Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, 10 Jul 2024 at 00:34, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 10:16 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> >> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 22:15, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 4:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 04:23, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 3:14 PM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 1:58 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> *>>> ** I think such foresight is a necessary component of >>>>>>>>> intelligence, not a "byproduct".* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>I agree, I can detect the existence of foresight in others and >>>>>>>> so can natural selection, and that's why we have it. It aids in >>>>>>>> getting >>>>>>>> our genes transferred into the next generation. But I was talking about >>>>>>>> consciousness not foresight, and regardless of how important we >>>>>>>> personally >>>>>>>> think consciousness is, from evolution's point of view it's >>>>>>>> utterly useless, and yet we have it, or at least I have it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *> you don't seem to think zombies are logically possible,* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Zombies are possible, it's philosophical zombies, a.k.a. smart >>>>>> zombies, that are impossible because it's a brute fact that consciousness >>>>>> is the way data behaves when it is being processed intelligently, or >>>>>> at least that's what I think. Unless you believe that all iterated >>>>>> sequences of "why" or "how" questions go on forever then you must >>>>>> believe that brute facts exist; and I can't think of a better candidate >>>>>> for >>>>>> one than consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> *> so then epiphenomenalism is false* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy "*Epiphenomenalism >>>>>> is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states >>>>>> or >>>>>> events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not >>>>>> themselves cause anything*". If that is the definition then I >>>>>> believe in Epiphenomenalism. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you believe mental states do not cause anything, then you believe >>>>> philosophical zombies are logically possible (since we could remove >>>>> consciousness without altering behavior). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Mental states could be necessarily tied to physical states without >>>> having any separate causal efficacy, and zombies would not be logically >>>> possible. Software is necessarily tied to hardware activity: if a computer >>>> runs a particular program, it is not optional that the program is >>>> implemented. However, the software does not itself have causal efficacy, >>>> causing current to flow in wires and semiconductors and so on: there is >>>> always a sufficient explanation for such activity in purely physical terms. >>>> >>> >>> I don't disagree that there is sufficient explanation in all the >>> particle movements all following physical laws. >>> >>> But then consider the question, how do we decide what level is in >>> control? You make the case that we should consider the quantum field level >>> in control because everything is ultimately reducible to it. >>> >>> But I don't think that's the best metric for deciding whether it's in >>> control or not. Do the molecules in the brain tell neurons what do, or do >>> neurons tell molecules what to do (e.g. when they fire)? Or is it some >>> mutually conditioned relationship? >>> >>> Do neurons fire on their own and tell brains what to do, or do neurons >>> only fire when other neurons of the whole brain stimulate them >>> appropriately so they have to fire? Or is it again, another case of >>> mutualism? >>> >>> When two people are discussing ideas, are the ideas determining how each >>> brain thinks and responds, or are the brains determining the ideas by >>> virtue of generating the words through which they are expressed? >>> >>> Through in each of these cases, we can always drop a layer and explain >>> all the events at that layer, that is not (in my view) enough of a reason >>> to argue that the events at that layer are "in charge." Control structures, >>> such as whole brain regions, or complex computer programs, can involve and >>> be influenced by the actions of billions of separate events and separate >>> parts, and as such, they transcend the behaviors of any single physical >>> particle or physical law. >>> >>> Consider: whether or not a program halts might only be determinable by >>> some rules and proof in a mathematical system, and in this case no physical >>> law will reveal the answer to that physical system's (the computer's) >>> behavior. So if higher level laws are required in the explanation, does it >>> still make sense to appeal to the lower level (physical) laws as providing >>> the explanation? >>> >>> Given the generality of computers, they can also simulate any imaginable >>> set of physical laws. In such simulations, again I think appealing to our >>> physical laws as explaining what happens in these simulations is a mistake, >>> as the simulation is organized in a manner to make our physical laws >>> irrelevant to the simulation. So while you could explain what happens in >>> the simulation in terms of the physics of the computer running it, it adds >>> no explanatory power: it all cancels out leaving you with a model of the >>> simulated physics. >>> >> >> I would say that something has separate causal efficacy of its own if >> physical events cannot be predicted without taking that thing into account. >> > > I agree. > > > For example, the trajectory of a bullet cannot be predicted without taking >> the wind into account. In the brain, the trajectory of an atom can be >> predicted without taking consciousness into account. >> > > > Here I disagree. You are hiding consciousness away in the overwhelming > complexity and obscurity of atomic motion. But we can't discard it. > Consider the following behavior (example from Yudowsky): > > "Consciousness, whatever it may be—a substance, a process, a name for a > confusion—is not epiphenomenal; your mind can catch the inner listener in > the act of listening, and say so out loud. The fact that I have typed this > paragraph would at least seem to refute the idea that consciousness has no > experimentally detectable consequences." > > "If you can close your eyes, and sense yourself sensing—if you can be > aware of yourself being aware, and think "I am aware that I am aware"—and > say out loud, "I am aware that I am aware"—then your consciousness is not > without effect on your internal narrative, or your moving lips. You can see > yourself seeing, and your internal narrative reflects this, and so do your > lips if you choose to say it out loud." > > In the act of reporting one's experience of their own consciousness, in > the act of catching the inner listener in the act of listening, is this > something that can be explained *without taking consciousness into account*? > That is the classic objection to epiphenomenalism, but if consciousness is supervenient, then the physical activity on which the consciousness supervenes also causes the physical activity describing the consciousness. A different objection is to double down on the idea that physical reality is causally closed. Advanced alien scientists who have no knowledge of human consciousness would not say about the motion of Eliezer Yudkovsky’s vocal cords, “we can’t explain that sequence of vibrations at the 2 minute mark, there must be some force acting on the vocal cords that we are unaware of”. The wind therefore can be said to have separate causal efficacy of its own, >> but consciousness cannot. This is perhaps a narrow, reductionist account >> and it misses out on all that is important about the mind and intelligence, >> but I think it is a valid difference. >> >> I view mental states as high-level states operating in their own regime >>>>> of causality (much like a Java computer program). The java computer >>>>> program >>>>> can run on any platform, regardless of the particular physical nature of >>>>> it. It has in a sense isolated itself from the causality of the electrons >>>>> and semiconductors, and operates in its own realm of the causality of if >>>>> statements, and for loops. Consider this program, for example: >>>>> >>>>> [image: twin-prime-program2.png] >>>>> >>>>> What causes the program to terminate? Is it the inputs, and the >>>>> logical relation of primality, or is it the electrons flowing through the >>>>> CPU? I would argue that the higher-level causality, regarding the logical >>>>> relations of the inputs to the program logic is just as important. It >>>>> determines the physics of things like when the program terminates. At this >>>>> level, the microcircuitry is relevant only to its support of the higher >>>>> level causal structures, but the program doesn't need to be aware of nor >>>>> consider those low-level things. It operates the same regardless. >>>>> >>>>> I view consciousness as like that high-level control structure. It >>>>> operates within a causal realm where ideas and thoughts have causal >>>>> influence and power, and can reach down to the lower level to do things >>>>> like trigger nerve impulses. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Here is a quote from Roger Sperry, who eloquently describes what I am >>>>> speaking of: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "I am going to align myself in a counterstand, along with that >>>>> approximately 0.1 per cent mentalist minority, in support of a >>>>> hypothetical >>>>> brain model in which consciousness and mental forces generally are given >>>>> their due representation as important features in the chain of control. >>>>> These appear as active operational forces and dynamic properties that >>>>> interact with and upon the physiological machinery. Any model or >>>>> description that leaves out conscious forces, according to this view, is >>>>> bound to be pretty sadly incomplete and unsatisfactory. The conscious mind >>>>> in this scheme, far from being put aside and dispensed with as an >>>>> "inconsequential byproduct," "epiphenomenon," or "inner aspect," as is the >>>>> customary treatment these days, gets located, instead, front and center, >>>>> directly in the midst of the causal interplay of cerebral mechanisms. >>>>> >>>>> Mental forces in this particular scheme are put in the driver's seat, >>>>> as it were. They give the orders and they push and haul around the >>>>> physiology and physicochemical processes as much as or more than the >>>>> latter >>>>> control them. This is a scheme that puts mind back in its old post, over >>>>> matter, in a sense-not under, outside, or beside it. It's a scheme that >>>>> idealizes ideas and ideals over physico-chemical interactions, nerve >>>>> impulse traffic-or DNA. It's a brain model in which conscious, mental, >>>>> psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning achievement of some five >>>>> hundred million years or more of evolution. >>>>> >>>>> [...] The basic reasoning is simple: First, we contend that conscious >>>>> or mental phenomena are dynamic, emergent, pattern (or configurational) >>>>> properties of the living brain in action -- a point accepted by many, >>>>> including some of the more tough-minded brain researchers. Second, the >>>>> argument goes a critical step further, and insists that these emergent >>>>> pattern properties in the brain have causal control potency -- just as >>>>> they >>>>> do elsewhere in the universe. And there we have the answer to the age-old >>>>> enigma of consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> To put it very simply, it becomes a question largely of who pushes >>>>> whom around in the population of causal forces that occupy the cranium. >>>>> There exists within the human cranium a whole world of diverse causal >>>>> forces; what is more, there are forces within forces within forces, as in >>>>> no other cubic half-foot of universe that we know. >>>>> >>>>> [...] Along with their internal atomic and subnuclear parts, the brain >>>>> molecules are obliged to submit to a course of activity in time and space >>>>> that is determined very largely by the overall dynamic and spatial >>>>> properties of the whole brain cell as an entity. Even the brain cells, >>>>> however, with their long fibers and impulse conducting elements, do not >>>>> have very much to say either about when or in what time pattern, for >>>>> example, they are going to fire their messages. The firing orders come >>>>> from >>>>> a higher command. [...] >>>>> >>>>> In short, if one climbs upward through the chain of command within the >>>>> brain, one finds at the very top those overall organizational forces and >>>>> dynamic properties of the large patterns of cerebral excitation that >>>>> constitute the mental or psychic phenomena. [...] >>>>> >>>>> Near the apex of this compound command system in the brain we find >>>>> ideas. In the brain model proposed here, the causal potency of an idea, or >>>>> an ideal, becomes just as real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve >>>>> impulse. Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact with >>>>> each other and with other mental forces in the same brain, in neighboring >>>>> brains, and in distant, foreign brains. And they also interact with real >>>>> consequence upon the external surroundings to produce in toto an explosive >>>>> advance in evolution on this globe far beyond anything known before, >>>>> including the emergence of the living cell." >>>>> >>>>> -- Roger Sperry <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Wolcott_Sperry> >>>>> in "Mind, Brain, and Humanist Values >>>>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/sperry/Mind_Brain_and_Humanist_Values.html>" >>>>> (1966) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Jason >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *> As you said previously, if consciousness had no effects, there >>>>>>> would be no reason for it to evolve in the first place.* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> What I said in my last post was "It must be because consciousness is >>>>>> the byproduct of something else that is not useless, there are no other >>>>>> possibilities". >>>>>> >>>>>> *> There is another possibility: consciousness is not useless.* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If consciousness is not useless from Evolution's point of view then >>>>>> it must produce "something" that natural selection can see, and if >>>>>> natural >>>>>> selection can see that certain "something" then so can you or me. So the >>>>>> Turing Test is not just a good test for intelligence it's also a good >>>>>> test >>>>>> for consciousness. The only trouble is, what is that "something"? >>>>>> Presumably whatever it is that "something" must be related to mind in >>>>>> some >>>>>> way, but If it is not intelligent activity then what the hell is it"? >>>>>> >>>>>> John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUibzDkhvbB3Ys90fjC8oZod%2B7scy39HsNJYQVTB0Tw26w%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUibzDkhvbB3Ys90fjC8oZod%2B7scy39HsNJYQVTB0Tw26w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypX1HAz7OCW-49aahL4DcxK%3DY%3DLbP%2BOT0cF7%2ByxVco7ebQ%40mail.gmail.com.
