Ben, List: Rather than "discernments" or some other novel term, should we maybe take the starting point for phaneroscopy to be perceptual judgments, especially given Peirce's characterization of these as acritical abductions?
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Jeff, Clark, list, > > I needed to look around till I found that you meant "The Logic of > Mathematics: An Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within," and the > three questions posed near its beginning. Here's an online version (sans > italics, unfortunately) > > http://web.archive.org/web/20090814011504/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cat_win_96.htm > > In an earlier message you wrote, > > [Begin quote] > 1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which mathematical > deduction can set out? > 2. What are their general characters? > 3. Why are not other hypotheses possible, and the like? > > Drawing on Peirce’s way of framing these questions about the starting > points for mathematical inquiry, I’ve framed an analogous set of questions > about inquiry in the phenomenological branch of cenoscopic science. How > might the normative sciences help us answer the following questions about > phenomenology. > > 1. What are the different systems of hypotheses from which > phenomenological inquiry can set out? > 2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological hypotheses? > 3. Why are not other phenomenological hypotheses possible, and the like? > [End quote] > > I like that idea. I'm one for trying in an area to apply, in lockstep > analogy, a proceeding taken from another area. > > Yet - pure-mathematical deduction starts out from hypotheses, but does > phaneroscopic (and, by extension, cenoscopic) analysis start out from > hypotheses? Off the top of my head, and maybe I'm wrong about this, it > seems to me that phaneroscopy a.k.a. phenomenology starts out from some > sort of discernments, noticings, of positive phenomena in general. These > discernments are not hypothetical suppositions or theoretical expectations. > I'm not sure what to call the formulation of such a noticing or > discernment, in the sense that a hypothesis formulates a supposition and a > theory formulates expectations. > > Still I'll try a revision of the three questions in order to apply them to > phenomenology by lockstep analogy _*mutatis mutandis*_. > > 1. What are the different systems of discernments from which > phenomenological inquiry can set out? > 2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological discernments? > 3. Why are not other phenomenological discernments possible, and the like? > > Does that make sense? Does it seem at all promising? > > Best, Ben >
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