@Terren. That's why is crucial to fully read the papers. By reading the papers, you will come across paragraphs like this:
"Correctly, self-reference cannot be spoken of. But even saying “self-reference cannot be spoken of” is an utterance about it, so not even such a sentence can be uttered. Even naming it is faulty. Not even saying “self-reference” is correct. Is a very peculiar states of affairs. On the one hand, we cannot speak about it, on the other hand, this “entity” (wrong again, because not being spokeable-about, we cannot call it “entity” either) is responsible for bringing consciousness into existence. Some might wonder, if we cannot speak about it, why are we sure that it is the one that brings consciousness into existence. The reason we can do this is because we observe the phenomenology of qualia (like inclusion and transcendence of levels) and conclude that this is possible only if some entity that we call “self-reference” must “exist”." I understand that we live in an age where attention span has been reduced to 5 seconds. Nothing wrong with that. But if that is your attention span, then you should employ it for tik-tok videos. Other subjects require a different attention span. On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 21:32:24 UTC+3 Terren Suydam wrote: > From your paper, you define self-reference as: "Let self-reference be the > entity with the property of looking-back-at-itself." > > Your definition invokes the concepts *entity*, *property*, *looking-back*, > and *itself*. That's a lot of complexity for something that is > fundamental. It's easy for me to imagine *entities *with different > *properties* (i.e. that don't *look-back-on-itself), *but only because > I'm starting from a linguistic perspective that already defines *entities > *and *properties, *and *looking-back-at-itself.* You don't have that > luxury. If you want to derive everything from a monism, you cannot define > that monism in terms of concepts imported from a different metaphysics or > conceptual framework. *Entities *and *properties of > looking-back-at-itself *must be defined relative to your fundamental > monism. > > On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 2:04 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> @Terren. There is no "self" and "ability to reference". There is just >> self-reference. You can call it hampty-dampty if you want. >> >> On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 20:01:24 UTC+3 Terren Suydam wrote: >> >>> I read enough to confirm that you postulate self-reference as >>> fundamental - the entity upon which everything else can be built. I'm >>> wondering how that can be fundamental if it requires two components (self, >>> and the ability to reference). >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 11:32 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>>> The proper understanding happens by reading the paper, not by using >>>> hallucinatory objects to give you a devoid of meaning shortcut. >>>> >>>> On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 16:42:11 UTC+3 Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>>> I used Claude Sonnet to summarize your paper. Tell me if any of this >>>>> misses the mark, but the paper appears to posit *self-reference* as >>>>> fundamental, upon which all other aspects of reality are derived. >>>>> >>>>> If so (this is me now), my first thought is that self-reference cannot >>>>> be fundamental, because it already presupposes two distinct components: a >>>>> "self" and the capacity to "reference". Worse, defining "self" (something >>>>> to be derived) in terms of "self-reference" (fundamental) is circular. >>>>> >>>>> Terren >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 9:09 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >>>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I invite you to discover my paper "How Self-Reference Builds the >>>>>> World" which is the theory of everything that people searched for >>>>>> millennia. It can be found on my philpeople profile: >>>>>> https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4f13128c-5b63-422f-a6cb-4c3eb4f3618cn%40googlegroups.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4f13128c-5b63-422f-a6cb-4c3eb4f3618cn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ea01c75c-3cdd-4d9e-9ced-eb184ae03777n%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ea01c75c-3cdd-4d9e-9ced-eb184ae03777n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d91bb4ab-d34c-4508-9fa8-7278599ff78en%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d91bb4ab-d34c-4508-9fa8-7278599ff78en%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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