On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 11:21:21PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> >>>>> "SGM" == Scott G Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> SGM> Different kind of security. Freenet is perfectly fine from a
> SGM> "Dont let anyone find out whats going on/being transmitted"
> SGM> sort of stance. The argument is over "Dont let anyone find
> SGM> out we're running Freenet" which is an arguable problem.
>
> I think that's the "cluster" idea. "Don't talk to strangers" means:
> "Even if someone knows I'm running Freenet, don't let them use my node
> to entrap me."
Yes, nobody denies that the cluster idea would be great if it actually
achieved its intentions without breaking Freenet, but there are serious
questions over its ability to achieve either of these requirements.
As Scott has pointed out, capturing the gateway node would provide a nice
neat list of nodes whose owners previously believed were safe as houses,
where as capturing a normal Freenet node would give you a somewhat random
list of other nodes which could be anywhere in the world.
On the second point, there are serious questions over whether one of
Brandon's clusters would be of significantly more value to Freenet than an
individual Freenet node, not to mention the obvious client/server
central-point-of-failure and host of "er, how do I find other trusted
nodes who trust me" issues which Brandon seems to feel are not our
problem, yet which has plagued systems such as ssh (ssh can be defeated
quite easily by a "Man in the Middle" attack without server
authentication, yet server authentication requires some effort (although
much less than a trusted-cluster approach would require) and almost nobody
does it).
Ian.
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