Sung, List,

Maybe it would help if you told me whether you wish to have:
(1) a mathematical discussion about mathematical categories or
(2) a philosophical discussion about mathematical categories.

In Case 1, I can only say what I always say when you bring up
this subject, to wit, that it would be necessary to learn the
definitions of mathematical categories and sign relations
in order to study their potential relationships.

In Case 2, I always find that actually being a veteran of the
relevant courses in mathematics, much less many, many graduate
level courses and seminars, pretty much disqualifies a person
from being heard in philosophical discussions on those subjects,
so blather on, Dudes ...

TGIF❢

Jon

Sungchul Ji wrote:
Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists,

1)  Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one
defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a
mathematical category ?

2) "Triad" is a system of three entities, while "trichotomy" is the
process of dividing a system into three parts, either physically or
mentally, the latter case of which is called "prescinding" by Peirce.

With all the best.

Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



Jeff D., Jon,

I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies
is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over the
years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and
others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related sign,
object, interpretant, which are involved as the correlates in genuinely
triadic action, and 'trichotomy' for three-fold classifications,
especially categorially correlated ones such as qualisign, sinsign,
legisign. However, it should be noted that there are passages in which
Peirce calls trichotomies 'triads', and other passages by Peirce that
make no sense unless one follows the 'triad'-versus-'trichotomy'
distinction. I don't have the quotes handy but we've been over it many
times. A separate issue is the one about whether the
sign-object-interpretant triad is also categorially correlated trichotomy.

Best, Ben

On 10/1/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

Hello Jon,

If you have links to the earlier discussions of the distinction between
"triadicities" and "trichotomies", I'd like to take a look.  In addition
to being interested in distinction you are making, I'd like to read more
about how you are thinking about the projection of the triadic relations
onto the mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain.

In his monograph <Reading Peirce Reading>, Richard Smyth makes much of
the conceptions of the restrictions and limitations that apply to a
given domain of inquiry.  I'd like to see how your account of the
partitions of the domain compares to his reconstruction of some
arguments Peirce develops in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."

Thanks,

Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM
To: Peirce List 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions • Selected Passages

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