John, all, It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and independence from exclusion.
It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by assuming the Cartesian dualism that he rejected. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:23 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Lists, > > At the end of the 19th Century there was a reaction against the idea that > logic was a human creation and depended on the mind. This view is called > psychologism. The founders of modern logic, including in particular Frege and > Peirce, were anti-psychologists who argued that logic is independent of human > psychology. I won’t give the arguments here, since they are readily available > (see, e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/). Whether logic > is independent of thought depends on what you take thought to be. An idealist > like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by Platonists > like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that thoughts > are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires > further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position > is that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world (early > Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his view > that true propositions = facts). > > Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans > requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are > meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with > Jerry, I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just > as can mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both > logical and mathematical. I go a bit further and argue that logic and > mathematics depend on the nature of the world, and that we must discover them > through hypothetical reasoning rather than a priori (for example whether > continuity exists, the infinite exists and similar). This allows a version of > non-psychologistic naturalism that is somewhat similar to what I take to be > Mill’s position, though he is often interpreted as a psychologist. So I don’t > see Jerry’s worry that there is a gap between the formal aspects of, say, > information theory and its manifestation as making sense. It seems to me that > this presupposes that the formal aspects can exist independently, involving > either a rationalism or an idealism or both that I cannot accept, as I find > it ontological otiose. This is my argument against Jerry’s objection. I also > deviate from Peirce here, I think, and certainly from my philosophical hero, > Bertrand Russell. > > However my views may be, there is a clear antipsychologist position on logic > that is associated with the greatest logicians, and I think it very hasty to > adopt Stan’s classification of logic. > > John Collier > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, 18 November 2015 10:34 PM > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > Cc: Ed Dellian; PEIRCE-L; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Auletta > Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz > Subject: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Sung, all -- > Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in > cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture. > {everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}}}}} > > STAN > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Ed, > > Thanks for your response. > You wrote : > > "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product > of the human brain, (111815-1) > and therefore it is not logical." > > I can't quite agree with (111815-1). Instead I would assert that > > "Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is > not surprising (111815-2) > that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in > the Universe." > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > > > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote: > Sung, > > You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. > "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product > of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not > the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the > Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art > of measuring refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has > its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers > to "what could be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not > Algebra", on my website www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). > Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; > geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature > (based on the reality and measurability of space and time) > > Ed. > > Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von > Sungchul Ji > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29 > An: PEIRCE-L > Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; Auletta > Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz > Betreff: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Hi, > > A correction: > > Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (4) with > "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA". > > Thanks. > > Sung > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov > <spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E. > Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu> > > > (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.) > > Franklin, Gary R, lists, > > In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be > published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed in > Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would appreciate > hearing from you. > > There are several points that need explanations: > > (1) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to facilitate > discussions. I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with what we call > logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'. > > (2) I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to > biology in 1997 [1-6]. (I feel funny to list so many of my own references > here despite Franklin's recent criticism. The only justification I have for > doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the statements > that I make on these posts are supported by my published research results, as > is also the case for many of the discussants on these lists.) > > (3) When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology, I > was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the > second row, Table 1) in order to account for some of the cellular metabolism > and processes. I then decided to export this concept back to humanese where > "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction between > sentences and linguistic texts including simple syllogisms. This extension > seems reasonable because we can then say that > > 1) words denote (first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs > that I listed in my previous post) > > 2) sentences decide or judge (Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs) > > 3) texts argue (the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign). > > > > __________________________________________________________ > > Table 1. The common structures of the languages at three levels -- > 'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].' > > __________________________________________________________ > > > 1st articulation 2nd articulation '3rd > articulation' > > __________________________________________________________ > > 'humanese' words letters > sentences > | | > | > V V > V > sentences words > syllogisms/texts > ___________________________________________________________ > > 'cellese' 1-D biopolymers monomers 3-D > biopolymers > | | > | > V V > V > 3-D biopolymers 1-D biopolymers chemical > waves [8] > > ____________________________________________________________ > > 'cosmese' terms X > propositions > (or logic ?) | | > | > V V > V > propositions terms > arguments > _____________________________________________________________ > > > (4) You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row. I was > led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry consideration with > respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am at a loss what this > may be. Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce discussed something > related to this ? Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups of signs (i.e., > qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, and > argument) ? If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to the monomers in > biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA, and 20 amino > acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in human languages. This > may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups and 10 classes, which I > referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite signs", respectively, in > [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from Franklin in his recent > post and Edwina in 2012. > > (5) If the above considerations are right in principle, we may conclude that > language is one of those "simple concepts applicable every subject" that > Peirce was talking about. Another simple concept applicable to every subject > may be "waves", since humanese is mediated by sound waves, cellese by > electromagnetic, mechanical and chemical concentration waves, and cosmese by > electromagnetic, gravitational and probability waves. > These conclusions are in good agreement with the Petoukhov hypothesis that > organisms are akin to musical instruments [9, 10] and Pythagorian and Plato's > idea of Musica universalis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ > Musica_universalis; I want to thank Jerry Chandler for bringing this idea to > my attention recently). > > All the best. > > Sung > > > References: > [1] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: molecular > biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. BioSystems 44:17-39. > [2] Ji, S. (1997). A cell-linguistic analysis of apoptosis, Comments on > Toxicology 5(6):571-85. > [3] Ji, S. (1999). The cell as the smallest DNA-based molecular computer. > BioSystem 52:123-133. > [4] Ji, S. (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar, > Phonetics, and Semantics. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 870: 411-417. > [5] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- > and Macrosemiotics, in Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”, S. Simpkins, J. > Deely, (eds.), Legas, Ottawa, pp. 357-374. > [6] Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA. Semiotica 138(1/4): 15-42. > [7] Ji, S. (2012). The Wave-Particle Complementarity in Physics, B iolgy > and Philosophy. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular > Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. PDF > retrievable from conformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters. See Table > 2.13 on pp. 44-45. > [8] Ji, S. (2012). The Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: The > Cell Language Theory. ibid. PDF retrievable from conformon.net under > Publications > Book Chapters. See Table 6.3 on p.166. > [9] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) Music and the Modeling Approach to Genetic > Systems of Biological Resonances. Extended Abstract, The 4th ISIS Summit, > Vienna, Austria, 2015. http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812 > [10] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015) The system-resonance approach in modeling > genetic structures. BioSystems (in press, > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/03032647). > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 3:40 AM, Franklin Ransom > <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary F, > > GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly defining two kinds of signs > as parts of other signs: “If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are > elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to > be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real > objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, > B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B.” Do you not > agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject? > > FR: No, I do agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject. But I > also note there is an ambiguity in the way it is stated, that permits the > possibility that a term may be such a sign that has a predicate or subject. > > GF: Peirce then proceeds to define depth and breadth in terms of predicates > and subjects: > “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. … > The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the > real objects of a sign is called the logical breadth.” Now, when you say that > “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions”, > are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s > definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has predicates and > signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in order to have > breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all signs have those? > If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term “a sign” in those > definitions can be any sign at all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign > that has depth and breadth (and thus can convey information) must have > predicate(s) and subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign? > > FR: First of all, I would like to note that because the totality of the > predicates of a sign is identified with the totality of characters it > signifies, and is its logical depth, and precisely how a term's logical depth > is determined is by the totality of characters it signifies, this supports > the case I am making. Likewise in the case of the the totality of subjects. > > I am not sure it is required that every sign have a predicate and a subject. > He says IF a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements of the > meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential > part). This doesn't necessarily mean that every sign must have a predicate. > Likewise in the case of the subject. > > Now, having said that, let's consider the possibility, as you suggest, that > there are signs that do not have real objects. This is different from saying > that a sign has no subject. A subject is supposed to be a sign (A) that > denotes the real objects the other sign (B) denotes. So let us separate those > into two different points. I think it may be too much to argue that a sign > has no real object, because this implies it has no dynamical object. Are you > comfortable with asserting that there are signs with no dynamical object? I > would like to hear about that idea, if you have something to say. > > Going further along the same lines, let us in parallel fashion note that a > predicate is a sign (B) that signifies the characters that the other sign (A) > signifies. Do you claim that there can be a sign which signifies nothing? In > order that a sign be a sign, it must signify something about its object. This > signifying is typically characterized by Peirce as, well, characters that the > sign attributes to the (dynamical) object. > > I think that every sign must signify something about some object. Not only > must it both signify something and be about an object, it must also have an > interpretant. Any interpretant, being determined by the sign to be so > determined to the object in the way the original sign is, must denote that > very same object, and signify it in some way related to how the original sign > signifies. That is, it must have, if not the whole, at least elements of the > meaning of the original sign. And yes, this applies to all signs. So far as I > can tell, this is simply tautology, given the definition of sign. > > GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that > purpose by being joined to other signs. > > FR: I don't think I overlooked that statement; in point of fact, that was why > I mentioned in bold print in my last post that no term has information > outside of the synthetic propositions in which it participates. > > Also what he says in the Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs > involve simpler signs, which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how > all signs play their parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. > > FR: I'm not sure what the point is of referencing how complex signs involve > simpler signs; and if you don't mind, would you please be so kind as to offer > a page reference for me that makes the point? > > In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce > defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a > cognition of a mind.” > > FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as "a > representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind." > > Then in 1909 he writes that: > “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the > nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of > the knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being” > (CP 6.341, 1909). > What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say > that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? > > FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly > the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign that > is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed to > that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage that > we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a > proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject, > that does not make it any less true that a term can have something predicated > of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated (and thus have > subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process by which this > happens. > > I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are > the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to > statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information, > and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes sense. > I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say about signs > and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously that by signs > he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to believe it did not > refer to propositions at all, because this would contradict what he said in > 1893, and I found that statement highly suggestive. At the same time, after > putting a lot of thought into this reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a > proposition must denote and signify, and consequently must have predicate and > subject in the sense in which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it > is hard to see how any sign could have no object or signify nothing about the > object, in virtue of being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the > conclusion that yes, Peirce meant to apply the statements to every sign, > whatsoever. > > -- Franklin > > --------------------------------------------------- > > On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Franklin, my responses inserted below. > > Gary f. > > From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > Sent: 13-Nov-15 15:02 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Gary F, list, > > Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on > Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of > the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. > > I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" > instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce > was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. > GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly defining two kinds of signs > as parts of other signs: “If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are > elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to > be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real > objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, > B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B.” Do you not > agree that these are definitions of predicate and subject? > > Peirce then proceeds to define depth and breadth in terms of predicates and > subjects: > “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. … > The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the > real objects of a sign is called the logical breadth.” Now, when you say that > “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions”, > are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? According to Peirce’s > definition here, a sign can have depth only if it has predicates and > signifies characters. Do all signs do that? Likewise, in order to have > breadth, a sign must have subjects and real objects. Do all signs have those? > If not, how can you claim that the referent of the term “a sign” in those > definitions can be any sign at all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign > that has depth and breadth (and thus can convey information) must have > predicate(s) and subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign? > > But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the > way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat > unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce > remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and > alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. > Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may > be regarded as propositions. > > In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign > cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to > form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). > > In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that > terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have > informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true > that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning > by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information > of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which > the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and > breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with > respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as > predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it > increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, > the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when the > term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the proposition as its > subject. > > Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to > supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given > as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are > such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that > are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very > practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies > what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with > respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. > > That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded > as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the > claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce > does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the > scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before > the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas > and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes to focus > on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I have > suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded as > propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the idea of > proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our > understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although > "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, > but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it is also true > that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined > to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an > interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as > such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is > focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has consequences for how we > should understand what all signs are up to, what the purpose of every > interpretant is, regardless of whether it is the interpretant of a > proposition or of another type of sign. > GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that > purpose by being joined to other signs. Also what he says in the Syllabus and > elsewhere about how complex signs involve simpler signs, which offers a much > less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their parts in approaching > the ideal of the Absolute Truth. > > In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce > defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a > cognition of a mind.” Then in 1909 he writes that: > “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the > nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of > the knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being” > (CP 6.341, 1909). > What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say > that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? > > Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we > find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as > they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the > determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged > proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a > certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be regarded > as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see in this > respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment is a > determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judgment > has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol to > determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same way" > (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in communicating > the interpretant of the judged proposition to the interpreter, though the > man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a term; but despite normally > being considered a term, in this case it expresses a fact, which is properly > what a proposition does. > > --Franklin > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net >
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