Jon, Lists, I agree that starting with Cartesian dualism will give a bad interpretation of Peirce, but I am not sure what you mean by your first distinction. Could you expand?
The Cartesian position is a consequence of what I called rationalism if it accepts material substance. Idealism is the result if it does not (what I take to be Russell’s position, though he also argued for what he called neutral monism, which is not technically idealistic in, e.g., the Berkeleyan sense). I am unclear if Peirce was a rationalist, but I suspect that his idealism stems from this. It would be a mistake to understand this more or less as Russell as a world of universals, which Peirce would reject as a form of nominalism (though Russell would shudder at this idea). Peirce’s metaphysics is definitely not a Cartesian world with material substance sliced off, which is pretty much Berkeleyan idealism. The latter effectively makes ideas particulars, and is nominalistic as a result. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 2:46 PM To: John Collier Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments John, all, It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and independence from exclusion. It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by assuming the Cartesian dualism that he rejected. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:23 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Lists, At the end of the 19th Century there was a reaction against the idea that logic was a human creation and depended on the mind. This view is called psychologism. The founders of modern logic, including in particular Frege and Peirce, were anti-psychologists who argued that logic is independent of human psychology. I won’t give the arguments here, since they are readily available (see, e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/). Whether logic is independent of thought depends on what you take thought to be. An idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position is that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world (early Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his view that true propositions = facts). Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with Jerry, I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just as can mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both logical and mathematical. I go a bit further and argue that logic and mathematics depend on the nature of the world, and that we must discover them through hypothetical reasoning rather than a priori (for example whether continuity exists, the infinite exists and similar). This allows a version of non-psychologistic naturalism that is somewhat similar to what I take to be Mill’s position, though he is often interpreted as a psychologist. So I don’t see Jerry’s worry that there is a gap between the formal aspects of, say, information theory and its manifestation as making sense. It seems to me that this presupposes that the formal aspects can exist independently, involving either a rationalism or an idealism or both that I cannot accept, as I find it ontological otiose. This is my argument against Jerry’s objection. I also deviate from Peirce here, I think, and certainly from my philosophical hero, Bertrand Russell. However my views may be, there is a clear antipsychologist position on logic that is associated with the greatest logicians, and I think it very hasty to adopt Stan’s classification of logic. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu] Sent: Wednesday, 18 November 2015 10:34 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> Cc: Ed Dellian; PEIRCE-L; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz Subject: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments Sung, all -- Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture. {everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}}}}} STAN On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> wrote: Ed, Thanks for your response. You wrote : "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain, (111815-1) and therefore it is not logical." I can't quite agree with (111815-1). Instead I would assert that "Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not surprising (111815-2) that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in the Universe." All the best. Sung On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de<mailto:ed.dell...@t-online.de>> wrote: Sung, You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers to "what could be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website www.neutonus-reformatus.com<http://www.neutonus-reformatus.com>, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the reality and measurability of space and time) Ed. ________________________________ Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com<mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com> [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com<mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com>] Im Auftrag von Sungchul Ji Gesendet: Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29 An: PEIRCE-L Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz Betreff: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Hi, A correction: Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (4) with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA". Thanks. Sung ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>>, Sergey Petoukhov <spetouk...@gmail.com<mailto:spetouk...@gmail.com>>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de<mailto:ed.dell...@t-online.de>>, "Robert E. Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu<mailto:u...@cbl.umces.edu>> (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.) Franklin, Gary R, lists, In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would appreciate hearing from you. There are several points that need explanations: (1) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to facilitate discussions. I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'. (2) I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to biology in 1997 [1-6]. (I feel funny to list so many of my own references here despite Franklin's recent criticism. The only justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants on these lists.) (3) When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the second row, Table 1) in order to account for some of the cellular metabolism and processes. I then decided to export this concept back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction between sentences and linguistic texts including simple syllogisms. This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that 1) words denote (first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs that I listed in my previous post) 2) sentences decide or judge (Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs) 3) texts argue (the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign). __________________________________________________________ Table 1. The common structures of the languages at three levels -- 'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].' __________________________________________________________ 1st articulation 2nd articulation '3rd articulation' __________________________________________________________ 'humanese' words letters sentences | | | V V V sentences words syllogisms/texts ___________________________________________________________ 'cellese' 1-D biopolymers monomers 3-D biopolymers | | | V V V 3-D biopolymers 1-D biopolymers chemical waves [8] ____________________________________________________________ 'cosmese' terms X propositions (or logic ?) | | | V V V propositions terms arguments _____________________________________________________________ (4) You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row. I was led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry consideration with respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am at a loss what this may be. Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce discussed something related to this ? Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups of signs (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, and argument) ? If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to the monomers in biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA, and 20 amino acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in human languages. This may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups and 10 classes, which I referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite signs", respectively, in [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from Franklin in his recent post and Edwina in 2012. (5) If the above considerations are right in principle, we may conclude that language is one of those "simple concepts applicable every subject" that Peirce was talking about. Another simple concept applicable to every subject may be "waves", since humanese is mediated by sound waves, cellese by electromagnetic, mechanical and chemical concentration waves, and cosmese by electromagnetic, gravitational and probability waves. These conclusions are in good agreement with the Petoukhov hypothesis that organisms are akin to musical instruments [9, 10] and Pythagorian and Plato's idea of Musica universalis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Musica_universalis; I want to thank Jerry Chandler for bringing this idea to my attention recently). All the best. Sung References: [1] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: molecular biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. BioSystems 44:17-39. [2] Ji, S. (1997). A cell-linguistic analysis of apoptosis, Comments on Toxicology 5(6):571-85. [3] Ji, S. (1999). The cell as the smallest DNA-based molecular computer. BioSystem 52:123-133. [4] Ji, S. (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar, Phonetics, and Semantics. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 870: 411-417. [5] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics, in Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”, S. Simpkins, J. Deely, (eds.), Legas, Ottawa, pp. 357-374. [6] Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA. Semiotica 138(1/4): 15-42. [7] Ji, S. (2012). The Wave-Particle Complementarity in Physics, B iolgy and Philosophy. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. PDF retrievable from conformon.net<http://conformon.net> under Publications > Book Chapters. See Table 2.13 on pp. 44-45. [8] Ji, S. (2012). The Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: The Cell Language Theory<http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=1098>. ibid. PDF retrievable from conformon.net<http://conformon.net> under Publications > Book Chapters. See Table 6.3 on p.166. [9] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) Music and the Modeling Approach to Genetic Systems of Biological Resonances. Extended Abstract, The 4th ISIS Summit, Vienna, Austria, 2015. http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812 [10] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) The system-resonance approach in modeling genetic structures. BioSystems (in press, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/03032647). On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 3:40 AM, Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com<mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F, GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly defining two kinds of signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B.” Do you not agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject? FR: No, I do agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject. But I also note there is an ambiguity in the way it is stated, that permits the possibility that a term may be such a sign that has a predicate or subject. GF: Peirce then proceeds to define depth and breadth in terms of predicates and subjects: “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the real objects of a sign is called the logical breadth.” Now, when you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be any sign at all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth and breadth (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) and subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign? FR: First of all, I would like to note that because the totality of the predicates of a sign is identified with the totality of characters it signifies, and is its logical depth, and precisely how a term's logical depth is determined is by the totality of characters it signifies, this supports the case I am making. Likewise in the case of the the totality of subjects. I am not sure it is required that every sign have a predicate and a subject. He says IF a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part). This doesn't necessarily mean that every sign must have a predicate. Likewise in the case of the subject. Now, having said that, let's consider the possibility, as you suggest, that there are signs that do not have real objects. This is different from saying that a sign has no subject. A subject is supposed to be a sign (A) that denotes the real objects the other sign (B) denotes. So let us separate those into two different points. I think it may be too much to argue that a sign has no real object, because this implies it has no dynamical object. Are you comfortable with asserting that there are signs with no dynamical object? I would like to hear about that idea, if you have something to say. Going further along the same lines, let us in parallel fashion note that a predicate is a sign (B) that signifies the characters that the other sign (A) signifies. Do you claim that there can be a sign which signifies nothing? In order that a sign be a sign, it must signify something about its object. This signifying is typically characterized by Peirce as, well, characters that the sign attributes to the (dynamical) object. I think that every sign must signify something about some object. Not only must it both signify something and be about an object, it must also have an interpretant. Any interpretant, being determined by the sign to be so determined to the object in the way the original sign is, must denote that very same object, and signify it in some way related to how the original sign signifies. That is, it must have, if not the whole, at least elements of the meaning of the original sign. And yes, this applies to all signs. So far as I can tell, this is simply tautology, given the definition of sign. GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that purpose by being joined to other signs. FR: I don't think I overlooked that statement; in point of fact, that was why I mentioned in bold print in my last post that no term has information outside of the synthetic propositions in which it participates. Also what he says in the Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs involve simpler signs, which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. FR: I'm not sure what the point is of referencing how complex signs involve simpler signs; and if you don't mind, would you please be so kind as to offer a page reference for me that makes the point? In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind.” FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as "a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind." Then in 1909 he writes that: “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being” (CP 6.341, 1909). What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject, that does not make it any less true that a term can have something predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated (and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process by which this happens. I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information, and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this would contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever. -- Franklin --------------------------------------------------- On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Franklin, my responses inserted below. Gary f. From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com<mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>] Sent: 13-Nov-15 15:02 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Gary F, list, Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly defining two kinds of signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B.” Do you not agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject? Peirce then proceeds to define depth and breadth in terms of predicates and subjects: “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the real objects of a sign is called the logical breadth.” Now, when you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be any sign at all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth and breadth (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) and subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign? But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions. In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the proposition as its subject. Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign. GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that purpose by being joined to other signs. Also what he says in the Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs involve simpler signs, which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind.” Then in 1909 he writes that: “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being” (CP 6.341, 1909). What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does. --Franklin ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701<tel:732-445-4701> www.conformon.net<http://www.conformon.net> -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701<tel:732-445-4701> www.conformon.net<http://www.conformon.net> -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701<tel:732-445-4701> www.conformon.net<http://www.conformon.net>
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