Tuk wrote: The question is, if idealism and the MOQ are both bad ideas, can idealism still be good for understanding the MOQ?
Why start with ‘the MOQ is a bad idea’? If that is your starting point, why should Dan or dmb or anyone bother to discuss the MOQ with you? On Sat., 05 Nov. 2016 at 12:40 am m...@tuukkavirtaperko.net < mailto:m...@tuukkavirtaperko.net > wrote: a, pre, code, a:link, body { word-wrap: break-word !important; } dmb, all, I'm pleased by your reply, dmb. It will take some time for me to write mine. I've began writing a response but it's a work in progress. However, at this point I might summarize what I found in LC that pertains to the Heinous Quadrilemma. Pirsig does state that idealism is good for understanding the MOQ. The question is, if idealism and the MOQ are both bad ideas, can idealism still be good for understanding the MOQ? I think so. Smoking cigarettes and jumping off the roof of a tall building are both bad ideas, but sometimes someone might attempt to persuade a smoker to quit by asking: "Why wouldn't you as well jump off a tall building?" This way the persuader attempts to make the smoker associate smoking with death. It probably doesn't usually work but sometimes it might. So, yes, a bad idea can be good for understanding another bad idea, but the ideas are still bad. The Heinous Quadrilemma remains. Regards, Tuk Lainaus David Harding < mailto:da...@goodmetaphysics.com >: > Tuk, > > FWIW I can find very little I disagree with dmb here. Main difference being > dmb has been kind enough to spend the time to go through each of your > comments and reply. > > I hope you take on board what he says here. > > Thanks, > > David. > > On Nov. 4, 2016 at 5:46 am, david < mailto:dmbucha...@hotmail.com > wrote: > > > > > ________________________________ > Tukka said: Dan and I were just arguing whether truth is equivalent with > good. Seems > like I was right. The word "mainly" implies there's also something else > to good than truth. > > dmb says: Pirsig identifies the MOQ with Pragmatism (a theory of truth) and > approvingly quotes William James saying, "Truth is a species of the Good". > More specifically, the MOQ divides the Good into four levels of static > values so that health is a biological species of the Good, wealth and fame > are a social species of the Good, and truth is an intellectual level kind > of Good. So truth isn't equivalent to the Good simply because it's not the > only kind of Good. > > "[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I > think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I > just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of > all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes." > > Tukka said: > > Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also > impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an > article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal > rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious". > However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of > static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's > just the general notion of static value that's undefinable. > > dmb says: > > This is very confusing. (A) You say Pirsig fails to mention a point that he > just mentioned, (B) you contradict that point for no apparent reason, and > (C) you say the theory can be defined but the general notion can't be > defined for no apparent reason. I'd be surprised if anyone can make sense > of that. > > > Tukka said: ...we here are obviously incapable of innovation if it > involves criticism of Pirsig. Even if the need for innovation could be > deductively proven we just wouldn't do it because, instead of > understanding that the MOQ requires us to replace worse ideas with > better ones, we'd be socially loyal to Pirsig and that's it. > > > dmb says: > > While I agree that social level values shouldn't get in the way of seeking > truth, I also think any fair and neutral observing would say that you're > letting pride stand in the way of getting questions to your answers. You're > letting ego stand in the way of even entertaining the possibility that > somebody might teach you something, aren't you? Please consider the obvious > hostility with which you responded to my answers: "You've pretended you're > my mentor and then posted me a pep talk," you said. "Because, if someone > reads that really carelessly, he or she might actually believe you're my > mentor. That I'm a novice, struggling to understand the MOQ, but you > already do and you're so generous you give me a pep talk," you added. I > think that sort of reaction is intellectually immature and irresponsible > and that no fruitful conversation can occur under such conditions. > > > Tukka said: I'd like a more precise definition of "objective scientific > instrument". Are questionnaires and social sciences objective? If not, why > not? [...] Generally speaking, social sciences are considered empirical > sciences as opposed to normative sciences. And don't we subscribe to > empiricism? Well, a social scientist could distinguish a king from a > commoner. > > > dmb says: > > There's a long discussion in Lila concerning the problem with "objectivity" > in the social sciences. That section would supply some answers. But it's > also an issue with which social science still grapples constantly. Since > the subject matter is not purely physical, the standard scientific methods > used in the physical sciences have to be adapted. The methods and > procedures used by social scientists are usually explained in great detail > so that each paper or Journal article will include a fairly substantial > section devoted to those methods. Ideally, anyone working at the graduate > level of any field will be able to explain what counts as valid evidence > and truth within that field so that they are, in effect, philosophers of > that discipline. Basically, the methods and standards need to be > appropriate to the nature of the subject matter and, obviously, physics and > anthropology have very different objects of study. > > "[50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. [To say SOM is identical to the > intellectual level of the MOQ] It seems to exclude non-subject-object > constructions such as symbolic logic, higher mathematics, and computer > languages from the intellectual level and gives them no home. Also the term > 'quality' as used in the MOQ would be excluded from the intellectual level. > In fact, the MOQ, which gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, > would also have to be excluded from the intellectual level." > > Tukka said: Important point for my case. I've been accused of trying to > impose SOM > on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM. > Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore. > > dmb says: > > Pirsig is explaining why it's "too restrictive" to say that SOM is > identical to the intellectual level, right? And so he's pointing out some > intellectual things that are not SOM. This has no bearing on whether or not > you've understood the relation between SOM and the MOQ. I have already > offered some criticism of exactly that - But that was done without making > any references to symbolic logic or regular logic. > > What Pirsig's point tells us is that SOM is an intellectual pattern among > other intellectual patterns, not the whole level. But please notice that > this is a major demotion, a huge reduction in rank for SOM. Within SOM, > subjects and objects are metaphysical, the very structure of reality, the > real substance of the universe. But in the MOQ, SOM is just a concept, an > abstraction invented by the human mind for human purposes. And we have to > take the same attitude toward the static levels of the MOQ, as an idea > invented for human purposes and not reality itself. In the MOQ, words and > concepts take you away from reality, not toward it. But we can talk about > words and think about ideas because those are knowable and definable, by > definition. (And that's why it would be a mistake to "have a theory that > accounts for symbolic logic, higher mathematics and programming languages > by placing them into a metaphysical category".) This error of treating > abstractions as if they were actual existiential realities is called > "reification" or, as Whitehead put it, "the fallacy of misplaced > concreteness". > > > Tukka said: The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to imply it > does, > though. I feel this way. Am I wrong? > > dmb says: > > I don't know who implied such a thing but logical contradictions are > invalid in the MOQ, just as they are in any other philosophy. But there is > plenty of room for criticizing Rationalistic philosophies like Hegel's, > wherein reality reality itself is supposed to be logically structured. > Logic is about the quality of thought, not the structure of reality. > > Pirsig explains his motives for attempting to solve the > mind-matter-problem this way: "Hugo: I don't agree on much of what > Merriam has to say. For one, his way of handling the Schrödinger Cat > paradox [59] RMP: I think this paradox exists as a result of the > materialist history of scientific thinking. Scientists often forget that > all scientific knowledge is subjective knowledge based on experience, > although science does not deny that this is true." > > "does not deny that this is true" doesn't mean "asserts that this is > true". This is because science is objective, not subjective, and has > little to say about subjectivity. > > Continued to a description of MOQ idealism: "All objects are in fact > mental constructs based on experience. If we do not forget this and > start with experience as the beginning point of the experiment, rather > than objective quantum particles as the beginning point of the > experiment, the paradox seems to vanish." > > This is one of the things of which people sometimes assume I don't > understand them. I don't know what reason I give them to suppose so. The > intention of this statement isn't to suggest that logical analysis may > not be performed within the MOQ. > > "The existence of collective masses of electrons can be inferred from > experience and there is every reason to think they exist independently > of the mind. But in the case of the spin of an *individual* electron, > there is *no* experience. In addition, the nature of the Heisenberg > Theory of Indeterminacy prevents any inference from general collective > experience of electrons to certify the spin of any individual electron. > If you can't experience something and you can't infer it either, then > you have no scientific basis for saying that it exists." > > I have inferred the Heinous Quadrilemma. Therefore it exists. > > "Maggie: The MOQ also says that every Quality event results in one > object and one subject. [60] RMP: It says subjects and objects are > deduced from quality events, but many quality events occur without a > resultant subject and object." > > I agree. > > "Maggie: The initial connection between leader and follower may be > formed by a Quality event at any level, but must be maintained by the > social level. [62] RMP: In the case of the military, where deserters are > executed by firing squad, you can say that leadership is maintained by > the biological and inorganic levels; that is, handcuffs and bullets." > > What does this make of military rank? That it is just a biological > pattern? That a lieutenant is not obeyed by his subordinates because of > his rank but because he seems like tough guy? > > I think Pirsig's definition is offensive towards soldiers. The French > Foreign Legion has some kind of a oath the soldiers have to swear. A > soldier obeying commands is operating at the social level. > > From the SODV (Subjects, Objects, Data and Values) paper: > "In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: > mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object > does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be > independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived > from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs > at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing. > It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of > the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality > is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made > possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject > and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is > deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of > the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the > cause of the Quality! > And: > [65] RMP: ...In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all > subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the > observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In > the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation > creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.' > Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where > there are no observations?'' > > Tukka said: > Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If > it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared > as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a > deduction has an undefined concept as a premise? > > > dmb says: > > Yes, deduced. This is what I've been trying to tell you about the relations > between SOM and the MOQ, about the place of subjects and objects in the > MOQ. The real deal with subjects and objects, I answered in response to > your question, is that they are not really real. They're just ideas derived > from experience. And that's what Pirsig is saying here. In all > subject-object metaphysics, he says, both the object and the subject are > assumed to exist prior to the observation but in the MOQ, the intellectual > patterns called 'observed' and 'observer' are derived from experience. This > is not idealism, by the way, because it puts experience first, not mind or > subjectivity. This point is also made at the end of chapter 29 of Lila and > there you'll see that he and William James call this radical empiricism, > not idealism. > > > Tukka said: ...but complementarity doesn't allow multiple contradictory > views to > coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And > the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the > only context provided for idealism is "true ideas". > > dmb says: > > The MOQ is the context, which means Pragmatic truth, which means that truth > is plural - among other things. In Pragmatism truth is not what corresponds > to the one and only objective reality but it has to agree with the > experience when it's put into practice for a particular purpose. Idealism > doesn't make much sense when you're doing empirical science but materialism > will work even if it's not true in any ultimate sense or in any > metaphysical sense. Physics isn't necessarily any truer than philosophy or > poetry and each domain is allowed to have its own standards of excellence. > > > And just one more. I'm out of time and steam. > > > [73] RMP: In the MOQ, the > static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object > and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual > patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to > help prevent confusion later on." > > > Tukka said: It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now. > > > dmb says: > > I think you've hereby admitted that you're confused about the relation > between SOM and the MOQ, about how to map subjects and objects onto the > four levels of value. If I try to help with that confusion, you might want > to consider thanking me instead of scolding me. It hardly seems fair to > pose the question and then attack those who presume to answer, you know? > > https://<a%20href= /antivirus">https:// www.avast.com /antivirus > Avast | Download Free Antivirus for PC, Mac & Android< > https://<a%20href= /antivirus">https:// www.avast.com /antivirus> > www.avast.com > Protect your devices with the best free antivirus on the market. Download > Avast antivirus and anti-spyware protection for your PC, Mac and Android. > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > MOQ Online - MOQ_Discuss< http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > moq.org > Robert M. Pirsig's MoQ deals with the fundamentals of existence and > provides a more coherent system for understanding reality than our current > paradigms allow > > > Tuukka said: > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
