically the
finite speed of communication in order to show that the duplication
results in two different consciousnesses.
The finite speed of communication is a problem only if consciousness
is localized to the physical brain -- if it is a non-local
computation, this might not be an issue.
It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have duplicated a
conscious being, we will not know whether the consciousnesses
differentiate on different incomes or not.
Suppose their is an RF link between them so they can share
computation, memory, sensor data,... Then we'd be inclined to say
that they could be a single consciousness. But now suppose they are
moved light-years apart. They could still share computation,
memory, etc. But intelligent action on the scale of an autonomous
rover would have to be based on the local resources of a single
rover. So they would have to effectively "differentiate". It
wouldn't be some kind of axiomatic, mathematically provable
differentiation - rather a practical, observable one.
Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious.
Why not? Suppose they are. If you would say "yes to the doctor" then
you must believe that AI is possible.
I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars rovers
are unlikely to be sufficiently complex/self referential to be
conscious. Do they have an inner narrative?
And if they were placed at different points on the surface of Mars,
they would have to start with at least some different data -- viz.,
their location on the surface relative to earth. The general issue I
am raising is that consciousness could be non-local, in which case
separated duplicates would not need any form of subluminal physical
communication in order to remain a single conscious being.
You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter.
If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then
separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still
aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No", then we know that
consciousness is localized to a particular physical body. If the
answer is "Yes", then we know that consciousness is non-local, even
though it might still supervene on the physical bodies.
I don't think that's logically impossible, but it would imply FTL
signaling and hence be inconsistent with current physics. It can't
just be QM entanglement, because it share computation, to make a
difference at X due to a perception at Y requires signal transmission.
Signal transmission or awareness? Non-locality does not entail FLT
signalling -- that makes it local.
The latter possibility seems the more likely if consciousness is, at
root, non-physical, so that the physical is an epiphenomenon of
consciousness.
Right, but then the challenge is to show that the physics derivative
from consciousness will exhibit spacetime finite signaling speed as
well as quantum entanglement.
Right, but first we have to derive real physics from consciousness. If
consciousness involves all of the infinity of computations that pass
through each observer moment, it seems that an awful lot of non-locality
is built into the whole enterprise.
Bruce
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