Bruce,
thanks for info. I had installed IMail first, and later installed IIS. I do 
believe most strongly in keeping a machine patched etc. The IMail I got was 
with the integratged NAV, and it has causght a few infected emails. The web 
server has three or four sites, with some having sharepoint enabled. I think 
it would be easier for me to move imail than sharepoint-enables sites, giving 
MS's instructions and information on moving such sites. What I will have to 
do is get another router, in addition to another server, as I have a NT4 
server serving as a PDC, a win2k server (with AD) serving up Oracle 
databases, and the win2k server running IMail and IIS. With your information 
I should not have much trouble I think in getting the ok. Dell's low-end 
server has worked well for our small organization (10-15 users). I am new to 
this discussion list so I have not seen any priors on the port 80 issue, and 
I don't recall anything in the manual, but I will go back and review that. If 
you have specific links at this time, I would be most interested in looking 
them up.

Thanks,
John

On Monday 17 February 2003 01:11 pm, you wrote:
> John (et al);
>
> The issue of iMail and IIS co-existing on a single server is both
> documented in the manual and has been well discussed (in fact beaten to
> death - no offense meant to anyone who didn't see or participate in those
> discussions) on this forum on several occasions.  Both the iMail web
> interface and the IIS web interface use port 80.
>
> Since they both use port 80 for the web interface, you have to jump thru
> some pretty elaborate hoops to make them work together simultaneously - but
> that was not the entire reason that I brought up the issue of them being on
> the same server.
>
> The real SECURITY issue for IIS (and SQL Server) is that the security on
> those two items must be AIR TIGHT or hackers WILL find ways to get around
> the programs and install programs onto the servers, change security levels
> and send spam without the server owner ever realizing that it has ever been
> done.
>
> When it comes to security, both IIS and SQL Server have many well known
> security issues.  If you haven't installed ALL of the available patches
> from Microsoft then your installation of Microsoft's IIS or SQL Server is a
> sitting duck for a hacker. (see:
> http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=FH;[LN];sp&; and scroll down
> to the middle of the page where you will find the "Server Products" list)
>
> Web servers traditionally have FRONT PAGE extensions or FTP portals for the
> people who design and host the web sites to send their files up to the
> server.  These present another set of security problems where both
> programs, viruses and worms can be introduced into the machines.  And NO
> Microsoft based server should ever have TELNET installed or enabled.  It
> cannot be properly secured.  Windows 2000 allows the use of Terminal Server
> for remote access and control and can be installed without the payment of
> any license or royalty fees if it is used only for administrative accounts.
>
> In today's environment, the rule of thumb should be to dedicate servers to
> a SINGLE JOB and not start mixing the reason's for their existence.  If you
> have a e-mail server, it should do nothing except process e-mail.
>
> If you have a web server, it should do nothing except server up web pages.
>
> If you have a DNS server, it should do nothing except maintain DNS entries
> and give out DNS information.
>
> We still have one DNS server that we inherited from the old IT staff at
> Rinella and it is the one that runs iMail for us.  They had done no
> maintenance to the box, never cleaned out any of the files and the main
> logical drive - the "C" drive was almost completely filled up.  We finally
> cleaned up all of the DNS entries so they had both the "A" and "PTR"
> records they were supposed to have and the next thing we will do is
> purchase another box to move the iMail to.
>
> The current box is a Dell server with 3 SCSI drives and two 1.4 MHz
> processors.  When the DNS was really busy (we also act as a primary DNS
> server to several of our clients who run WINS in their networks so it can
> generate a substantial amount of traffic) and one of our hosted clients
> would send out a mass e-mail to more than 3,000 recipients (one of our
> clients, a genealogy group, send out to more than 8,000 recipients on their
> list at a time), about half the e-mails would never be sent, and about a
> third would end up in the dead-letter office.  Since we cleaned up the
> trash files, compressed all of the logs we want to keep and deleted the
> rest of them, we gained back about 1/2 of the "C" drive and there is very
> little rejection or loss when even the largest of lists gets sent out.
>
> Remember, too, that while Microsoft doesn't document this, you must ALWAYS
> have at least 1/4 of your the drive on which your OS is installed (your
> ROOT drive) free for the OS to work with any given time.  If you get to
> having less than that on any Microsoft based server, you will notice a
> considerable slowdown in the machine's performance.  If you completely fill
> up an NT Server's root drive, and shut the machine down, you will never be
> able to boot the machine again.
>
> As a general rule of thumb, I always install a single package to a server.
> It makes it a little more expensive when you consider the cost of the
> server and the OS package, but my servers are only down when I am doing
> maintenance on them and I have only been hacked on one server on one
> occasion.  That was caused when we had a new kid to whom we gave the
> assignment to do the OS install on the server and he did not follow the
> checklist that we provided him - he followed the Microsoft instructions.
>
> When we looked at the cost of purchasing the hardware and OS, vs the cost
> of the time spent troubleshooting, chasing problems and otherwise defending
> ourselves against hackers, the cost of purchasing a separate box and the OS
> to install won hands down.
>
> Install to iMail on it's own server.
> Get rid of any unnecessary background programs.
> Run a recommended anti-virus and/or spam program on the iMail box.
> Run NORTON Corporate Edition on everything else.
> Run a firewall.
> Compress the old logs you must keep and delete what you can.
> Eliminate relaying.
> Keep the "C" drive clean, with at least 25% free space.
> Run a good defrag program.
> LOG EVERYTHING.
> Set your local security policy to LOCK OUT any account that has more than 3
> invalid password attempts in a five-hour period and keep them locked out
> until you MANUALLY reset them.
>
> If you follow these guidelines, you should have very little problems with
> hackers or viruses.
> The initial cost will be a little higher, but it will actually SAVE you
> both time and money in the long run.
>
> Bruce Barnes, CEO
> Rinella Internet Services, Chicago IL
> In the long run, it's always cheaper to do it right the first time.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of John K. Dyer
> Sent: Monday, February 17, 2003 10:26
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: L RE: [IMail Forum] imail, meltdown
>
>
> Bruce
> could you elaborate more on why you said you should never have IIS and
> IMail installed at the same time? What problems/syptoms would I see in this
> case. How is port 80 figuring in Imail (other than webmail, webcalendar)?
>
> I have some issues with mail not getting delivered to users from certain
> domains; this may be a separate issue, maybe not?
>
> Thanks, John
>
> On Monday 17 February 2003 08:10 am, you wrote:
> > Timothy,
> >
> > I think you have finally hit on the magic words: "This is a very clean
> > install, just iis, iMail [and] Sql on the box, as it is to be kept clean
> > being used as a development server."
> >
> > If you are running IMail on the box, then you should NEVER have IIS
> > installed at the same time.  They cannot comfortably share port 80 unless
> > you go about enabling that setup EXACTLY the right way.
> >
> > The other issue here is the SQL install.  There are numerous known
> > hackers issues with both IIS and SQL.
> >
> > If you are running Windows NT or 2000, did you REMOVE the EVERYONE group
> > completely from all of the directory permissions BEFORE you installed
> > IMail? (see how to do that in the article I have included below).
> >
> > The company I own, ChicagoNetTech, recently purchased a company called
> > Rinella Internet Services.  Rinella Internet Services was (and still is)
> > ruining IMail.  We initially thought about switching all of the user
> > accounts on them to another product and decided against it after giving
> > IMail a thorough look.  In fact, we have been negotiating the purchase of
> > Rinella for almost 18 months and joined this group as part of our
> > research on the purchase of the company,
> >
> > They also had several problems relating to spam and relaying that were
> > not totally resolved by just using the built in solutions that IMail
> > provides. After some substantial research, we found that the server they
> > were
>
> running
>
> > the IMail software on was providing the opportunity for the hackers and
> > spammers to get in via the security loopholes in the OS.
> >
> > Here is a document from the former head of It Security for the US Secrete
> > Service that discusses Windows 2000 Security - much of what he says is
>
> also
>
> > pertinent to Windows NT as well.
> >
> > This was originally published in a newsletter that I get from a group I
> > am a member of and I am passing it on to you (and everyone else on here)
> > because it is extremely important to have your SECURITY properly setup on
> > any machine BEFORE YOU INSTALL ANY SOFTWARE on the machine.
> >
> > Here's my suggestion to solve your problems:
> >
> >   1: Completely wipe the machine of everything. - REFORMAT ALL OF THE
> > HARD DRIVES and START OVER.
> >
> >   2: Install your OS and apply the security instructions included in the
> > article below
> >
> >   3: Install ALL MICROSOFT SECURITY PATCHES
> >
> >   4: Install SQL SERVER
> >
> >   5: Install SQL SERVER Service Pack III
> >
> >   6: Check the Windows UPDATE web site.  Scan for UPDATES and install
> > ONLY the CRITICAL UPDATES.  DO NOT INSTALL ANY of the .NET updates.  DO
> > NOT install any of the language packages that you don't absolutely
> > require.
> >
> >   7: Get rid of any GAMES, video players, ENTERTAINMENT software, coding
> > software and any other software that auto-installs on the server and
> > check for patches AGAIN to make certain you haven't removed anything. 
> > Remember, a server should NEVER be simultaneously used as a workstation.
> >
> >   8: REINSTALL Windows 2000 Service Pack 3 - if you have added or changed
> > anything since your original install, it is quite possible that you have
> > overwritten some of the updated files.
> >
> >   9: Install IMail and configure your main domain.  If you have any
>
> virtual
>
> > domains, then configure them as well.
> >
> > 10: Test your IMail server.
> >
> > 11: RENAME your GUEST ACCOUNT to something other than guest.
> >
> > 12: Do not allow anyone who doesn't absolutely need to log into the
> > server to have a login on that server that is enabled as a "login locally
> > to server" account.
> >
> > 13: Do not install any shared printers to this machine.  It is OK to
> > install a printer that is located on another machine, but change the
> > permissions on the printer so that NO ONE can use the printer on the
>
> server
>
> > except the SYSTEM and the ADMINISTRATOR.
> >
> > Bruce Barnes, CEO
> > Rinella Internet Services, Chicago IL
> >
> >
> >
> > Here is the article from Mike Mullens, former Assistant Network
> > Administrator for the US Secret Service.
> >
> > REMEMBER - ALWAYS MAKE A BACKUP COPY OF YOUR REGISTRY BEFORE MAKING
>
> CHANGES
>
> > TO THE REGISTRY!
> >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >-
>
> -
>
> >- -----------------------
> >
> > PLAY BY THE RULES FOR WIN2K SECURITY
> >
> > Security fixes and patches are useless if your Windows 2000 server is
> > placed on the network without a secure configuration. You can
>
> significantly
>
> > reduce your server's vulnerability and eliminate denial of service
> > attacks by following seven simple rules.
> >
> > RULE 1
> >
> > Remove all unnecessary programs and Windows Components. You can do this
>
> via
>
> > the Control Panel's Add/Remove Programs module. (Why patch a service or
> > program that shouldn't be running in the first place?)
> >
> > RULE 2
> >
> > Disable unneeded services. A significant number of services and
> > background processes are installed and started by default; disable any
> > services that aren't absolutely necessary for your server's everyday
> > performance. This
>
> is
>
> > done via the Services module under Administrative Tools.
> >
> > For a complete listing of Windows 2000 services and a description of
> > their purpose, take a look at Microsoft's Glossary of Windows 2000
> > Services.
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/management/w2kserv
>
> >i ces.asp
> >
> > RULE 3
> >
> > Change User Rights. By default, User Rights is wide open. Close this hole
> > with the following recommendations for specifying Group or User rights.
> >
> > 1. Access this computer from the network--Remove the Everyone Group and
> > replace it with a group that's more restrictive, such as Authenticated
> > Users. [NOTE:  Make certain you ADD the AUTHENTICATED USERS group BEFORE
> > you delete the EVERYONE group,  You need to do this with EVERY LOGICAL
> > DRIVE
> >
> > 2. Bypass Traverse Checking--Remove the Everyone Group and replace it
> > with Authenticated Users.
> >
> > 3. Create Permanent Shared Objects--Replace with Administrators Group
>
> only.
>
> > 4. Logon Locally--Replace with Administrators by username and Service
> > Accounts. I recommend by username because this creates an additional
> > security mechanism in case a rogue user tries to gain console access with
>
> a
>
> > tool that escalates the user's privilege to Administrator.
> >
> > 5. Shutdown System--Replace with Administrators Group only.
> >
> > RULE 4
> >
> > Synchronize your clocks and enable auditing. If you're going to compare
> > logs from different systems after a security incident, all of your
> > systems must have the same time. Auditing will track changes to your
> > system when employed properly. At a minimum, audit these events for both
> > Success and Failure:
> >
> > * Account logon events
> > * Account management
> > * Directory service access
> > * Logon events
> > * Object access (monitor for failure only)
> > * Policy change
> > * Privilege use
> > * Restart, Shutdown, and System
> >
> > RULE 5
> >
> > Disable unnecessary file sharing. Unless absolutely necessary, remove
> > hidden drive letters and remote admin shares (ADMIN$, C$, D$, etc.). To
> > remove these admin shares permanently, set the registry key
>
> AutoShareServer
>
> > to 0. This key is found at:
>
> HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameter
>
> >s
> >
> > If the key isn't present, add a value of type REG_DWORD and set that to
> > 0. This permanently disables all automatic hidden shares.
> >
> > RULE 6
> >
> > Set and enforce strict file level and registry permissions. Go through
>
> your
>
> > directories and verify that only specific groups have access to the
> > information contained within them. Restrict anonymous users from
> > accessing the registry. This can be done by a registry key:
> > HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\restrictanonymous
> >
> > Or via a Group Policy:
> >
> > Group Policy\Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security
> > Settings\Local Policies\Security Options\Additional restrictions for
> > anonymous connections
> >
> > The values for the registry key or the Group Policy Object are:
> >
> > 1=Do not allow enumeration of SAM accounts and shares.
> > 2=No access without explicit anonymous permissions.
> >
> > RULE 7
> >
> > Minimize your servers' exposure to denial of service attacks. Windows
> > 2000 allows you to adjust the TCP/IP parameters to have greater control
> > over connection state. Take advantage of this by modifying the following
> > hive with these registry entries:
> >
> > HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
> >
> > 1. SynAttackProtect: REG_DWORD=2. Drops third packets of the TCP/IP
> > handshake in an attempt to consume available session handles.
> >
> > 2. TcpMaxHalfOpen: REG_DWORD=500. Limits the number of half-opened TCP
> > sessions.
> >
> > 3. EnablePMTUDiscovery: REG_DWORD=0. Prevents the use of nonstandard Path
> > Maximum Transmission Unit size for all external connections.
> >
> > 4. Netbt\Parameters\NoNameReleaseOnDemand: REG_DWORD = 1. Prevents an
> > external host request for the server's NetBIOS name.
> >
> > 5. EnableDeadGWDetect REG_DWORD = 0. Prevents a server from switching
> > gateways and allowing an attacker to hijack a session.
> >
> > 6. EnableICMPRedirects: REG_DWORD = 0. Prevents an external host from
> > modifying the server's routing table.
> >
> > 7. DisableIPSourceRouting: REG_DWORD=1. Disables client source routing
> > attempts.
> >
> > Patching a poor configuration is useless until you add the first layer of
> > security to your operating system: Locking down the operating system is
>
> the
>
> > start of any deployment. After your operating system is secure, verify
>
> that
>
> > your server isn't listening on any ports that aren't integral to its
> > day-to-day operation and block all nonessential traffic from the Internet
> > to your system. Security is a layered approach, and this list is by no
> > means complete. But it's a start to hardening Internet-exposed servers.
> >
> > NOTE: Be sure to back up the registry before editing it so that you can
> > restore it if something goes wrong.
> >
> > Mike Mullins has served as a database administrator and assistant network
> > administrator for the U.S. Secret Service. He is a Network Security
> > Administrator for the Defense Information Systems Agency.
> >
> > ---------------------
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Timothy
> > Hunold-Cre8ive guy
> > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2003 00:57
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: RE: [IMail Forum] imail, meltdown
> >
> >
> > Weblogs just show me logging in, or trying to, that is when I realized
>
> that
>
> > my web was down. Why would a dictionary attack cause web to crash, it
>
> would
>
> > be more efficient to do it via pop3... You would have to be doing post
> > commands all day long.
> >
> > Why google? I would get vague info... The specific info I am seeking is
> > as it pertains to imail. I had used Kendra, and other dictionary attacks
> > to test my own servers back on v6.04... but at the same time, that was
> > not spawing email. I have all mail cc'd to another account, and I get all
>
> sorts
>
> > of stuff on Chinatimes, and other far eastern asia related topics. Seems
> > like it is relaying, and even if it is a dictionary attack, I find think
>
> it
>
> > might take about 100 years to reach my password in mixed case, and it
> > also is an acronym for a very highly specific industry term, along with a
> > sequence of numbers. It is the kind of thing that will never occur in any
> > language.
> >
> > I guess it sounds like a game of who can hold their breath longer. But in
> > the meantime, my server has been under attack for 2 weeks.
> >
> > I want to know why webmail keeps crashing after i change the ports at
> > random?
> >
> > This is a very clean install, just iis, imail sql on the box, as it is to
> > be kept clean being used as a development server.
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Jason Newland
> > Sent: Sunday, February 16, 2003 10:38 PM
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: RE: [IMail Forum] imail, meltdown
> >
> >
> > As I said before, you are seeing a dictionary attack, nothing else. 
> > There are several ways to stop or reduce these, just google for
> > dictionary attack. A 9 meg smtp log file isn't overly large, but in order
> > to "prove" your original theory correct, we need to see the web logs
> > where your attacker is doing the attacking.....
>
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>
>
>
>
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