> On 5 Sep 2020, at 01:00, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 5, 2020 at 5:37 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> > wrote: > On 9/4/2020 4:43 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 9:32 PM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl >> <mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>> wrote: >> Even if the MWI is false and the wavefunction collapses to produce only >> one of the possible outcomes with a probability given by the Born rule, >> you'll still get all possibilities realized in a generic infinite >> universe, whether it's spatially infinite or a universe that exists for >> an infinite long time. >> >> The only way to find out what exists beyond the realm we've explored s >> to do experiments. No philosophical reasoning about the interpretation >> of probabilities can ever settle whether or not the universe is so large >> or will exists for such a long time that another copy of me exists. >> That's why these discussions are not so useful as an argument of whether >> the MWI is correct or not. >> >> >> I think something along those lines was Sean Carroll's answer to the points >> David Albert raised. Unfortunately, it doesn't wash! >> >> Applying the Born rule to the repeated measurement scenario tells you that >> the probability of the extreme branches is low; whereas, the idea that all >> possible outcomes occur on every trial trivially implies that the >> probability of the extreme cases is exactly one. The contradiction couldn't >> be more stark, and waffling about infinite universes isn't going to change >> that -- the theory gives two, mutually contradictory, results. > > But the probability of observing extreme cases isn't 1 for a given observer. > > > And the probability isn't 1/2^N for a given observer either. The observer > observes what he observes. Probability is relevant for predictions, not post > hoc observations.
Exactly. > > We are talking about the predictions of the theory, not the experiences of > individual observers. We are talking about the prediction of the theory, about the experiences of individual observers. > I think Sean tried this evasive tactic as well, and Albert rightly pointed > out that that just makes everything idexical, He is right on this. > and ultimately makes science impossible. On the contrary, it reduces everything to the theory of machine indexical self-reference. Sean is not aware of the mathematical theory of self-reference (G and G*). > > And it is not just the extreme branches that have low probability. Given the > repeated measurement scenario we have been talking about, there are N > repetitions of the experiment, giving 2^N distinct binary sequences of > results. Applying the Born rule to each possible sequence shows that it has > probability 1/2^N. But if every result obtains on every trial, the > probability of each sequence is exactly one. But as you said yourself just above: probability is relevant for predictions, not post hoc observations. > In other words, Everett is incompatible with the Born rule. You can abandon > the Born rule if you like, or abandon the Everettian idea of every outcome > occurring on every trial, but you can't have both. You can derive both from arithmetic, once you distinguish the first and third person notions. > > The twisting and turning we are seeing by participants on this list is not > going to alter this basic observation. The universal Turing machine knows that this twisting is just a consequence of its inability to know that []p and ([]p & p) have to put different logics on the believable and the knowable, the observable, etc. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ4r6SmArnJMrO_-JGgeRCOmeX%3DCDUq4RkWg4_X5sCzSw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ4r6SmArnJMrO_-JGgeRCOmeX%3DCDUq4RkWg4_X5sCzSw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9C182945-52D3-4848-9B6D-8E0B72200085%40ulb.ac.be.
