To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
At 12:24 PM 9/30/2014, Clark wrote:
To me nominalism is whether there are just particular things and not real generals. I don't quite see how whether there's really randomness (a property of the fundamental things), whether there are hidden variables, whether one should take a more epistemic view of QM, the role or the observer or so forth apply.
HP: Is a probability a particular state of our knowledge (as in <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Bayesianism>Bayesian Qbism)? Or is it the realist's universal property independent of observers? Are hidden variables just a particular subjective model for predicting probabilities? Or are hidden variables universals of a deterministic universe?
CG: For instance, within the Everett MWI what are the ultimate constituents? Likewise with information-theoretical interpretations is the information the fundamental things? If so then if that's all there is, isn't that nominalism?
HP: I think Everett's view of MWI was realistic, but others disagree or don't believe it. Arguments over the meaning of information always involve realism vs. nominalism.
CG: So I confess I'm a bit confused. Admittedly with regards to quantum mechanics things are odd enough that one has to unpack a lot. Further the authors note that a lot of the terms are intentionally left unpacked. So it's not even clear how we are to take the terms. (Which I think is a bad thing in a poll like this where there may be ignorance or equivocation with regards to the terms)
HP: I agree. The poll is not worth much except to show ignorance, equivocation, or lack of consensus on all points. But that is my point. Epistemologies are not decidable or falsifiable. For example, suppose Einstein was a solipsist on weekdays and a Platonist on weekends. Would the theories of relativity have turned up different?
Howard
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