Ben, list,

It is my understanding that the mathematical category is another name for
semiosis.  In other words, a category is to mathematicians hat semiosis is
to semioticians.


To quote Peirce from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:


A "sign" is anything, A, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation Þ."

I believe that this definition of a sign is isomorphic with the
mathematical definition of a category.



With all the best.

Sung



> Sungchul, list
>
> I know next to nothing about category theory.
>
> Most generally a triad is a trio.  A predicate is called triadic if it
> is predicated of three objects like so: /Pxyz/. In Peirce's system a
> genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called
> semiosis, among three correlates: sign, object, and interpretant.
> Trichotomy is three-way division, whether as process or as result.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
>> Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists,
>>
>> 1)  Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one
>> defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a
>> mathematical category ?
>>
>> 2) "Triad" is a system of three entities, while "trichotomy" is the
>> process of dividing a system into three parts, either physically or
>> mentally, the latter case of which is called "prescinding" by Peirce.
>>
>> With all the best.
>>
>> Sung
>> __________________________________________________
>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>> Rutgers University
>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> 732-445-4701
>>
>> www.conformon.net
>>
>>
>>
>>> Jeff D., Jon,
>>>
>>> I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies
>>> is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over
>>> the
>>> years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and
>>> others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related sign,
>>> object, interpretant, which are involved as the correlates in genuinely
>>> triadic action, and 'trichotomy' for three-fold classifications,
>>> especially categorially correlated ones such as qualisign, sinsign,
>>> legisign. However, it should be noted that there are passages in which
>>> Peirce calls trichotomies 'triads', and other passages by Peirce that
>>> make no sense unless one follows the 'triad'-versus-'trichotomy'
>>> distinction. I don't have the quotes handy but we've been over it many
>>> times. A separate issue is the one about whether the
>>> sign-object-interpretant triad is also categorially correlated
>>> trichotomy.
>>>
>>> Best, Ben
>>>
>>> On 10/1/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello Jon,
>>>>
>>>> If you have links to the earlier discussions of the distinction
>>>> between
>>>> "triadicities" and "trichotomies", I'd like to take a look.  In
>>>> addition
>>>> to being interested in distinction you are making, I'd like to read
>>>> more
>>>> about how you are thinking about the projection of the triadic
>>>> relations
>>>> onto the mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain.
>>>>
>>>> In his monograph <Reading Peirce Reading>, Richard Smyth makes much of
>>>> the conceptions of the restrictions and limitations that apply to a
>>>> given domain of inquiry.  I'd like to see how your account of the
>>>> partitions of the domain compares to his reconstruction of some
>>>> arguments Peirce develops in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>
>>>> Jeff
>>>>
>>>> Jeff Downard
>>>> Associate Professor
>>>> Department of Philosophy
>>>> NAU
>>>> (o) 523-8354
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM
>>>> To: Peirce List 1
>>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions • Selected Passages
>>
>>
>
>


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