> On 4 Sep 2020, at 13:32, smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote: > > Even if the MWI is false and the wavefunction collapses to produce only one > of the possible outcomes with a probability given by the Born rule, you'll > still get all possibilities realized in a generic infinite universe, whether > it's spatially infinite or a universe that exists for an infinite long time. > > The only way to find out what exists beyond the realm we've explored s to do > experiments. No philosophical reasoning about the interpretation of > probabilities can ever settle whether or not the universe is so large or will > exists for such a long time that another copy of me exists. That's why these > discussions are not so useful as an argument of whether the MWI is correct or > not.
But we need some philosophical assumption about what is the “universe”. If we bet on mechanism, we have to bet on elementary arithmetic, but then we get the theorem that there is an infinity of computations going through our states, and that physics must be recovered through a measure on the relative computational histories. And this works, without eliminating the qualia (consciousness), which is not the case in physicist metaphysics. The burden of the proof is in the hand of the materialist (believer in ontological physical universe), and we already know that he has to abandon “indexical digital Mechanism”. Bruno > > Saibal > > On 04-09-2020 00:01, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: >> Sure. But Albert's argument is that in a single, probabilistic world >> that implements Born's rule, the number of scientist who find >> something contrary to Born's rule goes to zero as the number of >> repetitions increases. But in the multiverse there are always >> contrary worlds and, while their fraction decreases, their number >> increases with repetitions. >> Brent >> On 9/3/2020 12:02 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> Hi, >>> as there will be persons in self duplicate experiment who'll see >>> WWW...WW [1]. >>> But most should converge on 50%. >>> Quentin >>> Le jeu. 3 sept. 2020 à 20:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit : >>> Albert makes an interesting argument against Everettian QM, i.e. >>> that repeated experiments will not produce statistics that converge >>> to the Born rule, i.e. there will necessarily (not just >>> probabilistically) be experimenters in worlds supporting every >>> possible probability value. >>> Brent >>> On 9/3/2020 10:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> This sort of way of approaching physics is no different really from >>> theological debates about some esoteric Christian doctrine. >>> The last of Carroll's The Biggest Ideas in the Universe series is >>> actually interesting at the end: >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZqphkIO7yt4 >>> He has nowhere to go asn has no idea what to do. >>> @philipthrift >>> On Thursday, September 3, 2020 at 1:02:21 AM UTC-5 Brent wrote: >>> An interesting discussion of Everettian QM in two parts. The first >>> part >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyvgBe9VV70 >>> is just David Albert and Sean Carroll. It's quite reminiscent of >>> JKC and Bruno, using the same thought experiments (but more civil). >>> Brent >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/052f01fa-5d3e-4dfe-ac27-50c83668b0c0n%40googlegroups.com >>> [2]. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F513A7D.3080106%40verizon.net >> [3]. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAqpMSBV%2BcS2Z%3D9Gb6iCi3SDUphc9M%2B7xtww736119z1HA%40mail.gmail.com >> [4]. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F5167A5.3090502%40verizon.net >> [5]. >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] http://WWW...WW >> [2] >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/052f01fa-5d3e-4dfe-ac27-50c83668b0c0n%40googlegroups.com >> [3] >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F513A7D.3080106%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer >> [4] >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAqpMSBV%2BcS2Z%3D9Gb6iCi3SDUphc9M%2B7xtww736119z1HA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer >> [5] >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5F5167A5.3090502%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/99d4da60baa28cf13d4597a8ea82edb9%40zonnet.nl. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3EFACB1F-2C97-491E-9E7B-4FC63A232759%40ulb.ac.be.
