Brain doesn't exist. "Brain" is just an idea in consciousness. On Tuesday 9 July 2024 at 20:47:44 UTC+3 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > On Wed, 10 Jul 2024 at 02:12, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 11:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 10 Jul 2024 at 00:34, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 10:16 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 22:15, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 4:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 04:23, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 3:14 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 1:58 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *>>> ** I think such foresight is a necessary component of >>>>>>>>>>>> intelligence, not a "byproduct".* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>I agree, I can detect the existence of foresight in others >>>>>>>>>>> and so can natural selection, and that's why we have it. It aids >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> getting our genes transferred into the next generation. But I was >>>>>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>> about consciousness not foresight, and regardless of how important >>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>> personally think consciousness is, from evolution's point of >>>>>>>>>>> view it's utterly useless, and yet we have it, or at least I have >>>>>>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *> you don't seem to think zombies are logically possible,* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Zombies are possible, it's philosophical zombies, a.k.a. smart >>>>>>>>> zombies, that are impossible because it's a brute fact that >>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>> is the way data behaves when it is being processed intelligently, >>>>>>>>> or at least that's what I think. Unless you believe that all >>>>>>>>> iterated sequences of "why" or "how" questions go on forever then >>>>>>>>> you must believe that brute facts exist; and I can't think of a >>>>>>>>> better >>>>>>>>> candidate for one than consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> so then epiphenomenalism is false* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy >>>>>>>>> "*Epiphenomenalism >>>>>>>>> is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental >>>>>>>>> states or >>>>>>>>> events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do >>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> themselves cause anything*". If that is the definition then I >>>>>>>>> believe in Epiphenomenalism. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you believe mental states do not cause anything, then you >>>>>>>> believe philosophical zombies are logically possible (since we could >>>>>>>> remove >>>>>>>> consciousness without altering behavior). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mental states could be necessarily tied to physical states without >>>>>>> having any separate causal efficacy, and zombies would not be logically >>>>>>> possible. Software is necessarily tied to hardware activity: if a >>>>>>> computer >>>>>>> runs a particular program, it is not optional that the program is >>>>>>> implemented. However, the software does not itself have causal >>>>>>> efficacy, >>>>>>> causing current to flow in wires and semiconductors and so on: there is >>>>>>> always a sufficient explanation for such activity in purely physical >>>>>>> terms. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't disagree that there is sufficient explanation in all the >>>>>> particle movements all following physical laws. >>>>>> >>>>>> But then consider the question, how do we decide what level is in >>>>>> control? You make the case that we should consider the quantum field >>>>>> level >>>>>> in control because everything is ultimately reducible to it. >>>>>> >>>>>> But I don't think that's the best metric for deciding whether it's in >>>>>> control or not. Do the molecules in the brain tell neurons what do, or >>>>>> do >>>>>> neurons tell molecules what to do (e.g. when they fire)? Or is it some >>>>>> mutually conditioned relationship? >>>>>> >>>>>> Do neurons fire on their own and tell brains what to do, or do >>>>>> neurons only fire when other neurons of the whole brain stimulate them >>>>>> appropriately so they have to fire? Or is it again, another case of >>>>>> mutualism? >>>>>> >>>>>> When two people are discussing ideas, are the ideas determining how >>>>>> each brain thinks and responds, or are the brains determining the ideas >>>>>> by >>>>>> virtue of generating the words through which they are expressed? >>>>>> >>>>>> Through in each of these cases, we can always drop a layer and >>>>>> explain all the events at that layer, that is not (in my view) enough of >>>>>> a >>>>>> reason to argue that the events at that layer are "in charge." Control >>>>>> structures, such as whole brain regions, or complex computer programs, >>>>>> can >>>>>> involve and be influenced by the actions of billions of separate events >>>>>> and >>>>>> separate parts, and as such, they transcend the behaviors of any single >>>>>> physical particle or physical law. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider: whether or not a program halts might only be determinable >>>>>> by some rules and proof in a mathematical system, and in this case no >>>>>> physical law will reveal the answer to that physical system's (the >>>>>> computer's) behavior. So if higher level laws are required in the >>>>>> explanation, does it still make sense to appeal to the lower level >>>>>> (physical) laws as providing the explanation? >>>>>> >>>>>> Given the generality of computers, they can also simulate any >>>>>> imaginable set of physical laws. In such simulations, again I think >>>>>> appealing to our physical laws as explaining what happens in these >>>>>> simulations is a mistake, as the simulation is organized in a manner to >>>>>> make our physical laws irrelevant to the simulation. So while you could >>>>>> explain what happens in the simulation in terms of the physics of the >>>>>> computer running it, it adds no explanatory power: it all cancels out >>>>>> leaving you with a model of the simulated physics. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I would say that something has separate causal efficacy of its own if >>>>> physical events cannot be predicted without taking that thing into >>>>> account. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> >>>> For example, the trajectory of a bullet cannot be predicted without >>>>> taking the wind into account. In the brain, the trajectory of an atom can >>>>> be predicted without taking consciousness into account. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Here I disagree. You are hiding consciousness away in the overwhelming >>>> complexity and obscurity of atomic motion. But we can't discard it. >>>> Consider the following behavior (example from Yudowsky): >>>> >>>> "Consciousness, whatever it may be—a substance, a process, a name for a >>>> confusion—is not epiphenomenal; your mind can catch the inner listener in >>>> the act of listening, and say so out loud. The fact that I have typed this >>>> paragraph would at least seem to refute the idea that consciousness has no >>>> experimentally detectable consequences." >>>> >>>> "If you can close your eyes, and sense yourself sensing—if you can be >>>> aware of yourself being aware, and think "I am aware that I am aware"—and >>>> say out loud, "I am aware that I am aware"—then your consciousness is not >>>> without effect on your internal narrative, or your moving lips. You can >>>> see >>>> yourself seeing, and your internal narrative reflects this, and so do your >>>> lips if you choose to say it out loud." >>>> >>>> In the act of reporting one's experience of their own consciousness, in >>>> the act of catching the inner listener in the act of listening, is this >>>> something that can be explained *without taking consciousness into >>>> account*? >>>> >>> >>> That is the classic objection to epiphenomenalism, but if consciousness >>> is supervenient, then the physical activity on which the consciousness >>> supervenes also causes the physical activity describing the consciousness. >>> >> >> At higher levels it's no longer just physical activity. The laws that >> describe the higher levels aren't physical laws. >> >> Consider that we can also (if we choose) go much lower than the physical >> laws. We can describe every physical process as an operation on bits. And >> every operation can be described in terms of the NAND operation. So then >> everything is just bits and NANDS, there are no particles and fields, just >> ones and zeros and how they flip according to NAND. >> >> So if you plant your stake at the physical, how do you justify continuing >> to speak of physical laws and not 0,1, and NAND? >> >> Alternatively, if you see value and reason for talking about particles >> and fields, why not allow the same for the higher layers too? >> > > I am not saying that there is no value in talking about higher level > layers, just that the ability to talk about higher level layers does not > indicate that they have separate causal efficacy. We could describe the > functioning of the brain at the chemical level or at the cellular level. If > we consider only the chemical level, there is no physical effect that > cannot be explained purely by chemical interactions. So we can say that the > cellular level has no separate causal efficacy of its own, or no strongly > emergent effect. Does that mean that neural activity is epiphenomenal? If > so, consciousness is epiphenomenal in the same way. > > A different objection is to double down on the idea that physical reality >>> is causally closed. Advanced alien scientists who have no knowledge of >>> human consciousness would not say about the motion of Eliezer Yudkovsky’s >>> vocal cords, “we can’t explain that sequence of vibrations at the 2 minute >>> mark, there must be some force acting on the vocal cords that we are >>> unaware of”. >>> >> >> >> You can be a full throated physicalist without being an epiphenomenalist. >> Epiphenomenalism is usually considered a form of dualism (it says something >> exists beyond the physical, and no physical thing can ever tell you about >> that non-physical piece of ourselves). >> >> I think we can refute that, e.g., as Yudowsky does. Neither he nor I say >> that consciousness violates the laws of physics, just as a computer program >> does not cause bits to flip in ways that violate the principles of the >> hardware, but the program is free to define a class of structures and >> behaviors that exceed those of the underlying instruction set. Consider >> that the Java virtual machine has just 256 instructions. It can only really >> do 256 different things. But the programs that can be built using those 256 >> instructions are unbounded. The behaviors and states and state transitions >> a program might manifest are infinitely richer than those allowed at the >> bottom layer. >> >> Jason >> >> >>> The wind therefore can be said to have separate causal efficacy of its >>>>> own, but consciousness cannot. This is perhaps a narrow, reductionist >>>>> account and it misses out on all that is important about the mind and >>>>> intelligence, but I think it is a valid difference. >>>>> >>>>> I view mental states as high-level states operating in their own >>>>>>>> regime of causality (much like a Java computer program). The java >>>>>>>> computer >>>>>>>> program can run on any platform, regardless of the particular physical >>>>>>>> nature of it. It has in a sense isolated itself from the causality of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> electrons and semiconductors, and operates in its own realm of the >>>>>>>> causality of if statements, and for loops. Consider this program, for >>>>>>>> example: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [image: twin-prime-program2.png] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What causes the program to terminate? Is it the inputs, and the >>>>>>>> logical relation of primality, or is it the electrons flowing through >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> CPU? I would argue that the higher-level causality, regarding the >>>>>>>> logical >>>>>>>> relations of the inputs to the program logic is just as important. It >>>>>>>> determines the physics of things like when the program terminates. At >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> level, the microcircuitry is relevant only to its support of the >>>>>>>> higher >>>>>>>> level causal structures, but the program doesn't need to be aware of >>>>>>>> nor >>>>>>>> consider those low-level things. It operates the same regardless. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I view consciousness as like that high-level control structure. It >>>>>>>> operates within a causal realm where ideas and thoughts have causal >>>>>>>> influence and power, and can reach down to the lower level to do >>>>>>>> things >>>>>>>> like trigger nerve impulses. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here is a quote from Roger Sperry, who eloquently describes what I >>>>>>>> am speaking of: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "I am going to align myself in a counterstand, along with that >>>>>>>> approximately 0.1 per cent mentalist minority, in support of a >>>>>>>> hypothetical >>>>>>>> brain model in which consciousness and mental forces generally are >>>>>>>> given >>>>>>>> their due representation as important features in the chain of >>>>>>>> control. >>>>>>>> These appear as active operational forces and dynamic properties that >>>>>>>> interact with and upon the physiological machinery. Any model or >>>>>>>> description that leaves out conscious forces, according to this view, >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> bound to be pretty sadly incomplete and unsatisfactory. The conscious >>>>>>>> mind >>>>>>>> in this scheme, far from being put aside and dispensed with as an >>>>>>>> "inconsequential byproduct," "epiphenomenon," or "inner aspect," as is >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> customary treatment these days, gets located, instead, front and >>>>>>>> center, >>>>>>>> directly in the midst of the causal interplay of cerebral mechanisms. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mental forces in this particular scheme are put in the driver's >>>>>>>> seat, as it were. They give the orders and they push and haul around >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> physiology and physicochemical processes as much as or more than the >>>>>>>> latter >>>>>>>> control them. This is a scheme that puts mind back in its old post, >>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>> matter, in a sense-not under, outside, or beside it. It's a scheme >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> idealizes ideas and ideals over physico-chemical interactions, nerve >>>>>>>> impulse traffic-or DNA. It's a brain model in which conscious, mental, >>>>>>>> psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning achievement of some >>>>>>>> five >>>>>>>> hundred million years or more of evolution. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [...] The basic reasoning is simple: First, we contend that >>>>>>>> conscious or mental phenomena are dynamic, emergent, pattern (or >>>>>>>> configurational) properties of the living brain in action -- a point >>>>>>>> accepted by many, including some of the more tough-minded brain >>>>>>>> researchers. Second, the argument goes a critical step further, and >>>>>>>> insists >>>>>>>> that these emergent pattern properties in the brain have causal >>>>>>>> control >>>>>>>> potency -- just as they do elsewhere in the universe. And there we >>>>>>>> have the >>>>>>>> answer to the age-old enigma of consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To put it very simply, it becomes a question largely of who pushes >>>>>>>> whom around in the population of causal forces that occupy the >>>>>>>> cranium. >>>>>>>> There exists within the human cranium a whole world of diverse causal >>>>>>>> forces; what is more, there are forces within forces within forces, as >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> no other cubic half-foot of universe that we know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [...] Along with their internal atomic and subnuclear parts, the >>>>>>>> brain molecules are obliged to submit to a course of activity in time >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> space that is determined very largely by the overall dynamic and >>>>>>>> spatial >>>>>>>> properties of the whole brain cell as an entity. Even the brain cells, >>>>>>>> however, with their long fibers and impulse conducting elements, do >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> have very much to say either about when or in what time pattern, for >>>>>>>> example, they are going to fire their messages. The firing orders come >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>> a higher command. [...] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In short, if one climbs upward through the chain of command within >>>>>>>> the brain, one finds at the very top those overall organizational >>>>>>>> forces >>>>>>>> and dynamic properties of the large patterns of cerebral excitation >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> constitute the mental or psychic phenomena. [...] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Near the apex of this compound command system in the brain we find >>>>>>>> ideas. In the brain model proposed here, the causal potency of an >>>>>>>> idea, or >>>>>>>> an ideal, becomes just as real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a >>>>>>>> nerve >>>>>>>> impulse. Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> each other and with other mental forces in the same brain, in >>>>>>>> neighboring >>>>>>>> brains, and in distant, foreign brains. And they also interact with >>>>>>>> real >>>>>>>> consequence upon the external surroundings to produce in toto an >>>>>>>> explosive >>>>>>>> advance in evolution on this globe far beyond anything known before, >>>>>>>> including the emergence of the living cell." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- Roger Sperry >>>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Wolcott_Sperry> in "Mind, >>>>>>>> Brain, and Humanist Values >>>>>>>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/sperry/Mind_Brain_and_Humanist_Values.html>" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (1966) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *> As you said previously, if consciousness had no effects, there >>>>>>>>>> would be no reason for it to evolve in the first place.* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What I said in my last post was "It must be because consciousness >>>>>>>>> is the byproduct of something else that is not useless, there are no >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> possibilities". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> There is another possibility: consciousness is not useless.* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If consciousness is not useless from Evolution's point of view >>>>>>>>> then it must produce "something" that natural selection can see, and >>>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> natural selection can see that certain "something" then so can you or >>>>>>>>> me. >>>>>>>>> So the Turing Test is not just a good test for intelligence it's also >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> good test for consciousness. The only trouble is, what is that >>>>>>>>> "something"? >>>>>>>>> Presumably whatever it is that "something" must be related to mind in >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>> way, but If it is not intelligent activity then what the hell is it"? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis >>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to 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