On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:


On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 10:52:50 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



    On 5/2/2019 12:58 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote:


    On Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 7:10:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



        On 5/1/2019 4:24 PM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
        > I would say that one could have a Jupiter planet-sized
        network of
        > Intel® Core™ processors + whatever distributed program
        running on it,
        > and it will not be conscious.

        Based on what?  Human hubris?

        Brent



    A racist is [via Google definition] "aperson who shows or feels
    discrimination or prejudice against people of other races, or who
    believes that a particular race is superior to another".

    I'm not that, but I do think that different types of matter have
    different capabilities (as materials scientists do).

    Is there a type that is different from quarks and leptons?




Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of particles.

Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a materialist.


Phases  of matter is a mystery:

https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-aim-to-classify-all-possible-phases-of-matter-20180103/
https://news.stonybrook.edu/oncampus/simons-center-lecture-on-new-electronic-phases-of-matter-may-8/
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/04/new-phase-matter-confirmed-solid-and-liquid-same-time-potassium-physics/


No one can say except via the certainty of fundamentalist religion that all of chemistry, biochemistry, biology, neurobiology can be reduced to the physics of a few particles.



    I am a materialist.

    Except you imbue matter with properties that are undetectable. 
    You place emphasis on matter having experience, but that seems
    like a half-measure to me.  Why not go all the way and say that it
    has libertarian free will too.

    Brent


Consciousness itself - my 'self'  - is detected.

Galen Strawson (on free will):
via http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/strawsong/ <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/strawsong/>

"[T]he best way to try to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the free will debate, and of the reason why it is interminable, is to study the thing that keeps it going — our experience of freedom. Because this experience is something real, complex, and important, even if free will itself is not real. Because it may be that the experience of freedom is really all there is, so far as free will is concerned.* [footnote *] It may then be said that free will is real after all, because the reality of free will resides precisely in the reality of the experience of being free."

And the "experience of being free" consists entirely of your inability to reliabilty predict what you will do.

Brent


(on consciousness):
Consciousness Never Left
https://www.academia.edu/35683187/Consciousness_Never_Left <https://www.academia.edu/35683187/Consciousness_Never_Left>

"... So there is no mystery of consciousness. What we do not understand, what we find a mystery [(that is, matter)], is how conscious experience can be simply a matter of goings-on in the brain. But this is not because we do not know what consciousness is. It is because we do not know how to relate the things we know about the brain, when we use the language of physics and neurophysiology, to the things we know about the brain simply in having conscious experience – whose nature we know simply in having it."

@philipthrift


    On the other hand, the /new materialists/ [
    
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/mirroring-and-mattering-science-politics-and-the-new-feminist-materialism/
    
<https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/mirroring-and-mattering-science-politics-and-the-new-feminist-materialism/>
 ]

    reconceptualize “the terms of social theory, such that the social
    is seen as a part of, rather than distinct from, the natural, an
    undertaking that requires a rethinking of the natural too.” In
    this newly monist view, the proper response to the threat of
    biological determinism — the claim that biology is destiny or
    that our fate lies in our genes — is not to reject the natural
    sciences and assert the primacy of the social, nor indeed to
    treat the world as text, but rather to grasp the inseparability
    of the “bio” and the “social,” as captured in the word
    “biosocial.” In place of a linguistic process of representing the
    world, the new materialism proposes “mattering” as the generative
    process through which matter comes into being.

    *Material stuff — bodies, tools, objects — are understood as
    imbued with vitality and dynamic force. *

    This is a philosophical claim, but one that entails a political
    sensibility. And while materialism is a venerable school of
    thought, this conception of “mattering” seems, as I have
    suggested, very much of the moment.


    @philipthrift


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to