Ben, Jeff K., Gary F., Lists, Consider the following analogy between Peirce's normative theory of logic and Kant's normative theory of ethics. In the Grounding, Kant makes a distinction between a pure theory of ethics and an impure theory. The pure theory articulates the conditions necessary for a principle of morality to be objectively valid and what is necessary for any act of reasoning to satisfy the conditions specified in such laws of reason. An impure theory, on the other hand, draws on psychological and anthropological considerations about how we do act and do think in order to understand how we might overcome some of our biases and prejudices and better live up to the standards of morality. As such, a pure theory is an entirely theoretical inquiry, while an impure theory is more of a matter of practical considerations. Peirce seems to have a similar kind of division in mind when he makes the following point:
"In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my plain task and duty here to explore. In addition to this, there may be a psychological account of the matter, of the utmost importance and ever so extensive. With this, it is not my business here to meddle; although I may here and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my own doctrine." (CP 2.107) Peirce seems to be describing three different ways that we might inquire about the nature of inference. There is the cenoscopic science of logic, which studies the laws of valid reasoning and what is necessary for any scientific intelligence to employ such laws in the search for truth. There is the special science of psychology, which studies the habits that govern how creatures such as human beings actually do tend to think. There is also a practical inquiry of how better to apply standards of reasoning in our lives so as to improve the ways in which we think about one or another kind of practical problem. Peirce suggests that there are a number of differences between these three modes of inquiry concerning the nature of inference. Let me summarize some of the differences. 1. The cenoscopic science of logic is a normative theory, while the special science of psychology is a descriptive theory. The cenoscopic science draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on analysis and is tailored for use in examining what can be inferred from observations drawn from our common experience. Many of these observations involve de jure claims. The special science of psychology draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on inductive forms of inference and what can be inferred from observations that are empirically grounded. These observations are treated as de facto claims. The methods used in the cenoscopic science of logic are designed to help us discover and articulate what is necessary for any scientific inquirer to pursue the aim of finding the truth. The methods used in the special science of logic are designed to help us discover and articulate habits that tend to govern the actual thinking patterns of one or another kind of creature—such as a human being or a dolphin. Different beings may, in fact, follow somewhat different patterns of thought because the patterns may have a more or less contingent character. 2. The cenoscopic science of logic is a pure theory, where the central aim is discovering the fundamental truths concerning the laws of reason that govern valid inference. Finding such truths requires a willingness to persist in such inquiry for as long as it takes. As a matter of principle, that may be a very long run. The practical science of logic is an attempt to apply our current understanding to our current practical problems. As we attempt to solve these practical problems, we may profitably draw from our current theories in the cenoscopic science of logic and our current theories in the special science of psychology. As such, this inquiry involves a mixture of different kinds of conceptions that have been formed using different methods and in the pursuit of practical aims—and we could call such “inquiry” impure because of this mixing of different aims and approaches. That is a quick and incomplete summary of some of the differences that Peirce stresses between these three ways we inquire about inference. As such, I’m more than willing to admit that the practical application of logic may involve conceptions drawn from the special science of psychology. Having said that, let me ask: should we draw on the specialized observations and the descriptive conceptions used in the special science of psychology when we are developing the normative theory of logic? I want to press the point that, due to the de facto character of the special observations made in the science of psychology, they seem to have little relevance for our inquiries in the normative science of logic. Such evidence will not enable us to determine what is necessary for an inference to be valid. Peirce makes this kind of point in the following way: “The book is only intended to be pure theory. In like manner, if Normative Science does not in the least tend to the development of skill, its value as Normative Science remains the same. It is purely theoretical. Of course there are practical sciences of reasoning and investigation, of the conduct of life, and of the production of works of art. They correspond to the Normative Sciences, and may be probably expected to receive aid from them. … Nor again is Normative Science a special science, that is, one of those sciences that discover new phenomena. It is not even aided in any appreciable degree by any such science, and let me say that it is no more by psychology than by any other special science. … In like manner, and in just about the same degree, the fact that men for the most part show a natural disposition to approve nearly the same arguments that logic approves, nearly the same acts that ethics approves, and nearly the same works of art that esthetics approves, may be regarded as tending to support the conclusions of logic, ethics, and esthetics. But such support is perfectly insignificant; and when it comes to a particular case, to urge that anything is sound and good logically, morally, or esthetically, for no better reason than that men have a natural tendency to think so, I care not how strong and imperious that tendency may be, is as pernicious a fallacy as ever was.” (CP 5.125) Let me pose the following question. We are accustomed to thinking about Peirce’s architectonic ordering of the sciences in the following way. The principles articulated in the normative science of logic are tested in the science of metaphysics. In turn, the principles articulated in the science of metaphysics are tested in the special sciences. As such, the principles of in our normative theory of logic are tested—at least indirectly—in the special science of psychology. Given what Peirce says in the last sentence of what I’ve quoted above (at CP 5.125), in what way is our normative theory of the principles of logic put to the test in the special sciences—such as the science of psychology? Do any of the conclusions that we draw in the special science of psychology confirm or disconfirm our logical explanations of what is necessary for an inference to be valid? Or, does the process of inquiring in the special sciences put the normative theory to the test? That is, do we test the normative theory of logical inference by examining the extent to which we are better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes the inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid or invalid? I tend to think that the tests of our normative theory of logic take the latter form (and not the former). --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:44 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 Jeff K., Jeff D., Gary F., lists, Lists, I should note that Jeff Kasser is familiar with the topic of Peirce and psychologism. He wrote a paper that Joe Ransdell posted some years ago at Arisbe, "Peirce's Supposed Psychologism" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm . I agree with you, Jeff K. I tend to worry a little that, although on one hand it's good to keep aware of one's level of generality, on the other hand one can overdo it in the boundaries department and make it more difficult for philosophy to interact or collaborate with other fields. A lack of a definition of philosophy, lack of a definition that places it in the larger continuum of research, to which I alluded in another post, also seems accompanied by that effect. (Too little definition, overly strong boundaries, can one have both? I suspect so, by having an ill-defined field in which one still recoils too much from other fields' boundaries.) You wrote: [JK] If one doesn't attend carefully to the details of Peirce's self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with respect to psychologism. That's true if one is Peirce, too. He got overly harsh on his own earlier work because he hadn't closely read it lately. [From CP 5.402 Note 3 "Issues of Pragmaticism", 1905 http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-issues-pragmaticism-4 . Quote] ...the suspicion I myself expressed after a too hasty rereading of the forgotten magazine paper, that it expressed a stoic, that is, a nominalistic, materialistic, and utterly philistine state of thought, was quite mistaken. [End quote] He's referring to his _Baldwin Dictionary_ definition of pragmatism, in which he said, [From CP 5.3, "Pragmatic and Pragmatism", 1902 in the _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_. Reprinted CP 5.3, 1902 http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Baldwin_Dictionary_Definition_of_Pragmatic_%281%29_and_%282%29_Pragmatism . Quote] The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action - a stoical axiom which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty. [End quote] Best, Ben On 9/16/2014 5:41 PM, Kasser,Jeff wrote: I think that this is a really valuable point, Ben, and I think that an application of it bears very directly on discussions of psychologism and anti-psychologism in Peirce. Despite having opposed psychologism from the outset, Peirce was happy to pursue psychological solutions to some problems in logic. What's crucial here is to keep clear about the status of such solutions. When Peirce criticized his argument for the pragmatic maxim in 1877-78 for resting on a psychological principle, he was not, in my estimation, accusing his past self of psychologism. There are many reasons for this, starting with the fact that we'd have to come up with an explanation of how someone who railed against psychologism in the 1860's slipped into it in the 1870's. There are also clear anti-psychologistic claims in the stage-setting sections of "Fixation" and "How To" themselves. In the passage from the Minute Logic that Frederik quotes on p. 28 and in the later self-criticism I've already alluded to, it's pretty clear that by "psychological" treatments of logical matters, Peirce has in mind thinking about reasoning in terms of belief and action. There's nothing wrong about starting from claims about belief and action in order to establish certain logical norms, provided that one doesn't reduce the norms to that way of embodying reasoning. As you suggest below, Ben, it's a matter of a consilience of arguments. Peirce doesn't want his 1877-78 argument to be treated as the deepest or the only way of establishing such norms as the pragmatic maxim, but he's not accusing himself of circularity or relativism or the other vices of psychologism. If one doesn't attend carefully to the details of Peirce's self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with respect to psychologism. Best, Jeff ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:23 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List' Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
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