Hello Mara!
I want to say that only a pluralist would say it is possible to model monism with pluralism – and as a monist I want to say that one can’t do that. J Cathy *From:* Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com] *Sent:* Saturday, 17 May 2014 1:50 a.m. *To:* Catherine Legg *Cc:* peirce List *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality Cathy, List, Thank you for your thoughtful reply. You said, "This is very good but I want to call it 'modeling monism'". Perhaps we mean the same thing: modeling monism with pluralism? Mara Woods On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz> wrote: Mara - it is interesting to think about whether the nature of the final opinion would be so very much more highly developed than our current beliefs as to be unrecognisable by us as the truth even were we 'hit over the head with it', so to speak. I wonder whether the pragmatic maxim might have a role to play, though, in anchoring both sets of beliefs in specific expectations about how the world will behave based on those beliefs, which will serve to make their meaning, well, clear. So for instance a frog understands flies in a very basic rudimentary way, and an entomologist in a highly sophisticated way. But both expect the fly to pass them by in a particular kind of trajectory. In a later message, you wrote: "Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In other words: modeling pluralism." This is very good but I want to call it "modeling monism" :-) Cathy On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Mara Woods <mara.wo...@gmail.com> wrote: Gary, List, I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take my attention this week. Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. Mara Woods On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: Mara, list, Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed further reflection. You wrote: MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of them. As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. You concluded: MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods <mara.wo...@gmail.com> wrote: List, Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies principles outside of logic itself. As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of nominalism versus realism. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the first sections of the chapter. Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic components of the universe. Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, is to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a shared opinion about it. If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the sign and its final interpretant in a later post). Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of final beliefs are real. It seems that the import of the intellectual effect of intellectual concepts comes from the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only the consequences for rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because only the habits of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the consequences of, and intentionally maintains are rightly considered beliefs? Or is it because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically applied to those consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational conduct that can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)? Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a belief must include what the indefinite community settles on, that aspect of the belief must be included in its definition. Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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