Frederik wrote: "So we should give up the empiricist idea that it (6814-1) is a cumbersome process of abstraction in the mind of each individual, taking us from detailed ideas to less determinate, abstract ones. Rather general ideas, on many different levels of generality, is rather the bread and butter of cognition. Or senses are simply machines for sifting and concentrating general features from the perceptual stream - as P says, generality pours into our senses all of the time."
This may explain my unexpected finding over the past 5-6 years that there exists a 4-parameter mathematical equation, Eq. (6814-2), that can be derived from M. Planck's radiation law, Eq. (6814-3), discovered in 1900 that can fit data not only from blackbody radiation spectra themselves but also from the following diverse areas: (1) protein folding, (2) single-molecule enzyme turnover times, (3) mRNA levels in budding yeast. (4) mRNA levels in human breast cancer tissues, (5) human T-cell receptor gene diversity, (6) fMRI signals from human brains (7) decision-time measurements (8) gene size frequency distribution in the human genome, (9) protein size frequency distribution in cells, (10) word length distribution in Kerry's speech (but not in a dictionary), (11) sentence length frequency distributions in texts, and (12) polarized cosmological microwave background radiation. The 4-parameter equation called the Planck distribution looks like this: y = (a/(Ax + B)^5)/(b/(Ax + B)) - 1) (6814-2) which reduces to the Plank radiation formula when A = 1, and B = 0 and the parameters a and b replaced with the following Universal constants and temperature: u(lambda, T) = (8pihc/lambda^5)/(Exp(hc^2/kTlambda) - 1) (6814-3) where u = radiation intensity, pi = 3.14, lambda = wavelength, h = Planck constant, c = speed of light, k = Boltzmann constant, and T = temperature. Even if we admit that Eq. (6814-3) was derived inductively by analyzing the blackbody radiation spectra carried out by many brilliant physicists in Europe in the late 19th century, we cannot say that Eq. (6814-2) was similarly derived. So then where did it come from ? It seems to me that the most reasonable answer to this question is that it was there from the beginning, just as the American continent was there before Columbus happened to run into it. A similar reasoning may apply to the Schroedinger equation in QM: Schroedinger did not invent his wave equation out of nothing, but it was there even before he was born and he was lucky enough to run into it. With all the best. Sung _________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Dear Gary, lists - > > Thanks for some important comments - you highlight an issue which has not > been so central in our discussions on (anti-)psychologism until now - > namely the fact that psychological reductions of logic very often downplay > or even deny the generality of meaning. > If we think meaning should be constructed from a myriad of different > individual experiences in individual brains - then the explanation of > general meanings become difficult if not impossible - general meanings in > the sciences, to be sure, but also in large parts of everyday > communication. > Speakers of ordinary language share a large amount of general meanings and > it is seminal not to confuse those meanings with individual imagery in > individual brains. Quite on the contrary, it is a very central part of > the role of external signs - spoken and written language, images, > diagrams, gesture etc. - to fixate and communicate such general meanings. > Those meanings are not secondary access canals to more detailed, genuine > representations in brains - rather, general signs form a vehicle of though > which individual minds enter in order to think and communicate generally. > An important corollary here is that no two particular empirical phenomena > over chemical level are completely identical. We have no reason to think > that the any perception of an individual can be identical to that of > another (or the same individual at another point of time). Quite different > are general signs. Exactly because they - contrary to individual objects > and ideas - are unspecified as to most of their properties and only focus > upon few, selected properties and relations, they may be identical from > one person to the next. > So we should give up the empiricist idea that it is a cumbersome process > of abstraction in the mind of each individual, taking us from detailed > ideas to less determinate, abstract ones. Rather general ideas, on many > different levels of generality, is rather the bread and butter of > cognition. Or senses are simply machines for sifting and concentrating > general features from the perceptual stream - as P says, generality pours > into our senses all of the time. > Sameness of meaning across minds is not because several individuals > magically manage to perform the same abstractions from widely differing > sense expressions (my > Dear Gary, lists - > > Thanks for some important comments - you highlight an issue which has not > been so central in our discussions on (anti-)psychologism until now - > namely the fact that psychological reductions of logic very often downplay > or even deny the generality of meaning. > If we think meaning should be constructed from a myriad of different > individual experiences in individual brains - then the explanation of > general meanings become difficult if not impossible - general meanings in > the sciences, to be sure, but also in large parts of everyday > communication. > Speakers of ordinary language share a large amount of general meanings and > it is seminal not to confuse those meanings with individual imagery in > individual brains. Quite on the contrary, it is a very central part of > the role of external signs - spoken and written language, images, > diagrams, gesture etc. - to fixate and communicate such general meanings. > Those meanings are not secondary access canals to more detailed, genuine > representations in brains - rather, general signs form a vehicle of though > which individual minds enter in order to think and communicate generally. > An important corollary here is that no two particular empirical phenomena > over chemical level are completely identical. We have no reason to think > that the any perception of an individual can be identical to that of > another (or the same individual at another point of time). Quite different > are general signs. Exactly because they - contrary to individual objects > and ideas - are unspecified as to most of their properties and only focus > upon few, selected properties and relations, they may be identical from > one person to the next. > So we should give up the empiricist idea that it is a cumbersome process > of abstraction in the mind of each individual, taking us from detailed > ideas to less determinate, abstract ones. Rather general ideas, on many > different levels of generality, is rather the bread and butter of > cognition. Or senses are simply machines for sifting and concentrating > general features from the perceptual stream - as P says, generality pours > into our senses all of the time. > Sameness of meaning across minds is not because several individuals > magically manage to perform the same abstractions from widely differing > sense expressions (my experiences with dogs, being attacked by a Schaefer > when I was 8, is surely different from many of yours - but still we have > the very same linguistic concept of dogs, despite the associations I > attach to that concept) - sameness of meaning is granted by externalized > signs and our common activities and actions related to those signs. > > Best > F > : > > Lists, > > Id like to introduce here a couple of comments on Chapter 2 of NP > (specifically, on the beginning of 2.5), but Id also like to note that > much of the valuable conversation on these issues has been taking place > under other subject lines, and this post is meant to reflect on that > previous conversation as well. > > Here are the first three sentences (also the first 3 paragraphs!) of NP > 2.5: > > NP (p.44): Both Peirce's and Hussel's antipsychologicist semiotics are > based on the observation that even if simple, singular signs exist, most > interesting signs, beyond a certain degree of complexity, are tokens of > types, and many of these, in turn, refer to general objects (Peirce) or > ideal objects (Husserl). > A very important rule here is the Frege-Peircean idea that the semiotic > access to generality is made possible by general signs being unsaturated > and schematic: the predicate function _ is blue, for instance, is > general 1) because referring possibly to all things blue, 2) because of > the generality of the predicate blue, having a schematic granularity > allowing for a continuum of different particular blue > shades.[i]<x-msg://789/#_edn1> > This generality is what makes it possible for the sign to be used with > identicalgeneralmeaning, at the same time as the individual users are > free to adorn their use with a richness of individual mental imagery and > associations (like Ingardenian filling-in during literary reading) without > this imagery in any way constituting meaningsameness of meaning in > language being granted by successful intersubjective communication, > reference, and action. > > GF: The first sentence above explains the subtitle of this section, which > is The Indispensability of the Generality of Signs. But it is not only > the signs employed by science which must have generality, but also the > objects of those signs. Science can say nothing about a unique phenomenon > occurring only at a single point in spacetime, unless it can recognize the > event as belonging to a type of occurrence (in which case it is not > unique!). > > At this point the old debate between nominalism and realism rears its > head. Peirce frames his usage of the word thought this way: one must > not take a nominalistic view of Thought as if it were something that a man > had in his consciousness. Consciousness may mean any one of the three > categories. But if it is to mean Thought it is more without us than > within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us (letter to > James, Nov. 1902). > > Clearly NP follows Peirce in taking a realistic view of thought; and > from that point of view, Howards claim that logical and mathematical > operations can be observed existing as activites of human brains and > brains of lower animals is quite unfounded. What scientists can > empirically observe (to a very limited extent!) is the activity going on > in brains. They can then hypothesize about how brains manage to carry out > logical and mathematical operations, but that is not direct observation > of anything existing, its an interpretation based on the assumption > that the brain activity is correlated with a process which we believe to > be occurring; and that belief is not based on the observation of brain > activity but on inference from what the owner of that brain is doing or > saying. Realists say that the type of operation (i.e. the Thought) is > just as real as the empirically observed brain events. Not all scientists > say that, but they all act as if they believed it otherwise no type of > thought process would be intelligible, or could be an object of scientific > study. > > The second sentence/pargraph quoted from NP above adds to this realism the > crucial point that semiotic access to generality is made possible by > general signs being unsaturated and schematic. The term unsaturated > here can be taken as a metaphor from chemistry, related to Peirces > concept of logical valency, referring to the blank(s) in a predicate > which have not yet been filled by subject(s), where the number of blanks > is an aspect of the schema or form of the predicate. This is a crucial > point in Chapter 3, which well be starting in another week, so Ill just > observe here that in NP it links the indispensability of generality with > Peirces doctrine of the Dicisign. > > The third sentence/pargraph quoted above implicitly relates these issues > to Peircean pragmaticism, by observing that sameness of meaning in > language is granted by successful intersubjective communication, > reference, and action. As I hope to have showed above, this is just as > true for psychologists as it is for logicians. Science is a communal > practice and thats why it cant be done by individual brains studying > singular phenomena not unless we assume general types of phenomena to be > as real as their existing tokens, rather than imaginary or social > constructions. > > gary f. > >
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