Keith,
> if yahoo.com thinks there's any value at all in the client's IP address,
> they're deluded.
>
> the only way to reliably know a client is if the client presents you with
> cryptographic proof that they sent that message, and you trust the keying
> material on which that proof is based.
I completely agree with you if the goal is to know *who* the
client is, for any reasonable meaning of *who*. But that is
*NOT* the goal. For MIPv6, the *final* goal is to learn if
the client is *authorized* to create bindings, i.e. source
routes, for the _home address_ that it is using. The process
to learn whether it is authorized or not is basically a two
step process:
Step 1. Detect if the client wants to use the default
authorization mechanism, i.e. RR, or something
stronger.
Step 2. Use the authorization mechanism to detect if
the client is really authorized.
It was an _explicit_ IESG requirement that the authorization
mechanism MUST NOT rely on trusted third parties, i.e. on
a security infrastructure. Hence the "infrastructureless"
methods.
If we want to take the security-infrastructureless route,
we have little to build up but the routing infrastructure
and the addresses.
(The secure ND case does not apply for an arbitrary client
for contacting yahoo.com. I'm too tired to try to think
generally right now, and to work out more generic examples.)
--Pekka Nikander
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