[email protected] (Hardee, Charles H) writes: > I, too, don't see how they can be more secure. > Possession is supposedly 9/10ths as the saying goes, but unless there's > something bio-metric in the chip/card/human being relationship, I would > have to say that the chips cards are no more, if not less, secure than > the regular plastic we use today.
re: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2010.html#71 Korean bank Moves back to Mainframes (...no, not back) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2010.html#72 Korean bank Moves back to Mainframes (...no, not back) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2010.html#73 Korean bank Moves back to Mainframes (...no, not back) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2010.html#77 Korean bank Moves back to Mainframes (...no, not back) as previously mentioned the "yes card" scenario for chipcard resulted in bigger infrastructure vulnerability and more fraud than traditional magstripe. supposedly the chipcard was hard to counterfeit *AND* had two-factor authentication (chip/plastic: "somthing you have" and PIN: "somthing you know"). from three factor authentication model, misc. posts http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#3factor * something you have * something you know * something you are the assumption that multiple factor authentication is more secure than single factor is based on different authentication factors having different vulnerabilities. the problem with skimming (whether for the "yes card" or magstripe) ... is it is possible to have a single compromise process (end-point skimming compromise) ... invalidating the assumption about different factors having different vulnerabilities. In the case of multi-factor authentication magstripe (plastic/magstripe & PIN) ... a compromised end-point skims both the magstripe information and the PIN. in the "yes card" scenario, a compromised end-point skims the information used by terminals to establish a valid chipcard. the crooks then install the skimmed information (similar to information skimmed for counterfeit magstripe) in a counterfeit "yes card" chip. once a terminal has accepted the chipcard's validation information, it then asks the chipcard 1) whether the correct PIN has been entered (a "yes card" always answers "YES" ... so it isn't necessary to even know/skim the PIN), 2) whether the transaction should be offline ("YES"), and 3) whether the transaction is within the account credit limit ("YES"). in counterfeit magstripe scenario, the account number is eventually invalidated at the backend database (and future transactions are rejected). In the counterfeit "YES CARD" scenario, the terminal doesn't go online to find out about any account number invalidation. the greater counterfeit "YES CARD" fraud is because infrastructure business rules have been moved into the chipcard (infrastructure relying on the chipcard to decide whether it is online/offline transaction and whether the transaction is within the account's credit limit). misc. past "yes card" posts http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#yescard one of the issues with "something you are" biometrics ... is that nominally biometrics information is reduced to some sort of electronic pattern for matching against value stored in backend database. If that value is compromised (analogous to "something you know" PIN/passwords) ... it is difficult to issue a new finger or iris. Frequently biometrics are most dependable ... when they involve secure sensors/endpoints ... that possibly are under constant surveillance by armed guards. -- 40+yrs virtualization experience (since Jan68), online at home since Mar1970 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
