Gary R., Jon, List,
In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw
something, what can it it draw?
First off, it may have been poor choice on my part to use the word "draw" in
trying to describe what we might gain by looking to logic for the sake of
developing a phenomenological theory. So, let me start by agreeing with Gary
and Jon that it is important to keep straight the ordering of the sciences, and
remember that phenomenology can draw its principles from mathematics, and that
the normative sciences can draw their principles from both math and
phenomenology--but not the other way around.
Having conceded those points, let me try to explore the questions stated above.
In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? We can ask the same
question, of course, about the relationship between phenomenology and
mathematics. In what sense can mathematics draw things from phenomenology. As
we know, Peirce starts with three questions in "The Logic of Mathematics, an
attempt to develop my categories from within:
1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which mathematical
deduction can set out?
2. What are their general characters?
3. Why are not other hypotheses possible, and the like?
The strategy Peirce adopts in this essay is to see if we might draw on the
phenomenological examination of the fundamental categories of experience--both
material and formal--for the sake of answering these questions. So, let me
ask: in what ways might we be able to draw on the normative science of logic
as semiotics for the purposes of answering a similar set of questions about
phenomenology? Let's construct the questions about phenomenology by following
Peirce's lead:
1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which phenomenological
inquiry can set out?
2. What are their general characters?
3. Why are not other hypotheses possible, and the like?
Is it permissible to draw on the normative science of logic as semiotic for the
purposes of framing the questions that phenomenology seeks to answer? If so,
is it permissible to draw on the normative science of logic for insight
concerning the kinds of conceptions we might start with in framing the
hypotheses that are offered as possible answers to those questions? My hunch
is that the answer to both questions is Yes. So, let's explore the possibility
that this might be the correct answer.
In order to refine that positive answer, let's consider the second question
stated above: if phenomenology can draw something from the normative science
of logic for the purposes of framing the questions and the hypotheses that it
considers, what can it it draw? Peirce points out that, in doing mathematics,
we only need a logica utens for the sake of drawing out the consequences from
the starting hypotheses. The same is true when it comes to developing a
phenomenological theory. There is no need for a logical theory. We can
perform the required analyses of the key conceptions (and tones of thought)
without any assistance from such a theory.
Having said that, Peirce's method for developing the account of the categories
from within in "The Logic of Mathematics" is the following: "Our method must
be to observe how logic requires us to think and especially to reason, and to
attribute to the conception of the dyad those characters which it must have in
order to answer the requirements of logic." (CP 1.444)
It is possible that, at this point in the discussion, Peirce is describing the
method he is using for the purposes of developing a critical grammar. If this
is right, then it is worth pointing out that the development of a theoretical
explanation the logical character of the dyadic relationship in sign relations
rests ultimately on observations about the character of such things as logical
obligation and self-control. It is also worth point out that the test of the
adequacy of the explanation is see whether or not the explanation "answers the
requirements of logic." That is, does it put us in a better position to
explain how it is possible for a logical argument to be valid or how it is
possible for imperfectly rational creatures like us to answer the question:
why ought I to be logical?
It is also possible that, at this point in the discussion, Peirce is describing
a method that he is using for the purposes of developing a phenomenological
theory. If he is, would it be a violation of the principle that phenomenology
should draw its principles from math and not from the normative science of
logic? I don't think so. But I'd need to work that out.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 11:05 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories
Jeff, list,
It's VERY late on the East Coast, so I'll keep this quite brief for now: a
single question.
In what sense can phenomenology be said to draw "from both mathematics and from
logic"?
Certainly from the standpoint of
Peirce's '
classification of the sciences' phenomenology can be seen to draw from
mathematics, especially from the simplest mathematics. the logic of mathematics
(
involving
the understanding t
hat
there are monads, dyads, triads,
a kind of valency principle relating these,
a reduction principle,
discrete, pseudo-continuous and
continuous structures,
etc.)
In addition
. phenomenology can, as can all sciences, draw upon a logica utens. But,
except for its providing 'examples' and the like ('the like' including logical
lessons learned from it's formal study), again. from the standpoint of the
classification of the sciences, can phenomenology really be said to draw from
formal logic, logica docens? If so, how?
Best,
Gary
R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 1:02 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Hi Gary R., List,
My aim was to draw on points that are developed in the context of the logical
theory for the sake of understanding how he might be using the terms
"firstness, secondness, thirdness" in the phenomenological theory. For my
part, I take the aim of developing phenomenology as its own branch of
philosophical inquiry quite seriously. As such, I said "in the first instance"
because that is how--historically speaking-- Peirce arrived at these notions.
He started from the side of a philosophical logic and was examining the ways
that various predicates can stand in different kinds of relations. On my
reading of the development of his account of the categories, Peirce was working
at the level of phenomenology, logic and metaphysics from the very start (e.g.
in the Lowell Lectures and in New List). Slowly, he gained a sense of the
importance of separating more clearly between the goals guiding each kind of
inquiry along with the methods that we should use in developing the respective
accounts of the phenomenological, logical and metaphysical categories.
When he finally decided to make phenomenology a major branch of philosophical
inquiry in its own right, he made it clear that phenomenology draws from both
mathematics and from logic. When we are drawing from mathematics, it appears
that were developing the account of the categories "from the inside." That is,
we are looking at examples of formal conceptions in math--such as that of
generating a number series or generating a line by moving a particle--and then
we are drawing on these conceptions for clarifying the formal elements that are
part of common experience concerning positive matters. When we are coming at
phenomenology from the other direction and drawing from logic theory, we are
asking: what elements in experience are necessary for the very possibility of
having signs that are significant and for drawing inferences that are valid?
We then ask--are these formal elements really found in our common experience?
If so, let us learn to see them more clearly in their many guises.
Let me add a bit more. One reason we need a phenomenological theory is that,
for Peirce, as for other logicians of his generation, the science of logic
should be based on observations. All of the observations are drawn from our
ordinary experience--including especially the phenomena associated with
self-control and the phenomena involved in evaluating arguments as valid or
invalid. As such, we need to develop an account of the basic elements that are
an essential part of all of the phenomena we might observe. The account of the
formal and material elements is designed to put us in a better position to
analyze the phenomena we observe for the sake of seeing more clearly what is
necessary, when it comes to forming hypotheses, to make sense of the phenomena
that are calling out for explanation. Before drawing such inferences, we need
to correct for observational errors.
So, to offer an example, Augustus De Morgan, makes the following point in
Formal Logic, or, The Calculus of inference, necessary and probable. The
question he is trying to answer in this chapter on probability is: how much
confidence can we place in testimony provided by a number of witnesses? Here
is what he says about the fit between his theory and the phenomena that are
part of our common experience:
The student of this subject is always struck by the frequency of the problems
in which the science confirms an ordinary notion of common life, or is
confirmed by it, according to his state of mind with respect to the whole
doctrine. It is impossible to say that we a theory made to explain common
phenomena, and hence affording no reason for surprise that it does explain
them. The first principles are too few and two (sic) simple, the train of
deductions ends in conclusions too remote. I believe hundreds of cases might
be cited in which the results of this theory are found already established by
the common sense of mankind: in many of them, the mathematical sciences were
not powerful enough to give the modes of calculation, when the principles of
the theory were first digested.
The conclusion we can draw from De Morgan's remark is, I think, quite clear.
In the absence of a clear account of the phenomena we observe as part of our
common experience, the selection of the best logical theory will be
underdetermined. What is more, we need to be careful not to draw on the same
phenomena we relied on in forming our hypotheses when we are testing those
hypotheses. So, let's make sure we have an adequate theoretical account of the
the phenomena that are serving as the data for our theoretical inquiries.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 7:43 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories
Jeff wrote:
If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an
abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the
first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is
first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red thing, and
not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of relationship that
obtains when the predicate is considered separately from the things that might
stand in that relationship.
From the standpoint of logic, I would tend to fully agree with you. But from
that of phenomenology, I have some reservations. There *are* in fact red
things, and blue things, and snow may indeed appear much more blue than white
in a given situation of light and shade. And there are, in addition, possible
firstnesses which even modal logics can't really quite handle in reality.
This is to suggest that firstness, logically speaking, *is*, as you say, an
abstraction, but that the "first instance" is *not* a logical abstraction, but
a phenomenon. and even, for the sake of argument, a mere possible phenomenon.
So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the
thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first,
y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z might
stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of
firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves. Here, I am
following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives,
relations and relationships.
Again, I would tend to agree with you--and Peirce--when one considers the
categories strictly from the standpoint of logic.
Btw. Joe Ransdell and I tended to disagree on this matter. He would, I think,
be siding with you in this matter, in a sense suggesting that logic as semiotic
was 'sufficient', not quite imagining that phaneroscopy could really be a
scientific discipline--at least, not much of one.
Best,
Gary R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690><tel:718%20482-5690>
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu><mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>>
wrote:
Gary F., Gary R., List,
If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an
abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the
first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is
first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red thing, and
not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of relationship that
obtains when the predicate is considered separately from the things that might
stand in that relationship.
So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the
thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first,
y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z might
stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of
firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves. Here, I am
following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives,
relations and relationships.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond
[gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com><mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:07 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories
Matt wrote;
My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific instantiations
of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. This is similar to
how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of generality. Perhaps we all
should follow this standard. Saying "category the Third" just seems like bad
grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness."
I'm not sure that I fully agree. Sometimes Peirceans like to speak of, say,
Thirdness, as a category, or in some other way which does not represent an
"instantiation" of a category (I'm not even sure what "instantiation" means
exactly in regard to 1ns and 3ns especially).
Also, since except for certain types of analysis, the categories are all three
present in any genuine tricategorial relation, "instantiation" seems a
problematic expression. Perhaps I'm missing your meaning, however.
I agree with you that saying "category the Third" is just (Peirce's) bad
grammar. I don't know anyone else who uses that expression today. And I would
also say that "a Thirdness" is not only bad grammar, but probably altogether
meaningless.
Best,
Gary R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690><tel:718%20482-5690>
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Matt Faunce
<mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com><mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>><mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com><mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>>>>
wrote:
My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific instantiations
of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. This is similar to
how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of generality. Perhaps we all
should follow this standard. Saying "category the Third" just seems like bad
grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness."
Matt
On 10/28/15 5:49 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary, list,
Thanks for your contribution to the discussion of this question which, however,
seems to focus on Peirce's writings on categories prior to the 20th century.
At the moment my sense (and that's pretty much all it is, while I do think that
at least a mini-research project is in order) is that as he approaches, then
enters, the 20th century that Peirce uses the -ness suffix more and more,
especially in introducing his tricategoriality into a discussion. Once that's
been done, the context makes it clear what is first (i.e, 1ns), etc. in the
ensuing discussion.
So, in a word, I think he sees that employing the -ness helps disambiguate its
use in any given context, especially in introducing his no doubt strange, to
some even today, notion of three phenomenological categories.
Best,
Gary R
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