Eric,
Why would you ask about the pain IN the video? Shouldn't the person reply. "I 
don't believe in pain IN anything because, for me, pain is not internal it is 
external."

Nick,
That was a neat way of touching there square root of 2. If we changed it to the 
cube root of 2, we have a classic unsolved problem of Ancient Geek geometry 
--Duplicating the Cube: "To construct, with ruler and compasses, the length of 
the side of a cube which has twice the volume of a given cube". It has been 
proven (to the satisfaction of mathematicians)  that this is impossible.

Nick,
How can a person learn when he is hungry by observing other people? Perhaps he 
can recognize socially induced hunger (as in "at a party, we expect food") but 
do people usually detect low blood sugar in themselves  by observing the 
behavior of others? 

________________________________________
From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles 
[eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 04, 2016 9:23 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and cartoons

I'm not sure what to make of the cartoon comment either. Let's say we all agree 
that a person in front of us is in pain. Let's say we video tape that person 
and show it to someone else.

We ask our viewer afterwards "Did you see pain in that video?"

And he say "Yes."

Then we say, "Wait, you mean to tell me that those flat, pixilated colors on 
the screen were in pain?"

"No, no," they insist, "the person you video taped was in pain, the image 
itself wasn't!"

"But we asked you about the video," we assert confidently, "we want to know if 
there is pain in the video."

"Well, look... this is getting weird," he replies, "I'm leaving."

I kind of feel like we would end up in the same place if we tried to have a 
serious discussion about cartoons.

It is not, in Nick's position, an issue of a "sufficiently convincing 
performance." Certainly one can be fooled by people through various means, so 
we don't even need robots for that discussion. When we say, of a person that 
they gave a "convincing performance" what we mean is something like "When you 
look at a wider swath of that guy's behavior, you find that the chunk of 
behavior you originally studied is part of a very different pattern than you 
had originally assumed."

For example, a person who looks terribly dejected on a street corner holding a 
sign that speaks of their woes, but if you watch when they leave their post, 
they travel back to a perfectly middle-class house, change into nice clean 
clothes, and go about a normal life. That would be a "convincing performance." 
Note that we can speculate about whether it is a performance based on much less 
than that. Ultimately, however, we become certain it was "a performance" only 
by observing a larger swath of the world.





-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Lab Manager
Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning
American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
phone: (202) 885-3867   fax: (202) 885-1190
email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu>

On Fri, Mar 4, 2016 at 1:49 AM, Nick Thompson 
<nickthomp...@earthlink.net<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>> wrote:
Russ,

I am torn between judging your cartoon comment as silly or profound.

I have said that if a robot could be devised that was embedded in a social 
network of other robots, that systematically avoided injurious events and 
stimuli, that engaged in some communicative behavior when injured to which 
other robots responded by coming to its rescue, then I would have to entertain 
the notion that these robots experience pain.  To me, pain is all of that.  
Hard to imagine a cartoon doing that.  Hence my first judgment that the idea is 
frivolous.  (But probably not a lot more frivolous than my idea that motivation 
is like the first derivative of behavior.)   I think perhaps the comment 
confuses the map with the territory, as Bateson used to say.

So, now I am stuck with trying to figure out why I might possibly think it 
profound.  But let’s make the example as favorable to your case as we can.  Let 
it be the case that you experience me being horrible tortured by the CIA.  Do 
you experience pain.  If you are not a psychopath, probably yes.  Do you 
experience MY pain.  No, because my pain occurs against an entirely different 
history of experiences, including, by the way, the occlusion of my airway by 
the wet washcloth and the poured water. .

Something like that.

Nick





Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam 
[mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] On Behalf 
Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2016 10:12 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
<friam@redfish.com<mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and cartoons

Nick (and I think Eric) said that a sufficiently convincing performance of pain 
behavior by a robot is pain. I asked whether a sufficiently convincing animated 
depiction of pain behavior via a cartoon is also pain? In other words, can a 
cartoonist create pain by drawing it?

In asking that I don't mean the cartoonists own pain or pain in the viewer, but 
pain in the world in the same way that some third party has pain whether or not 
someone sees his pain behavior.

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