Edwina,
The Universe is both organized and disorganized, because without
dissipating free energy into heat (i.e, disorganization), no organization
is possible. Peirce probably did not know of this principle, which
emerged only in the latter part of the 20th century through the works of
irreversible thermodynamicists such as I. Prigogine. Since organization
and disorganization are equally important in understanding how the
Universe works, the following two assertions may be accorded an equal
validity:
"The matter of the universe is organized - and such (6820-1)
actions of organization can be identified with Mind."
"The matter of the universe is disorganized - and such (6820-2)
action of disorganization can be identified with the
lack of Mind."
With All the best.
Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> But Stan, aren't you thereby redefining Mind as confined to humans - who
> alone 'socially construct' their domain. That is, I define 'thought' as
> 'Mind' and consider that it is the basic organizing principle of the
> universe. Surely we must consider that the matter of the universe is
> organized - and such actions of organization, in my view, can be defined
> as Mind. Consciousness has nothing to do with Mind; that is, Mind would
> exist without consciousness.
>
> Edwina
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Stanley N Salthe
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 3:43 PM
> Subject: [biosemiotics:6818] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
>
>
> Gary noted:
>
>
>
>
> Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories. But if it is to
> mean Thought it is more without us than within. It is we that are in it,
> rather than it in any of usâ (letter to James, Nov. 1902).
>
>
>
>
> S: Why is this not just the âIntersubjectivityâ of the social
> constructivism perspective? That is, it is 'out there only in the sense
> of being in, or saturating, a particular historical moment.
>
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> wrote:
>
> Lists,
>
>
>
> Iâd like to introduce here a couple of comments on Chapter 2 of NP
> (specifically, on the beginning of 2.5), but Iâd also like to note
> that much of the valuable conversation on these issues has been taking
> place under other subject lines, and this post is meant to reflect on
> that previous conversation as well.
>
>
>
> Here are the first three sentences (also the first 3 paragraphs!) of
> NP 2.5:
>
>
>
> NP (p.44): Both Peirce's and Hussel's antipsychologicist semiotics are
> based on the observation that even if simple, singular signs exist,
> most interesting signs, beyond a certain degree of complexity, are
> tokens of types, and many of these, in turn, refer to general objects
> (Peirce) or ideal objects (Husserl).
>
> A very important rule here is the Frege-Peircean idea that the
> semiotic access to generality is made possible by general signs being
> unsaturated and schematic: the predicate function â_ is blueâ, for
> instance, is general 1) because referring possibly to all things blue,
> 2) because of the generality of the predicate blue, having a schematic
> granularity allowing for a continuum of different particular blue
> shades.[i]
>
> This generality is what makes it possible for the sign to be used with
> identicalâgeneralâmeaning, at the same time as the individual
> users are free to adorn their use with a richness of individual mental
> imagery and associations (like Ingardenian filling-in during literary
> reading) without this imagery in any way constituting
> meaningâsameness of meaning in language being granted by successful
> intersubjective communication, reference, and action.
>
>
>
> GF: The first sentence above explains the subtitle of this section,
> which is âThe Indispensability of the Generality of Signsâ. But it
> is not only the signs employed by science which must have generality,
> but also the objects of those signs. Science can say nothing about a
> unique phenomenon occurring only at a single point in spacetime,
> unless it can recognize the event as belonging to a type of occurrence
> (in which case it is not unique!).
>
>
>
> At this point the old debate between nominalism and realism rears its
> head. Peirce frames his usage of the word âthoughtâ this way:
> âone must not take a nominalistic view of Thought as if it were
> something that a man had in his consciousness. Consciousness may mean
> any one of the three categories. But if it is to mean Thought it is
> more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it
> in any of usâ (letter to James, Nov. 1902).
>
>
>
> Clearly NP follows Peirce in taking a realistic view of âthoughtâ;
> and from that point of view, Howardâs claim âthat logical and
> mathematical operations can be observed existing as activites of human
> brains and brains of lower animalsâ is quite unfounded. What
> scientists can empirically observe (to a very limited extent!) is the
> activity going on in brains. They can then hypothesize about how
> brains manage to carry out âlogical and mathematical operationsâ,
> but that is not direct observation of anything âexistingâ, itâs
> an interpretation based on the assumption that the brain activity is
> correlated with a process which we believe to be occurring; and that
> belief is not based on the observation of brain activity but on
> inference from what the âownerâ of that brain is doing or saying.
> Realists say that the type of operation (i.e. the âThoughtâ) is
> just as real as the empirically observed brain events. Not all
> scientists say that, but they all act as if they believed it â
> otherwise no type of thought process would be intelligible, or could
> be an object of scientific study.
>
>
>
> The second sentence/pargraph quoted from NP above adds to this realism
> the crucial point that âsemiotic access to generality is made
> possible by general signs being unsaturated and schematicâ. The term
> âunsaturatedâ here can be taken as a metaphor from chemistry,
> related to Peirceâs concept of logical âvalencyâ, referring to
> the âblank(s)â in a predicate which have not yet been filled by
> subject(s), where the number of blanks is an aspect of the schema or
> form of the predicate. This is a crucial point in Chapter 3, which
> weâll be starting in another week, so Iâll just observe here that
> in NP it links the âindispensability of generalityâ with
> Peirceâs doctrine of the Dicisign.
>
>
>
> The third sentence/pargraph quoted above implicitly relates these
> issues to Peircean pragmaticism, by observing that âsameness of
> meaning in languageâ is âgranted by successful intersubjective
> communication, reference, and action.â As I hope to have showed
> above, this is just as true for psychologists as it is for logicians.
> Science is a communal practice â and thatâs why it canât be done
> by individual brains studying singular phenomena â not unless we
> assume general types of phenomena to be as real as their existing
> tokens, rather than imaginary or âsocial constructionsâ.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> } The first principle is that you must not fool yourself -- and you
> are the easiest person to fool. [Richard P. Feynman] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk]
> Sent: 14-Sep-14 7:29 AM
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
> Subject: [biosemiotics:6806] Re: Natural Propositions
>
>
>
> Dear Howard, lists -
>
> But then neither is the opposite â¦
>
> Best
>
> F
>
>
>
> Den 14/09/2014 kl. 03.51 skrev Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com>
>
> :
>
>
>
>
>
> At 04:35 PM 9/13/2014, Frederik wrote:
>
>
>
> Dear Stan, lists -
> Good. I tend to side with Peirce here - though I would change the
> wording slightly: logic exising "outside" of human thought, meaning
> logic existing independently of human thought (which is why it may be
> implemented, to some degree, outside of human thought) â¦
>
>
> HP: Scientists would say that logical and mathematical operations can
> be observed existing as activites of human brains and brains of lower
> animals. Whether they exist independently in inanimate nature appears
> to be merely an irrefutable opinion, based simply on how you choose to
> define nature andlogic. That is why for millennia there has been
> continual undecidable controversy over the foundation of logic and
> mathematics.
> Siding with Peirce or taking a vote of opinions is not persuasive.
>
> Howard
>
>
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>
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