Jon S., list
For all I know Peirce may agree with you but I'm doubtful of the idea
itself.
Perceptual judgments have general and qualitative elements, but have at
least one foot firmly planted in the concrete haecceitous. They are such
as "Socrates is standing outside the city" and "This stable contains no
horses." Such judgments, perceptual recognitions of facts, a system of
such judgments, seem more a starting point for idioscopic fields.
Peirce once said that a sensation differs from a feeling in that a
sensation has a place and date. So far as I know, Peirce does not allow
of a judgment, discernent or otherwise, by feeling, and I guess I'm
straining in Peircean terms for such an idea.
Best, Ben
On 10/30/2015 12:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Ben, List:
Rather than "discernments" or some other novel term, should we maybe
take the starting point for phaneroscopy to be perceptual judgments,
especially given Peirce's characterization of these as acritical
abductions?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com
<mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>> wrote:
Jeff, Clark, list,
I needed to look around till I found that you meant "The Logic of
Mathematics: An Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within," and
the three questions posed near its beginning. Here's an online
version (sans italics, unfortunately)
http://web.archive.org/web/20090814011504/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cat_win_96.htm
<http://web.archive.org/web/20090814011504/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/cat_win_96.htm>
In an earlier message you wrote,
[Begin quote]
1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which
mathematical deduction can set out?
2. What are their general characters?
3. Why are not other hypotheses possible, and the like?
Drawing on Peirce’s way of framing these questions about the
starting points for mathematical inquiry, I’ve framed an
analogous set of questions about inquiry in the
phenomenological branch of cenoscopic science. How might the
normative sciences help us answer the following questions
about phenomenology.
1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which
phenomenological inquiry can set out?
2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological
hypotheses?
3. Why are not other phenomenological hypotheses possible, and
the like?
[End quote]
I like that idea. I'm one for trying in an area to apply, in
lockstep analogy, a proceeding taken from another area.
Yet - pure-mathematical deduction starts out from hypotheses, but
does phaneroscopic (and, by extension, cenoscopic) analysis start
out from hypotheses? Off the top of my head, and maybe I'm wrong
about this, it seems to me that phaneroscopy a.k.a. phenomenology
starts out from some sort of discernments, noticings, of positive
phenomena in general. These discernments are not hypothetical
suppositions or theoretical expectations. I'm not sure what to
call the formulation of such a noticing or discernment, in the
sense that a hypothesis formulates a supposition and a theory
formulates expectations.
Still I'll try a revision of the three questions in order to apply
them to phenomenology by lockstep analogy _/mutatis mutandis/_.
1. What are the different systems of discernments from which
phenomenological inquiry can set out?
2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological
discernments?
3. Why are not other phenomenological discernments possible, and
the like?
Does that make sense? Does it seem at all promising?
Best, Ben
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