Ben, Jeff K., Gary F., Lists,
Consider the following analogy between Peirce's normative theory of logic and
Kant's normative theory of ethics. In the Grounding, Kant makes a distinction
between a pure theory of ethics and an impure theory. The pure theory
articulates the conditions necessary for a principle of morality to be
objectively valid and what is necessary for any act of reasoning to satisfy the
conditions specified in such laws of reason. An impure theory, on the other
hand, draws on psychological and anthropological considerations about how we do
act and do think in order to understand how we might overcome some of our
biases and prejudices and better live up to the standards of morality. As
such, a pure theory is an entirely theoretical inquiry, while an impure theory
is more of a matter of practical considerations. Peirce seems to have a similar
kind of division in mind when he makes the following point:
"In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been
well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of
excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The
regulation has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to
make methodeutic practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it
is also to be borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must
take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my plain task and
duty here to explore. In addition to this, there may be a psychological account of the
matter, of the utmost importance and ever so extensive. With this, it is not my business
here to meddle; although I may here and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my
own doctrine." (CP 2.107)
Peirce seems to be describing three different ways that we might inquire about
the nature of inference. There is the cenoscopic science of logic, which
studies the laws of valid reasoning and what is necessary for any scientific
intelligence to employ such laws in the search for truth. There is the special
science of psychology, which studies the habits that govern how creatures such
as human beings actually do tend to think. There is also a practical inquiry
of how better to apply standards of reasoning in our lives so as to improve the
ways in which we think about one or another kind of practical problem. Peirce
suggests that there are a number of differences between these three modes of
inquiry concerning the nature of inference. Let me summarize some of the
differences.
1. The cenoscopic science of logic is a normative theory, while the special
science of psychology is a descriptive theory. The cenoscopic science draws on
a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on analysis and is tailored for
use in examining what can be inferred from observations drawn from our common
experience. Many of these observations involve de jure claims. The special
science of psychology draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily
on inductive forms of inference and what can be inferred from observations that
are empirically grounded. These observations are treated as de facto claims.
The methods used in the cenoscopic science of logic are designed to help us
discover and articulate what is necessary for any scientific inquirer to pursue
the aim of finding the truth. The methods used in the special science of logic
are designed to help us discover and articulate habits that tend to govern the
actual thinking patterns of one or another kin
d of cr
eature—such as a human being or a dolphin. Different beings may, in fact,
follow somewhat different patterns of thought because the patterns may have a
more or less contingent character.
2. The cenoscopic science of logic is a pure theory, where the central aim is
discovering the fundamental truths concerning the laws of reason that govern
valid inference. Finding such truths requires a willingness to persist in such
inquiry for as long as it takes. As a matter of principle, that may be a very
long run. The practical science of logic is an attempt to apply our current
understanding to our current practical problems. As we attempt to solve these
practical problems, we may profitably draw from our current theories in the
cenoscopic science of logic and our current theories in the special science of
psychology. As such, this inquiry involves a mixture of different kinds of
conceptions that have been formed using different methods and in the pursuit of
practical aims—and we could call such “inquiry” impure because of this mixing
of different aims and approaches.
That is a quick and incomplete summary of some of the differences that Peirce
stresses between these three ways we inquire about inference. As such, I’m
more than willing to admit that the practical application of logic may involve
conceptions drawn from the special science of psychology. Having said that,
let me ask: should we draw on the specialized observations and the descriptive
conceptions used in the special science of psychology when we are developing
the normative theory of logic? I want to press the point that, due to the de
facto character of the special observations made in the science of psychology,
they seem to have little relevance for our inquiries in the normative science
of logic. Such evidence will not enable us to determine what is necessary for
an inference to be valid. Peirce makes this kind of point in the following way:
“The book is only intended to be pure theory. In like manner, if Normative
Science does not in the least tend to the development of skill, its value as
Normative Science remains the same. It is purely theoretical. Of course there
are practical sciences of reasoning and investigation, of the conduct of life,
and of the production of works of art. They correspond to the Normative
Sciences, and may be probably expected to receive aid from them. … Nor again
is Normative Science a special science, that is, one of those sciences that
discover new phenomena. It is not even aided in any appreciable degree by any
such science, and let me say that it is no more by psychology than by any other
special science. … In like manner, and in just about the same degree, the fact
that men for the most part show a natural disposition to approve nearly the
same arguments that logic approves, nearly the same acts that ethics approves,
and nearly the same works of art that esthetics approves
, may b
e regarded as tending to support the conclusions of logic, ethics, and
esthetics. But such support is perfectly insignificant; and when it comes to a
particular case, to urge that anything is sound and good logically, morally, or
esthetically, for no better reason than that men have a natural tendency to
think so, I care not how strong and imperious that tendency may be, is as
pernicious a fallacy as ever was.” (CP 5.125)
Let me pose the following question. We are accustomed to thinking about
Peirce’s architectonic ordering of the sciences in the following way. The
principles articulated in the normative science of logic are tested in the
science of metaphysics. In turn, the principles articulated in the science of
metaphysics are tested in the special sciences. As such, the principles of in
our normative theory of logic are tested—at least indirectly—in the special
science of psychology. Given what Peirce says in the last sentence of what
I’ve quoted above (at CP 5.125), in what way is our normative theory of the
principles of logic put to the test in the special sciences—such as the science
of psychology? Do any of the conclusions that we draw in the special science
of psychology confirm or disconfirm our logical explanations of what is
necessary for an inference to be valid? Or, does the process of inquiring in
the special sciences put the normative theory to the test? Tha
t is, d
o we test the normative theory of logical inference by examining the extent to
which we are better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special
observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes the
inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid or invalid? I
tend to think that the tests of our normative theory of logic take the latter
form (and not the former).
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:44 PM
To:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 2
Jeff K., Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
Lists, I should note that Jeff Kasser is familiar with the topic of Peirce and
psychologism. He wrote a paper that Joe Ransdell posted some years ago at Arisbe,
"Peirce's Supposed Psychologism"
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm .
I agree with you, Jeff K. I tend to worry a little that, although on one hand
it's good to keep aware of one's level of generality, on the other hand one can
overdo it in the boundaries department and make it more difficult for
philosophy to interact or collaborate with other fields. A lack of a definition
of philosophy, lack of a definition that places it in the larger continuum of
research, to which I alluded in another post, also seems accompanied by that
effect. (Too little definition, overly strong boundaries, can one have both? I
suspect so, by having an ill-defined field in which one still recoils too much
from other fields' boundaries.)
You wrote:
[JK] If one doesn't attend carefully to the details of Peirce's
self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with
respect to psychologism.
That's true if one is Peirce, too. He got overly harsh on his own earlier work
because he hadn't closely read it lately.
[From CP 5.402 Note 3 "Issues of Pragmaticism",
1905http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-issues-pragmaticism-4 . Quote]
...the suspicion I myself expressed after a too hasty rereading of the
forgotten magazine paper, that it expressed a stoic, that is, a nominalistic,
materialistic, and utterly philistine state of thought, was quite mistaken.
[End quote]
He's referring to his _Baldwin Dictionary_ definition of pragmatism, in which
he said,
[From CP 5.3, "Pragmatic and Pragmatism", 1902 in the _Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology_. Reprinted CP 5.3,
1902http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Baldwin_Dictionary_Definition_of_Pragmatic_%281%29_and_%282%29_Pragmatism
. Quote]
The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action - a stoical axiom
which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so
forcibly as it did at thirty.
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 9/16/2014 5:41 PM, Kasser,Jeff wrote:
I think that this is a really valuable point, Ben, and I think that an application of it bears very
directly on discussions of psychologism and anti-psychologism in Peirce. Despite having opposed
psychologism from the outset, Peirce was happy to pursue psychological solutions to some problems
in logic. What's crucial here is to keep clear about the status of such solutions. When Peirce
criticized his argument for the pragmatic maxim in 1877-78 for resting on a psychological
principle, he was not, in my estimation, accusing his past self of psychologism. There are many
reasons for this, starting with the fact that we'd have to come up with an explanation of how
someone who railed against psychologism in the 1860's slipped into it in the 1870's. There are also
clear anti-psychologistic claims in the stage-setting sections of "Fixation" and
"How To" themselves. In the passage from the Minute Logic that Frederik quotes on p. 28
and in the later self-criticism I've already alluded
to, it
's pretty clear that by "psychological" treatments of logical matters, Peirce
has in mind thinking about reasoning in terms of belief and action. There's nothing wrong
about starting from claims about belief and action in order to establish certain logical
norms, provided that one doesn't reduce the norms to that way of embodying reasoning. As
you suggest below, Ben, it's a matter of a consilience of arguments. Peirce doesn't want
his 1877-78 argument to be treated as the deepest or the only way of establishing such
norms as the pragmatic maxim, but he's not accusing himself of circularity or relativism
or the other vices of psychologism. If one doesn't attend carefully to the details of
Peirce's self-assessments, he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with
respect to psychologism.
Best,
Jeff
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:23 AM
To:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
