> Using your google or twitter account to secure you communications (like > webRTC is planning to do to secure the DTLS self-signed certificates) seems > not appopriate at all to me, you are increasing unnecessarly the (already > huge) > influence of these entities which can become the attackers.
No idea what you're talking about. No one is suggesting using goog/twit for anything. We're saying run legacy p2p and other apps over secure anonymous networks. >>> Maybe http://www.peersm.com >> >> No. The slides show use of clearnet interface to BT/web so those >> RTC exit 'browsers/people' running it there are still at risk. Quite >> uncool for peersm users to offload their content risk onto such >> gateways via tor protocol. > > What is uncool compared to a Tor exit node? The facilitators are bridging to > bt/web, until the bt clients can talk the browser's language (WebSocket, > WebRTC), they are not really necessary for the web since you can access the > Tor network via WebSockets. It is uncool for the consumers on the left of the 'principles' slide to offload their risk of 'filesharing' behaviour onto the 'facilitators that run bt/web over clearnet' on the right half of the slide. While such 'facilitators' may wish to take on that risk for the users on the left, it's all still a waste of a clearnet game. There's no reason p2p filesharing has to talk to clearnet when all peers can just move themselves safely and entirely onto and within anonymous networks forevermore. p2p is by definition without need to centralized corporate clearnet hubs. It is peers talking to peers, they make up their own network base. So this insistence people have on building insecure non-anon p2p protocols in the clear over clearnet is old. Yes p2p/dht is often necessary to distribute load over anonymous nodes in slower anon nets. That p2p/dht/anonet technology does in fact need development help in scaling up to millions of users. > But even if bt clients could talk with peersm users this does not solve the > issues of bt protocol, really too transparent. >> >> "they're not solveable with clearnet solutions. ... BT is and will be >> insufficient until you [run it entirely within] an anonymous net, or it >> becomes one itself" > > That's what we are trying to propose with peersm protocol. No, that peersm slide seems to protect the users at the left over their torlike circuits at the expense of the facilitators exposure on the right. This is not a solution to the 'takedown' issue since the facilitators will still get 'takedown'. If you put both left and right sides, and far right side of 'bittorrent network' and 'web sites' all under anonymous networks you would have no problem. Peersm does not do that so it is an incomplete solution to takedown issue, particularly with bidirectional bt protocol. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
