Jeff D., Jeff K., Gary F., lists,
I agree with much of what you say, Jeff D., and with what Peirce says,
although I think he underplays the extent to which his methodeutic was
generalized from his own experience and expertise. Peirce's restatement
"The Categories" (MS 403 of 1893
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm ) of his
"On a New List" has a bit of such impurity.
[
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm#93s8
Quote]
_§8. The Second Intermediate Conception: Relation, which
Occasions the Third_ ^E [§23]
The study of psychology, from which we find it convenient to
borrow a few principles, shows us that we can never know, or even
think, that a thing has a quality without thinking or having thought
of other things partaking that quality and of still others wanting
it, or at least possessing it in smaller measure. This is the
natural, common-sense belief of the mass of men; and it seems to be
confirmed by careful observation. There are only a few thinkers who
do not accept it. [....]
[End quote]
It's just incredibly difficulty to stay on a general cenoscopic level
and not rely on idioscopic experience's instances to provide material
for generalization and the attempt to base the generalization in purely
cenoscopic considerations ('pulling the ladder up' after oneself).
There's an extreme where it seems hopeless to avoid reliance on the
actual for corroboration of seemingly philosophical ideas. That's why I
suggest looking at the actual dependences among successful sciences in
order to help build a systematic classification of them, and indeed
Peirce places the whole subject of research classification in the
'Sciences of Review' a.k.a. 'Synthetic Philosophy', posterior to the
special and other discovery sciences. The mathematician Dieudonné (a
member of Bourbaki) said in his encyclopedia article on the
classifications of mathematics that those classifications tend to arise
from what is useful to working mathematicians and not from a
systematist's pre-conceived notions. The city of successful researches
may, in its layout below, come to reflect the constellations of the
studied realities above, without any city planners having provided the
specific scheme in advance. Or, take a less romantic image, a pattern of
molds in a petrie dish may reveal the distribution of nutrients placed
along the bottom of the dish. Those are metaphors, but there is an
actual system of actual researches into many spheres of the real. The
mental opens the door for general considerations, intellectually and
imaginationally accessed real generals, to affect the actual, sometimes
in non-pre-conceived yet enlightening ways. It might be discovered, in
applying a philosophical normative science to special sciences, that
more of that philosophical normative science belongs in 'Synthetic
Philosophy' or at least idioscopically applied philosophy than we thought.
You wrote,
> [JD] [...] in what way is our normative theory of the principles
of logic put to the test in the special sciences—such as the science
of psychology? Do any of the conclusions that we draw in the
special science of psychology confirm or disconfirm our logical
explanations of what is necessary for an inference to be valid? Or,
does the process of inquiring in the special sciences put the
normative theory to the test? That is, do we test the normative
theory of logical inference by examining the extent to which we are
better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special
observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes
the inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid
or invalid? I tend to think that the tests of our normative theory
of logic take the latter form (and not the former).
[End quote]
Your first statement of the alternative doesn't seem equivalent to your
second statement of the alternative. It seems part of the purpose of
general statistics, for example, to help us "detect errors" (by the
general statistical study of errors) "in the way we've analyzed the
special observations," and the general study of statistics, or at least
the study of inferential statistics, seems part of the normative theory
of inference. It helps us see what inferences would be sound. But maybe
there's merely something about your wording that's going over my head,
and the possibility of my failing to get something that most people get
should not be underrated. So, I'll take your first statement of the
alternative as the one clearer to me at this point. I agree that the
special-scientific tests of our normative theory of logic tend to
consist in how it helps us see more clearly what makes the inferences we
are trying to draw valid or invalid (or sound or unsound, or as having
or lacking whatever character is, in a normative light, to be prized in
the given kind of inference). Yet a difficulty of a normative theory in
application could point to any number of problems. It might be that
difficulties in application could lead us to see a logical problem in
the normative theory that _/ought/_ to have been seen at the general
normative level, but somehow it escaped our attention, because we're
fallible. Another possibility, because we're fallible, is that ideas of
how to apply the normative doctrine became mistakenly attached to
doctrine itself; the doctrine, say, was expressed partly in terms of
those potential applications, etc., and some of those ideas turned out
to be mistaken.
Mathematics has been taken to such heights of rigor that one doesn't
really expect mathematical errors to be discovered through in an
application of math to special science, the far likelier explanation of
a difficulty is that one is applying math that is valid mathematically
but unsuitable for the specific application. But comparatively trivial
examples are quite possible, suppose somebody miscalculates pi and this
results in problems in manufacturing. The normative philosophical
sciences have not all been taken to such heights of rigor. It's not all
the study of syllogistic forms. Be it (according to Peirce) in
philosophical logic or in maths of logic (I wish I knew), even
Aristotelian logical quantification turned out, after thousands of
years, to be a special case of Boolean logical quantification (I like to
think that Boole discovered it by pure thought, but I don't know). Some
of Fourier's math was regarded as non-rigorous but its success in
real-world applications buoyed it for people, and if I remember
correctly it's been generally made rigorous. None of this should reduce
us to psychologism or sociologism. It just means that sometimes our
errors turn up in application, but we should still seek to make our
general-level corrections on the basis of better-understood general
considerations ('pull the ladder back up' after ourselves).
Best, Ben
On 9/17/2014 1:21 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Ben, Jeff K., Gary F., Lists,
Consider the following analogy between Peirce's normative theory of logic and
Kant's normative theory of ethics. In the Grounding, Kant makes a distinction
between a pure theory of ethics and an impure theory. The pure theory
articulates the conditions necessary for a principle of morality to be
objectively valid and what is necessary for any act of reasoning to satisfy the
conditions specified in such laws of reason. An impure theory, on the other
hand, draws on psychological and anthropological considerations about how we do
act and do think in order to understand how we might overcome some of our
biases and prejudices and better live up to the standards of morality. As
such, a pure theory is an entirely theoretical inquiry, while an impure theory
is more of a matter of practical considerations. Peirce seems to have a similar
kind of division in mind when he makes the following point:
"In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been
well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of
excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The
regulation has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to
make methodeutic practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it
is also to be borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must
take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my plain task and
duty here to explore. In addition to this, there may be a psychological account of the
matter, of the utmost importance and ever so extensive. With this, it is not my business
here to meddle; although I may here and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my
own doctrine." (CP 2.107)
Peirce seems to be describing three different ways that we might inquire about
the nature of inference. There is the cenoscopic science of logic, which
studies the laws of valid reasoning and what is necessary for any scientific
intelligence to employ such laws in the search for truth. There is the special
science of psychology, which studies the habits that govern how creatures such
as human beings actually do tend to think. There is also a practical inquiry
of how better to apply standards of reasoning in our lives so as to improve the
ways in which we think about one or another kind of practical problem. Peirce
suggests that there are a number of differences between these three modes of
inquiry concerning the nature of inference. Let me summarize some of the
differences.
1. The cenoscopic science of logic is a normative theory, while the special
science of psychology is a descriptive theory. The cenoscopic science draws on
a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on analysis and is tailored for
use in examining what can be inferred from observations drawn from our common
experience. Many of these observations involve de jure claims. The special
science of psychology draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily
on inductive forms of inference and what can be inferred from observations that
are empirically grounded. These observations are treated as de facto claims.
The methods used in the cenoscopic science of logic are designed to help us
discover and articulate what is necessary for any scientific inquirer to pursue
the aim of finding the truth. The methods used in the special science of logic
are designed to help us discover and articulate habits that tend to govern the
actual thinking patterns of one or another kind of creature—such as a human
being or a dolphin. Different beings may, in fact, follow somewhat different
patterns of thought because the patterns may have a more or less contingent
character.
2. The cenoscopic science of logic is a pure theory, where the central aim is
discovering the fundamental truths concerning the laws of reason that govern
valid inference. Finding such truths requires a willingness to persist in such
inquiry for as long as it takes. As a matter of principle, that may be a very
long run. The practical science of logic is an attempt to apply our current
understanding to our current practical problems. As we attempt to solve these
practical problems, we may profitably draw from our current theories in the
cenoscopic science of logic and our current theories in the special science of
psychology. As such, this inquiry involves a mixture of different kinds of
conceptions that have been formed using different methods and in the pursuit of
practical aims—and we could call such “inquiry” impure because of this mixing
of different aims and approaches.
That is a quick and incomplete summary of some of the differences that Peirce
stresses between these three ways we inquire about inference. As such, I’m
more than willing to admit that the practical application of logic may involve
conceptions drawn from the special science of psychology. Having said that,
let me ask: should we draw on the specialized observations and the descriptive
conceptions used in the special science of psychology when we are developing
the normative theory of logic? I want to press the point that, due to the de
facto character of the special observations made in the science of psychology,
they seem to have little relevance for our inquiries in the normative science
of logic. Such evidence will not enable us to determine what is necessary for
an inference to be valid. Peirce makes this kind of point in the following way:
“The book is only intended to be pure theory. In like manner, if Normative
Science does not in the least tend to the development of skill, its value as
Normative Science remains the same. It is purely theoretical. Of course there
are practical sciences of reasoning and investigation, of the conduct of life,
and of the production of works of art. They correspond to the Normative
Sciences, and may be probably expected to receive aid from them. … Nor again
is Normative Science a special science, that is, one of those sciences that
discover new phenomena. It is not even aided in any appreciable degree by any
such science, and let me say that it is no more by psychology than by any other
special science. … In like manner, and in just about the same degree, the fact
that men for the most part show a natural disposition to approve nearly the
same arguments that logic approves, nearly the same acts that ethics approves,
and nearly the same works of art that esthetics approves, may be regarded as
tending to support the conclusions of logic, ethics, and esthetics. But such
support is perfectly insignificant; and when it comes to a particular case, to
urge that anything is sound and good logically, morally, or esthetically, for
no better reason than that men have a natural tendency to think so, I care not
how strong and imperious that tendency may be, is as pernicious a fallacy as
ever was.” (CP 5.125)
Let me pose the following question. We are accustomed to thinking about
Peirce’s architectonic ordering of the sciences in the following way. The
principles articulated in the normative science of logic are tested in the
science of metaphysics. In turn, the principles articulated in the science of
metaphysics are tested in the special sciences. As such, the principles of in
our normative theory of logic are tested—at least indirectly—in the special
science of psychology. Given what Peirce says in the last sentence of what
I’ve quoted above (at CP 5.125), in what way is our normative theory of the
principles of logic put to the test in the special sciences—such as the science
of psychology? Do any of the conclusions that we draw in the special science
of psychology confirm or disconfirm our logical explanations of what is
necessary for an inference to be valid? Or, does the process of inquiring in
the special sciences put the normative theory to the test? That is, do we test
the normative theory of logical inference by examining the extent to which we
are better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special
observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes the
inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid or invalid? I
tend to think that the tests of our normative theory of logic take the latter
form (and not the former).
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:44 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 2
Jeff K., Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
Lists, I should note that Jeff Kasser is familiar with the topic of Peirce and
psychologism. He wrote a paper that Joe Ransdell posted some years ago at Arisbe,
"Peirce's Supposed Psychologism"
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm .
I agree with you, Jeff K. I tend to worry a little that, although on one hand
it's good to keep aware of one's level of generality, on the other hand one can
overdo it in the boundaries department and make it more difficult for
philosophy to interact or collaborate with other fields. A lack of a definition
of philosophy, lack of a definition that places it in the larger continuum of
research, to which I alluded in another post, also seems accompanied by that
effect. (Too little definition, overly strong boundaries, can one have both? I
suspect so, by having an ill-defined field in which one still recoils too much
from other fields' boundaries.)
You wrote:
[JK] If one doesn't attend carefully to the details of Peirce's
self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with
respect to psychologism.
That's true if one is Peirce, too. He got overly harsh on his own earlier work
because he hadn't closely read it lately.
[From CP 5.402 Note 3 "Issues of Pragmaticism", 1905
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-issues-pragmaticism-4 . Quote]
...the suspicion I myself expressed after a too hasty rereading of the
forgotten magazine paper, that it expressed a stoic, that is, a nominalistic,
materialistic, and utterly philistine state of thought, was quite mistaken.
[End quote]
He's referring to his _Baldwin Dictionary_ definition of pragmatism, in which
he said,
[From CP 5.3, "Pragmatic and Pragmatism", 1902 in the _Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology_. Reprinted CP 5.3, 1902
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Baldwin_Dictionary_Definition_of_Pragmatic_%281%29_and_%282%29_Pragmatism
. Quote]
The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action - a stoical axiom
which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so
forcibly as it did at thirty.
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 9/16/2014 5:41 PM, Kasser,Jeff wrote:
I think that this is a really valuable point, Ben, and I think that an application of it bears very directly
on discussions of psychologism and anti-psychologism in Peirce. Despite having opposed psychologism from the
outset, Peirce was happy to pursue psychological solutions to some problems in logic. What's crucial here is
to keep clear about the status of such solutions. When Peirce criticized his argument for the pragmatic maxim
in 1877-78 for resting on a psychological principle, he was not, in my estimation, accusing his past self of
psychologism. There are many reasons for this, starting with the fact that we'd have to come up with an
explanation of how someone who railed against psychologism in the 1860's slipped into it in the 1870's. There
are also clear anti-psychologistic claims in the stage-setting sections of "Fixation" and "How
To" themselves. In the passage from the Minute Logic that Frederik quotes on p. 28 and in the later
self-criticism I've already alluded to, it's pretty clear that by "psychological" treatments of
logical matters, Peirce has in mind thinking about reasoning in terms of belief and action. There's nothing
wrong about starting from claims about belief and action in order to establish certain logical norms,
provided that one doesn't reduce the norms to that way of embodying reasoning. As you suggest below, Ben,
it's a matter of a consilience of arguments. Peirce doesn't want his 1877-78 argument to be treated as the
deepest or the only way of establishing such norms as the pragmatic maxim, but he's not accusing himself of
circularity or relativism or the other vices of psychologism. If one doesn't attend carefully to the details
of Peirce's self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with respect to
psychologism.
Best,
Jeff
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:23 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
