> On 14 Sep 2016, at 11:25 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > >> On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The >>>> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the >>>> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and >>>> duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must >>>> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their relation >>>> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven. >>>> >>> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process >>> underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged; >>> otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the >>> physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness >>> can be cut up into infinitesimals. >> >> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model. Each thread of >> the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an "observer >> moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference >> by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time". So they make >> the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued. > > That understanding of an "observer moment" appears to undermine the "Yes > Doctor" scenario. The point of YD, it seems to me, is that one can replace > oneself with a computer running some program -- the digital simulation at the > basis of mechanism. Such a simulation, being a single computation, can be > stopped and restarted at will without the observer being conscious of > anything. If consciousness, or "observer moments", are intrinsically made up > of an infinite number of threads, then this is not possible, and YD fails.
The question of whether you should replace your brain with a machine is a starting point, not a conclusion. The conclusion is that if you can, then there are neither physical brims nor physical machines. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
